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ABSTRACT 
 
Nuremberg became famous for the 13 Nuremberg Trials against the leading 
German officials after World War II. Following the first trial against the remaining Nazi 
leaders before the Allied International Military Tribunal in 1945-1946, the United States 
initiated 12 subsequent proceedings against leading members of all areas of Germany‟s 
society. The Justice Trial against 16 representatives of Nazi Germany‟s judicial system was 
the third of these trials and held before US Military Tribunal III in 1947. 
Organised and held under the aegis of the United States as one of the war‟s victors, 
the trials were seen by many as simple acts of vengeance, hidden behind a smokescreen of 
legality. Therefore, especially in post-war Germany, the trials were often described as 
victor‟s justice. Yet, besides investigations relating to specific aspects of this allegation, a 
profound analysis of this issue has not been done for the Justice Trial. 
This study aims to help in closing this gap. Focussing on the issue of victor‟s 
justice, the work analyses and evaluates all stages of the Justice Trial, from its legal basis, 
to the planning and preparation, to the proceedings and judgments, to the enforcement of 
the sentences after the trial. In the end, it is concluded that only two aspects, the violation of 
the principle of separation of powers and the restriction to initiate trials only against 
German nationals, can be seen as examples of victor‟s justice. 
All other aspects cannot be proved as examples of victor‟s justice; whether 
Germany‟s state sovereignty was violated, whether the judges were impartial, whether the 
ex post facto principle was violated, whether the defendants could be held individually 
responsible, whether the defendants received a fair trial, whether the trial was justified from 
a moral point of view, whether the defendants were selected for appropriate reasons, 
whether the Tribunal analysed and evaluated the Nazi legal system and the defendant‟s role 
therein reasonably, whether the US judges and prosecutors were qualified enough, and 
whether the early release of the convicted defendants in the 1950s was arbitrary. 
The Justice Trial and all other Nuremberg Trials, in many ways, set unique 
precedents for international criminal law. The legacy, therefore, is primarily a positive one. 
Thus, overall, it is concluded that the limited examples of victor‟s justice within the Justice 
Trial do not ultimately undermine these achievements. 
 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, bibliography and 
appendices) comprises approximately 49,608 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
 
The name Nuremberg became well known for the trial against the 
German major war criminals after World War II. On 1 October 1946, the 
International Military Tribunal sentenced prominent Nazis like Hermann 
Goering, Rudolf Hess and Albert Speer, among others, to death or long time 
imprisonment.
1
 The judgment itself was a document of historic significance, 
which for the first time brought to light the enormous number of violent 
crimes committed by Nazi Germany. Furthermore, this trial was one of the 
first and most important steps on the way to an accepted international 
criminal law, which did not really exist prior the event. 
Reporters, politicians, writers and the world public stood still when it 
came to the reading of the judgment by the Tribunal; afterwards, people 
attempted to get back to a normal life, especially in Europe where the war 
had left millions without a home and with terrible trauma. However, the 
four major allied winners of the war, the United States of America, Great 
Britain, the Soviet Union and France, had decided that there needed to be 
more trials to investigate the atrocities carried out by Nazi Germany before 
and during World War II.
2
 
Originally, it was planned that the International Military Tribunal 
would continue its work and proceed with a series of trials following the 
trial of the major war criminals but, for different political and strategic 
reasons relating to the upcoming Cold War, it remained the only trial held 
by the International Military Tribunal.
3
 Though, by Allied Control Council 
Law No. 10, enacted on 20 December 1945, each of the four Allies received 
                                                          
1
 The United States of America, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics v Hermann Wilhelm 
Goering and others (International Military Tribunal) (1945-1946) I Trial of the Major War 
Criminals before the International Military Tribunal 365-367. 
2
 Jonathan Friedman “Law and Politics in the Subsequent Nuremberg Trials, 1946-1949” in 
Patricia Heberer and Juergen Matthaeus (eds) Atrocities on Trial: Historical Perspectives 
on the Politics of Prosecuting War Crimes (University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 2008) 
75-77. 
3
 Ibid, 76-77. 
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the power to establish their own courts for trying Nazi criminals within their 
occupation zone.
4
 The city of Nuremberg, as the location where the major 
trial was held, was part of the American zone of occupation; therefore, the 
United States Military Government for Germany was in charge for the so 
called subsequent Nuremberg proceedings.
5
 
Since the International Military Tribunal had already established the 
criminality of war crimes, aggressive war and crimes against humanity, 
these trials were for the purpose of determining the guilt of second-tier 
Nazis accused of those crimes.
6
 As many as 185 defendants, representing 
different sectors of German society, were indicted before American military 
tribunals in a series of 12 trials.
7
 The defendants were grouped according to 
their main area of activity, namely medical, legal, ethnological, economic 
and political.
8
 
From 17 February 1947 until 18 October 1947, the third of these 
subsequent trials was held under US Military Tribunal III, charging the 
representatives of the legal group with several crimes.
9
 It was the case of 
The United States of America v Josef Altstoetter and others, generally 
known as the Justice or Judges’ Trial. 
In his opening statement for the prosecution, Chief Prosecutor 
Brigadier General Telford Taylor stated:
10
 
This case is unusual in that the defendants are charged with crimes 
committed in the name of the law. These men, together with their 
deceased or fugitive colleagues, were the embodiment of what passed for 
justice in the Third Reich. Most of the defendants have served, at various 
times, as judges, as state prosecutors, and as officials of the Reich 
Ministry of Justice. All but one are professional jurists; they are well 
                                                          
4
 M Cherif Bassiouni Crimes against Humanity in International Criminal Law (2 ed, 
Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1999) 531-532. 
5
 Ibid, 533. 
6
 “Subsequent Nuremberg Proceedings” www.ushmm.org (last accessed 16 March 2010). 
7
 Friedman, above n 2, 75. 
8
 “Nurnberg Military Tribunals: Indictments” www.loc.gov/rr/frd (last accessed 16 March 
2010). 
9
 The United States of America v Josef Altstoetter and others (Justice Case) (1947) III 
Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council 
Law No. 10 (Case No 3) 3-6. 
10
 Ibid, 31. 
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accustomed to courts and courtrooms, though their present role may be 
new to them. 
The Justice Trial was a difficult one for the American occupants as 
well as for the German public. Most of the accused men were not obviously 
evil like some of the defendants in the major trial before. During the Nazi 
reign, all 16 defendants were officials in the Reich Ministry of Justice or 
members of the People‟s Court and Special Courts in Germany.11 They had 
served for the German Government following and applying the given 
legislation in Nazi Germany. Therefore, this trial, like all other Nuremberg 
Trials, was often under fire for being victor’s justice. 
The German jurisprudence could not accept that the Nazi crimes had 
been punished on the basis of international law; especially the violation of 
the rules of the ex post facto principle was criticised.
12
 Hence, generations 
of German post-war jurists were taught that Nuremberg was victor‟s justice 
and, even today, some jurists treat the Nuremberg Trials as questionable.
13
 
Accordingly, my thesis will analyse the question to what extent victor‟s 
justice was really committed within the Justice Trial. 
Among the winners of World War II, the United States made clear 
from the beginning that there had to be some punishment of the Nazi 
officials.
14
 Yet, instead of using martial law and just shoot or imprison the 
responsible Germans, the US Government favoured regular court trials.
15
 
However, many people were and are still convinced that these trials were 
purely a creation of the victors to exercise vengeance on the Germans. 
The term victor’s justice is strongly connected with the concept of 
vengeance. It was especially popular in post-war Germany and “implies the 
imposition of an alien, largely inappropriate, and unfair legal procedure 
                                                          
11
 Ibid, 3. 
12
 Klaus Baestlein “Der Nuernberger Juristenprozess und seine Rezeption in Deutschland” 
in Lore Maria Peschel-Gutzeit (ed) Das Nuernberger Juristen-Urteil von 1947 (Nomos 
Verlag, Baden-Baden, 1996) 9. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Robert K Woetzel The Nuremberg Trials in International Law with a Postlude on the 
Eichmann Case (rev ed, Stevens, London, 1962) 3-5. 
15
 Telford Taylor “The Nuremberg Trials” (1955) 55 Colum L Rev 488, 499. 
 16 
against the vanquished.”16 Regarding this issue, a lot of literature is 
available relating to the trial of the major war criminals, but not much work 
has been done for the subsequent trials and, among these, particularly not 
for the Justice Trial. Thus, this thesis will investigate different aspects of 
what could be seen as victor‟s justice within the Justice Trial and will 
evaluate them. The paper is structured chronologically, based on the 
historical facts. Within each chapter, the facts of the trial will be detailed 
and questioned using different aspects of victor‟s justice. 
The question of victor‟s justice is broad and vague. Therefore, it is 
necessary to divide it into several sub-questions, which will be asked and 
answered in their respective chapters. The outcome will be an overall 
conclusion that argues either to what extent the Justice Trial was only the 
framework for exercising vengeance on the defeated Germans or that 
victor‟s justice was not committed in this trial. 
Chapter II analyses the legal background of the trial by examining 
the following issues: 
Who had the legal and political power in Germany at the time of the 
trial? Were the Allies entitled to legislate for the German territory? 
Was the trial legitimated by existing international law? 
Why did a German court not deal with this case? 
Why did the Tribunal consist only of judges from the United States? 
Was there a moral necessity for such a trial? 
In chapter III, the involved parties of the trial will be introduced and 
the issues of victor‟s justice will be analysed by discussing the following 
questions: 
                                                          
16
 Patricia Heberer and Juergen Matthaeus “Introduction: War Crimes Trials and the 
Historian” in Patricia Heberer and Juergen Matthaeus (eds) Atrocities on Trial: Historical 
Perspectives on the Politics of Prosecuting War Crimes (University of Nebraska Press, 
Lincoln, 2008) xv. 
 17 
Were the US judges sufficiently qualified to judge over jurists from 
another legal system? 
Were the deciding judges of the Tribunal independent from US post-
war politics? 
Was the prosecution counsel sufficiently qualified to accuse jurists 
from another legal system? 
What were the criteria for selecting the defendants? 
Chapter IV looks at the trial proceedings and focuses on the 
following questions: 
Were the charges, especially the count of crimes against humanity, 
compatible with existing rules of criminal law? What about the ex 
post facto principle? Could the defendants be held individually 
responsible? 
Was the tu qouque argument a valid argument used by the defence? 
Did the defendants receive a fair hearing? 
Chapter V analyses the judgment of US Military Tribunal III and 
discusses the following questions: 
Did the Tribunal analyse and evaluate the German legal system 
under the Nazis appropriately? 
Did the Tribunal evaluate the role of the defendants in Nazi 
Germany appropriately? 
Why were the individual verdicts relatively mild compared to 
sentences given in other trials at Nuremberg? 
Finally, in chapter VI, the legacy of the Justice Trial and of the 
Nuremberg Trials in general will be discussed by examining the following 
questions: 
 18 
Why did the US Military Government initiate only this one trial 
against members of the Nazi judiciary and many other German 
jurists were not tried at all? 
Why were all convicted defendants released long before the end of 
their prison terms? 
A conclusion will be drawn in chapter VII stating that before, during 
and after the trial there were certain issues that have to be seen as victor‟s 
justice. However, by looking at the whole situation after World War II, it is 
exceptional how the Allies, and in particular the United States, dealt with 
the defeated Germans. The atrocities committed by Nazi Germany, not only 
in conquered territories during the war but also within Germany itself, were 
unique in world history and needed a significant response. The Nuremberg 
Trials gave such a response and were, in respect to the given circumstances, 
an exceptional and admirable way to deal with those responsible for it. 
Nuremberg set a precedent for international law, and the Justice Trial 
clarified once and for all that no jurist should ever again just apply the given 
law of one‟s country without paying respect to the most basic moral 
principles of humankind. The few aspects within the Justice Trial that have 
to be evaluated as examples of victor‟s justice do not ultimately undermine 
these achievements. Therefore, although it was the victorious Allies who 
presided over the vanquished Germans, the Nuremberg Trials in my opinion 
cannot be seen as vengeance of the victors. 
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II LEGAL BASIS OF THE TRIAL 
 
This chapter analyses the question whether victor‟s justice can be 
seen in the establishment of US Military Tribunal III, and will conclude that 
this is not the case as the Allies legally exercised governmental power in 
Germany after World War II. 
After the war, the victorious Allies divided the German territory in 
four occupation zones. The Military Government of each Allied Power 
became authorised to rule and legislate for their part of the German territory. 
It will be shown that the enacting of new laws by the Allied authorities to 
create a legal basis for the trials of Nazi war criminals did not violate 
international law, although the reasons differ among experts. 
Furthermore, this chapter will deal with the question of whether the 
Justice Trial was necessary in a moral way, an argument those responsible 
in the US administration always stressed as a major reason for the 
Nuremberg Trials. It will be concluded that there truly was a moral 
necessity for the conduct of the trial. After the outrageous atrocities 
committed by the Nazis within their own country, hidden behind a 
smokescreen of alleged legality, there was no better way to deal with it. 
 
A The Allies as the Controllers of the Legislative Power in Germany 
after World War II 
 
1 The legitimisation of the trial by Allied documents 
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(a) Declaration on German Atrocities (Moscow Declaration 1943) 
 
The Moscow Declaration from 30 October 1943 is the real starting 
point of the legitimisation process for the International Military Tribunal 
and also for the subsequent US military tribunals. 
Previously, several official actions were taken by statesmen and 
governments: President Roosevelt of the United States and Prime Minister 
Churchill from Great Britain simultaneously warned the Axis Powers, 
namely Germany, Italy and Japan, on 25 October 1941 that retribution 
would follow in the wake of their crimes.
17
 On 21 August 1942, President 
Roosevelt warned again and issued a statement “that the time will come 
when they shall have to stand in courts of law in the very countries which 
they are now oppressing and to answer for their acts.”18 
Prime Minister Churchill declared on 8 September 1942 “that those 
guilty of war crimes will „have to stand up before tribunals in every land 
where the atrocities have been committed.‟”19 The Governments in exile of 
nine German-occupied countries issued the St. James Declaration on 13 
January 1942 in London, wherein they explicitly rejected punishment by 
acts of vengeance and promulgated “that the signatory powers „place among 
their principal war aims the punishment, through the channel of organized 
justice, of those guilty of or responsible for these crimes‟”20. Furthermore, 
on 7 October 1942, the decision of seventeen nations to form the United 
Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes was announced in 
Washington and London.
21
 
                                                          
17
 Woetzel, above n 14, 3. 
18
 Whitney R Harris Tyranny on Trial: The Evidence at Nuremberg (Southern Methodist 
University Press, Dallas, 1954) 4. 
19
 Woetzel, above n 14, 4. 
20
 Yves Beigbeder Judging War Criminals: The Politics of International Justice (St. 
Martin‟s Press, New York, 1999) 32. 
21
 Woetzel, above n 14, 4. The Commission was finally established in October 1943, but it 
was not more than a weak evidence-collecting body that left investigations to its member 
states. By the time Nuremberg was in the works, it was unceremoniously dismantled. Gary 
 21 
However, until the Moscow Conference there was no joint 
declaration of the major Allied Powers, who at the time were the United 
States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union only. At the conference, the 
representatives of these countries, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister 
Churchill and Soviet-leader Stalin, debated for the first time together about 
what should happen to the German officials after the war. In the end, they 
declared the following:
22
 
The United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union have 
received from many quarters evidence of atrocities, massacres and cold-
blooded mass executions which are being perpetrated by the Hitlerite 
forces in the many countries they have overrun and from which they are 
now being steadily expelled. The brutalities of Hitlerite domination are no 
new thing and all the peoples or territories in their grip have suffered from 
the worst form of government by terror. ... 
At the time of the granting of any armistice to any government which may 
be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of 
the Nazi party who have been responsible for, or have taken a consenting 
part in the above atrocities, massacres, and executions, will be sent back 
to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that 
they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated 
countries and of the free governments which will be created therein. ... 
The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of the major 
criminals, whose offences have no particular geographical localisation 
and who will be punished by the joint decision of the Government of the 
Allies. 
Although the outcome of this statement finally resulted in the 
Nuremberg Trials, to the three Allies it was not at all obvious at the time 
that trials were the best way to deal with the defeated Germans.
23
 When 
Churchill and Roosevelt met in Quebec in September 1944, they principally 
adopted the Morgenthau Plan, under which approach, as part of the 
denazification process of Germany, the major Nazi war criminals were to be 
shot on sight and lesser Nazis were sent to repair Allied lands damaged by 
                                                                                                                                                   
J Bass Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton 
University Press, Prinveton, 2002) 149. 
22
 Moscow Declaration on German Atrocities (released 1 November 1943). 
23
 Bass, above n 21, 147. 
 22 
the war.
24
 Henry Morgenthau Jr. was America‟s Secretary of the Treasury 
and said what the British and American public would have preferred to hear 
at the time.
25
 
However, in the end, legalism triumphed because President 
Roosevelt became convinced by the plan of his Secretary of War, Henry L 
Stimson, that war criminals had to be put on trial for the reason of 
America‟s own domestic respect of due process, and Roosevelt was able to 
convince Churchill, who had called for the execution of the top Axis leaders 
without trial, of this idea.
26
 
Stalin, on the other side, was in favour of summary executions at any 
time. At the Tehran Conference, which was held in 1943 but after the 
Moscow Conference, he proposed the shooting of 50,000 to 100,000 
Germans.
27
 When he had to realise that this was unlikely, he tried to arrange 
show trials, which would have not been too different from those established 
in Stalin‟s purges.28 In the end, fortunately, he did not succeed with this idea 
 
(b) London Agreement of 8 August 1945 
 
At the conference in Yalta, the three Allies declared on 11 February 
1945 that they would accept the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers 
only.
29
 Furthermore, they agreed that the Allied Powers will each occupy a 
separate zone of Germany with coordinated administration and control 
through a Central Control Council composed of the supreme commanders of 
the Allied armed forces at Berlin.
30
 France was to be invited to take over a 
zone of occupation and to participate as a fourth member of the Control 
                                                          
24
 Beigbeder, above n 20, 31. The author refers to the Quebec Conference held in 
September 1942, but this is obviously a typo as no conference was held in Quebec at the 
time. 
25
 Bass, above n 21, 147. 
26
 Ibid, 147-148. 
27
 Ibid, 147. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Justice Case, above n 9, 1187. 
30
 Ibid. 
 23 
Council for Germany.
31
 Also, it was announced the “inflexible purpose to ... 
bring all war criminals to just and swift punishment”32. 
On 8 May 1945, the German armed forces surrendered 
unconditionally, and on 5 June 1945, by the Berlin Declaration, the Allied 
Powers, including France, which had accepted the invitation from Yalta, 
took over the state authority in Germany.
33
 Additionally, the Allies declared 
that the punishment of European Axis war criminals “was made a primary 
task of the military occupation of Germany.”34 However, the question about 
the exact procedure for dealing with the war criminals remained open. 
Consequently, on 26 June 1945, representatives of the four major 
Allied Powers met in London and opened formal discussions toward a 
quadripartite agreement for an international trial. They lasted for six weeks 
paying tribute to very different ideas among the delegates.
35
 The participants 
from the Soviet Union, for example, were convinced that the Nazi leaders 
were already guilty. General Nikitchenko, who later became one of the 
judges of the International Military Tribunal in the trial against the major 
war criminals, stated:
36
 
The fact that the Nazi leaders are criminals has already been established. 
The task of the Tribunal is only to determine the measure of guilt of each 
particular person and mete out the necessary punishment – the sentences. 
This was absolutely contrary to the ideas of the US delegation. US 
Supreme Court Justice Robert H Jackson, who later became the Chief 
Prosecutor for the United States before the International Military Tribunal, 
made clear that “the Moscow and Yalta declarations „are an accusation and 
not a conviction.‟ … The United States had decided against „political 
                                                          
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Woetzel, above n 14, 5. 
33
 Berlin Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme 
Authority by Allied Powers (5 June 1945), preamble. 
34
 Justice Case, above n 9, 1187. 
35
 Taylor “The Nuremberg Trials“, above n 15, 498. 
36
 Ibid, 499. 
 24 
executions,‟ and „if we are going to have a trial, then it must be an actual 
trial.‟”37 
However, after long discussions the representatives of the four 
Allied Powers resolved their remaining differences and, on 8 August 1945, 
promulgated the London Agreement “for the Prosecution and Punishment of 
the Major War Criminals of the European Axis”38, embodying Jackson‟s 
conception rather than Nikitchenko‟s.39 Later on, 19 other countries adhered 
to the Agreement, reinforcing its international credentials.
40
 
With the London Agreement, the four Allies took over the 
responsibility to prosecute and punish the major war criminals and set the 
stage not only for the trial before the Nuremberg International Military 
Tribunal but also for the subsequent Nuremberg Trials. With respect to the 
Justice Trial, the relevant parts of the Agreement read as follows:
41
 
Now therefore the Government of the United States of America, the 
Provisional Government of the French Republic, the Government of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ... acting in the 
interests of all the United Nations and by their representatives duly 
authorized thereto have concluded this Agreement. 
Article 1. There shall be established after consultation with the Control 
Council for Germany an International Military Tribunal for the trial of 
war criminals whose offenses have no particular geographical location 
whether they be accused individually or in their capacity as members of 
organizations or groups or in both capacities. 
Article 2. The constitution, jurisdiction and functions of the International 
Military Tribunal shall be those set out in the Charter annexed to this 
Agreement, which Charter shall form an integral part of this Agreement. 
... 
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Article 4. Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the provisions 
established by the Moscow Declaration concerning the return of war 
criminals to the countries where they committed their crimes. ... 
Article 6. Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the jurisdiction or the 
powers of any national or occupation court established or to be 
established in any allied territory or in Germany for the trial of war 
criminals. ... 
 
(c) Charter of the International Military Tribunal 
 
According to Article 2 of the London Agreement, the conference 
participants issued a charter for an International Military Tribunal, which 
they attached to and made an integral part of the Agreement. Article 1 of 
this Charter reads as follows:
42
 
In pursuance of the Agreement signed on the 8
th
 day of August 1945 by 
the Government of the French Republic, the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, there shall be established an 
International Military Tribunal ... for the just and prompt trial and 
punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis. ... 
Hereinafter, the Charter described the power and jurisdiction of the 
then established International Military Tribunal and defined or recognized 
the crimes for which the European Axis war criminals were to be tried.
43
 In 
Article 6, the crimes which were punishable were listed and defined:
44
 
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual 
responsibility: 
(a) Crimes against peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or 
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international 
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treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or 
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing; 
(b) War crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such 
violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or 
deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population 
of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or 
persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private 
property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation 
not justified by military necessity; 
(c) Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation, and other inhuman acts committed against any 
civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, 
racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation 
of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. 
Furthermore, the Charter explained the responsibility of individuals 
in relation to these crimes:
45
 
Article 6. ... Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating 
in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to 
commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed 
by any persons in execution of such plan. 
Article 7. The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State 
or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be 
considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment. 
Article 8. The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his 
Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but 
may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines 
that justice so requires. 
Also, the Charter granted a special jurisdiction to declare Nazi 
groups or organisations as a whole criminal. In the Charter this is stated as 
follows:
46
 
Article 9. At the trial of any individual member of any group or 
organization the Tribunal may declare (in connection with any act of 
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which the individual may be convicted) that the group or organization of 
which the individual was a member was a criminal organization. ... 
Article 10. In cases where a group or organization is declared criminal by 
the Tribunal, the competent national authority of any Signatory shall have 
the right to bring individuals to trial for membership therein before 
national, military or occupation courts. In any such case the criminal 
nature of the group or organization is considered proved and shall not be 
questioned. 
Article 11. Any person convicted by the Tribunal may be charged before 
a national, military or occupation court, referred to in Article 10 of this 
Charter, with a crime other than of membership in a criminal group or 
organization and such court may, after convicting him, impose upon him 
punishment independent of and additional to the punishment imposed by 
the Tribunal for participation in the criminal activities of such group or 
organization. 
In its judgment from 1946, the International Military Tribunal 
declared that in its opinion the Charter was the expression of international 
law which existed already at the time of the Charter‟s creation, and the 
Charter itself was a contribution to international law.
47
 Consequently, the 
International Tribunal concluded that the law of the Charter was decisive 
and binding upon them.
48
 
Former Lord Chancellor of Great Britain, Viscount Maugham, 
criticised this view of the International Military Tribunal. He mentioned that 
the Charter as drawn did not found its provisions on the rules of 
international law, and the Allies formulated the Charter on their own 
authority and created provisions which they thought would be just and 
proper in the trial of the major war criminals rather than exercising existing 
international law.
49
 For example, he stated that since the law of nations 
came into existence there had never been a case
50
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where any individual has been tried for the alleged crime of participating 
in the waging of an aggressive war or a war in violation of an 
international treaty, and that no Nation had ever before asserted that such 
an act was a crime under international law. 
Hence, for him, the London Agreement and its annexed Charter as 
well as the jurisdiction of the International Military Tribunal depended only 
“on the fact of the unconditional surrender by the German armies and the 
occupation thereafter of the whole of Germany by the four Powers who 
signed the document.”51 
Maugham‟s view was that the International Military Tribunal was 
without doubt an ad hoc tribunal with a limited jurisdiction, and the London 
Agreement with the annexed Charter was rather a document of victor‟s 
justice to set out rules for the punishment of the defeated Germans than the 
expression of existing international law.
52
 However, he agreed that the 
International Military Tribunal, as being the creation of the Charter, was 
necessarily bound by its terms and the Charter, therefore, was the legal basis 
of the International Military Tribunal.
53
 
Regarding the Justice Trial, the London Agreement together with the 
annexed Charter established not only the legal basis for the International 
Military Tribunal but also for the subsequent Nuremberg Trials. When 
looking at the judgment in the Justice Trial, it becomes clear that the rules 
and principles set out in the Charter formed the background for the 
decisions of US Military Tribunal III. Therefore, the Charter was also part 
of the legitimisation process for Tribunal III. 
However, according to Maugham, the code necessarily was derived 
from the four different systems of Allied national law and, therefore, applied 
only in the major trial.
54
 Hence, the problem remained that the Charter was 
created for the joint court of the Allies only and, originally, was not made 
for the separate courts of each Allied Power within their jurisdictional 
territories. 
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(d) Allied Control Council Law No. 10 
 
On 20 December 1945, the four Allied Powers resolved this issue by 
enacting Control Council Law No. 10, which became the most important 
part in the creation of the US Military Tribunals at Nuremberg. In its 
preamble, Control Council Law No. 10 stated that this act was established
55
 
in order to give effect to the terms of the Moscow Declaration of 30 
October 1943 and the London Agreement of 8 August 1945, and the 
Charter issued pursuant thereto and in order to establish a uniform legal 
basis in Germany for the prosecution of war criminals and other similar 
offenders, other than those dealt with by the International Military 
Tribunal ... 
Control Council Law No. 10 defined the jurisdiction of US Military 
Tribunal III and of similar military tribunals in Germany.
56
 Article III 
granted the authorisation of arresting, charging and trying war criminals to 
the Military Governments of each Allied Power within their zone of 
occupation. Article III sections (1) and (2) read as follows:
57
 
1. Each occupying authority, within its Zone of occupation, 
(a) shall have the right to cause persons within such Zone suspected of 
having committed a crime, including those charged with crime by one of 
the United Nations, to be arrested ... 
(d) shall have the right to cause all persons so arrested and charged, and 
not delivered to another authority as herein provided, or released, to be 
brought to trial before an appropriate tribunal. ... 
2. The Tribunal by which persons charged with offenses hereunder shall 
be tried and the rules and procedure thereof shall be determined or 
designated by each Zone Commander for his respective Zone. Nothing 
herein is intended to, or shall impair or limit the jurisdiction or power of 
any court or tribunal now or hereafter established in any Zone by the 
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Commander thereof, or of the International Military Tribunal established 
by the London Agreement of 8 August 1945. ... 
Also, the provisions of the London Agreement, of its annexed 
Charter and of the Moscow Declaration were made an integral part of 
Control Council Law No. 10. This was announced in Article I:
58
 
The Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943 „Concerning Responsibility 
of Hitlerites for Committed Atrocities‟ and the London Agreement of 8 
August 1945 „Concerning Prosecution and Punishment of Major War 
Criminals of the European Axis‟ are made integral parts of this Law. ... 
Consequently, in its judgment, US Military Tribunal III made clear 
that its creation and legal jurisdiction was based upon and limited by these 
statutes. In the Tribunal‟s opinion, the defendants were rightly accused with 
crimes as defined in Control Council Law No. 10 only, and it stated that this 
law was legally enacted by the Allied Control Council for Germany.
59
 In 
due consideration of Article 2 of the London Agreement, which provided 
that the Charter of the International Military Tribunal shall form an integral 
part of the Agreement, the judgment stated:
60
 
Thus, it appears that the indictment is drawn under and pursuant to the 
provisions of Control Council Law No. 10 ... that ... expressly 
incorporates the London Agreement as a part thereof, and that the IMT 
Charter is a part of the London Agreement. 
Furthermore, Control Council Law No. 10 specified four wide 
ranging statutory offences, namely (a) crimes against peace; (b) war crimes; 
(c) crimes against humanity; and (d) membership in criminal 
organisations.
61
 The Tribunal in the Justice Case had to deal with crimes of 
the categories (b), (c) and (d) only.
62
 Article II section (1) of Control 
Council Law No. 10 defined these crimes as follows:
63
 
(b) War Crimes. Atrocities or offences against persons or property 
constituting violations of the laws or customs of war, including but not 
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limited to, murder, ill treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any 
other purpose, of civilian population from occupied territory, murder or ill 
treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, 
plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns 
or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity. 
(c) Crimes against Humanity. Atrocities and offences, including but not 
limited to murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, 
imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed against 
any civilian population , or persecutions on political, racial or religious 
grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the country 
where perpetrated. 
(d) Membership in categories of a criminal group or organization declared 
criminal by the International Military Tribunal. 
Hence, Control Council Law No. 10 stipulated not only the formal 
jurisdiction of US Military Tribunal III but also the substantive criminal law 
itself, which had to be applied in the Justice Trial. For this reason, Control 
Council Law No. 10 was the legal basis not only for the creation, but also 
for the decisions, of US Military Tribunal III. 
 
(e) Ordinance No. 7 of the US Military Government for Germany 
 
With the establishment of Control Council Law No. 10, the zone 
commanders of each Allied Power were authorised to designate tribunals for 
the trial of offences hereunder and to determine the rules and procedure of 
these bodies.
64
 
Interestingly enough, each of the four authorities over the separate 
zones adopted their own method of ascertaining, bringing to trial and trying 
the persons in their zone believed to be guilty of war crimes.
65
 Furthermore, 
the definitions of crime in the four zones were widely different. For 
example, Control Council Law No. 10 was made applicable in the American 
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but not in the British zone of occupation.
66
 The British Military Government 
did not operate under the rules of Control Council Law No. 10 but under a 
Royal Warrant from 14 June 1945, which limited the crimes for which 
persons in the British zone could be tried to violations of the laws and 
usages of war, excluding crimes against peace and crimes against 
humanity.
67
 
However, on 18 October 1946, the US Military Government enacted 
Ordinance No. 7 “for the organization and powers of certain military 
tribunals”68, and to implement the rules of Control Council Law No. 10 
within the American zone of occupation. Article II section (a) of the 
Ordinance said:
69
 
Pursuant to the powers of the Military Governor for the United States 
Zone of Occupation within Germany and further pursuant to the powers 
conferred upon the Zone Commander by Control Council Law No. 10 and 
Article 10 and 11 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal 
annexed to the London Agreement of 8 August 1945 certain Tribunals to 
be known as „Military Tribunals‟ shall be established hereunder. 
Accordingly, US Military Tribunal III was established on 13 
February 1947 with the task to try the selected defendants for crimes listed 
and defined in Article II of Control Council Law No. 10.
70
 Article I of 
Ordinance No. 7 explicitly recognised these crimes as punishable offences. 
There it said:
71
 
The purpose of this Ordinance is to provide for the establishment of 
military tribunals which shall have power to try and punish persons 
charged with offenses recognized as crimes in Article II of Control 
Council Law No. 10, including conspiracies to commit any such crimes. 
Nothing herein shall prejudice the jurisdiction or the powers of other 
courts established or which may be established for the trial of any such 
offenses. 
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Ordinance No. 7 also regulated the law of procedure, what in fact 
was an adoption of the rules of procedure as defined in the London 
Agreement and Control Council Law No. 10.
72
 These rules were solely 
based on the common law tradition, what meant that instead of the 
inquisitorial system used in German criminal law, the adversarial system 
used in the United States was taken.
73
 Thus, it was not on the Tribunal to 
explore the truth (like in the inquisitorial system), but the statements and 
pleadings by the parties became the basis of the proceeding (like in the 
adversarial system).
74
 
 
(f) Judgment of the International Military Tribunal 
 
According to the Charter annexed to the London Agreement, the 
International Military Tribunal was created. The major war criminals of 
Nazi Germany were tried and sentenced with judgment from 30 September 
and 1 October 1946 by this Tribunal, which consisted of judges from all 
four Allied Powers, namely the United States, Great Britain, France and the 
Soviet Union.
75
 Control Council Law No. 10 referred directly to this 
judgment. For example, Article II section (1) (d) of Control Council Law 
No. 10 stated that “each of the following acts is recognized as a crime: ... 
Membership in categories of a criminal group or organization declared 
criminal by the International Military Tribunal.”76 
Furthermore, Article X of Ordinance No. 7 stipulated that statements 
and conclusions of the International Military Tribunal were binding for the 
subsequent US military tribunals. Article X reads as follows:
77
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The determination of the International Military Tribunal in the judgment 
in Case No. 1 that invasions, aggressive acts, aggressive wars, crimes, 
atrocities or inhumane acts were planned or occurred, shall be binding on 
the tribunals established hereunder and shall not be questioned except 
insofar as the participation therein or knowledge thereof by any particular 
person may be concerned. Statements of the International Military 
Tribunal in the judgment in Case No. 1 constitute proof of the facts stated, 
in the absence of substantial new evidence to the contrary. 
Hence, the judgment of the International Tribunal was also part of 
the legal basis of US Military Tribunal III. 
 
2 Compatibility with existing international law and customs 
 
(a) Non-applicability of Hague Convention No. IV (Laws and Customs of 
War on Land) 
 
The international conferences of 1899 and 1907 in The Hague in the 
Netherlands established rules of warfare between the signatory nations.
78
 
Hague Convention No. IV was created, after minor revisions on the text 
from 1899, at the second conference providing laws and customs of war on 
land.
79
 It consisted of nine articles in the main text and 56 annexed articles, 
and it was enacted with agreement from 18 October 1907.
80
 At both 
conferences, Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Russia and 
the United States were among the countries which signed the Convention.
81
 
Article 2 of Hague Convention No. IV stated:
82
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The provisions contained in the Regulations referred to in Article 1, as 
well as in the present Convention, do not apply except between 
Contracting Powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the 
Convention. 
Hence, Hague Convention No. IV was valid and binding 
international law between Germany and the four Allied Powers in 1947. 
However, it did not apply to post-war Germany because of Article 42 of the 
annex to the Convention. Therein it said: “Territory is considered occupied 
when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The 
occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been 
established and can be exercised.”83 
John H E Fried looked at this rule in regard to the existing situation 
in Germany after World War II and, in 1946, he stated:
84
 
The provisions of the Hague Regulations restricting the rights of an 
occupant refer to a belligerent, who, favored by the changing fortunes of 
war, actually exercises military authority over enemy territory and 
thereby prevents the legitimate sovereign -who remains the legitimate 
sovereign- from exercising his full authority. The Regulations draw 
important legal conclusions from the fact that the legitimate sovereign 
may at any moment himself be favored by the changing fortunes of war, 
reconquer the territory and put an end to the occupation. ... In other 
words, the Hague Regulations think of an occupation which is a phase of 
an as yet undecided war. Until May 7, 1945, the Allies were belligerent 
occupants in the then occupied parts of Germany, and their rights and 
duties were circumscribed by the respective provisions of the Hague 
Regulations. As a result of the subjugation of Germany the legal character 
of the occupation of German territory was drastically changed. The 
occupants do no longer act in lieu of the „legtimate sovereign‟. They 
themselves exercise sovereignty. ... 
This interpretation by Fried is viable but not the only possible 
argument. However, if one looks at Article 42 related to the overall structure 
of Hague Convention No. IV, it becomes obvious that only belligerent 
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occupations, meaning the invasion of an army into the territory of another 
country during acts of war,
85
 can be meant. 
This view was supported by many scholars of high standing in the 
field of international law, among them Hans Kelsen and Alwyn V 
Freeman.
86
 In 1947, Freeman said:
87
 
On the other hand, a distinction is clearly warranted between measures 
taken by the Allies prior to destruction of the German Government and 
those taken thereafter. Only the former need be tested by the Hague 
Regulations, which are inapplicable to the situation now prevailing in 
Germany. Disappearance of the German State as a belligerent entity, 
necessarily implied in the Declaration of Berlin of June 5, 1945, signifies 
that a true state of war -and hence belligerent occupation- no longer exists 
within the meaning of international law. ... 
This view was also supported by the International Military Tribunal. 
In its case against the German major war criminals, the defendants had 
claimed that Germany was no longer bound by the rules of Hague 
Convention No. IV in many of the territories occupied during the war 
because Germany had completely subjugated those countries and 
incorporated them into the German Reich, a fact which allegedly gave 
Germany authority to deal with the occupied territories as though they were 
part of Germany.
88
 The International Tribunal referred to the doctrine of 
subjugation and held that it is unnecessary to decide whether the doctrine 
has any application where the subjugation is the result of aggressive war.
89
 
The reason given was significant and confirmed the interpretation of Fried 
and Freeman:
90
 
The doctrine [of subjugation] was never considered to be applicable so 
long as there was an army in the field attempting to restore the occupied 
territories to their true owners, and in this case, therefore, the doctrine 
could not apply to any territories occupied after 1
st
 September, 1939. 
                                                          
85
 Justice Case, above n 9, 961. 
86
 Ibid, 962. 
87
 Alwyn V Freeman “War Crimes by Enemy Nationals Administering Justice in Occupied 
Territory” (1947) 41 Am J Int‟l L 579, 605. 
88
 International Military Tribunal I, above n 1, 254. 
89
 Ibid. 
90
 Ibid. 
 37 
US Military Tribunal III referred to this statement and concluded as 
follows:
 91
 
The clear implication from the foregoing is that the Rules of Land 
Warfare apply to the conduct of a belligerent in occupied territory so long 
as there is an army in the field attempting to restore the country to its true 
owner, but that those rules do not apply when belligerency is ended, there 
is no longer an army in the field, and, as in the case of Germany, 
subjugation has occurred by virtue of military conquest. 
Hence, in the case of post-war Germany, after the unconditional 
surrender of the German armed forces on 8 May 1945, the status of 
belligerent occupation of the German territory by the Allied Powers did not 
exist anymore and, therefore, Hague Convention No. IV could not apply to 
Germany after 8 May 1945. 
Although the reasons differ, all opinions described above share the 
same point of view, which is that the written rules set out in Hague 
Convention No. IV did not apply to post-war Germany and, therefore, the 
enacted laws of the Allied Powers, especially Control Council Law No. 10 
and Ordinance No. 7, did not have to match the criteria of the Hague 
Convention. 
 
(b) The issue of Germany‟s remaining sovereignty 
 
In general, the sovereignty of a state is defined as follows:
 92
 
Sovereignty is the power of a state to do everything necessary to govern 
itself, such as making, executing, and applying laws; imposing and 
collecting taxes; making war and peace; and forming treaties or engaging 
in commerce with foreign nations. 
Therefore, the power to legislate is an inseparable part of a country‟s 
sovereignty. The validity of Control Council Law No. 10 and of Ordinance 
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No. 7 and, with it, the right of the Allies to legislate for the German 
territory, was questioned throughout all Nuremberg Trials by several 
German writers.
93
 Contrary to most legal scholars in international law, those 
critics argued that the Allies did not have the legal authority to exercise 
legislative power over the German territory because, in their opinion, 
Germany had never lost its sovereignty after the war.
94
 
In its judgment for the Justice Trial, US Military Tribunal III 
carefully considered this issue and discussed it in considerable length. 
Although one member of the Tribunal, Judge Blair, did not agree with the 
Tribunal‟s analysis, his final evaluation was the same, namely that the Allies 
truly had the right to legislate and rule for the German territory after World 
War II because of the unconditional surrender and the simultaneous collapse 
of the German Government.
95
 
In terms of victor‟s justice, there are no signs that the opinions of the 
judges of Tribunal III were based on ideas of vengeance. Their statements in 
the judgment represented a critical and careful analysis of this issue based 
on legal theory rather than on personal feelings or emotions. Within their 
statements one is not able to find obviously subjective opinions about Nazis 
and Nazi Germany. By replacing the words Germany and Germans with 
other names of nations and nationals, the judgment could just as well have 
been made for other countries where a similar post-war situation could have 
occurred. 
 
(i) View of US Military Tribunal III 
 
In all subsequent trials at Nuremberg, the defence had claimed that 
the jurisdiction of the Allied tribunals violated Germany‟s sovereignty. In 
the Justice Case, Tribunal III responded vigorously to this. In the judgment, 
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two of the three judges argued that the legitimacy of the Tribunal was based 
on the legitimacy of the Allied defeat of Germany. The judgment referred to 
the Berlin Declaration from 5 June 1945 and explained:
96
 
The unconditional surrender of Germany took place on 8 May 1945. The 
surrender was preceded by the complete disintegration of the central 
government and was followed by the complete occupation of all of 
Germany. There were no opposing German forces in the field; the 
officials who during the war had exercised the powers of the Reich 
Government were either dead, in prison, or in hiding. On 5 June 1945 the 
Allied Powers announced that they „hereby assume supreme authority 
with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the 
German Government, the High Command, and any state, municipal or 
local government or authority,‟ and declared that „there is no central 
government or authority in Germany capable of accepting responsibility 
for the maintenance of order, the administration of the country, and 
compliance with the requirements of the victorious powers.‟ … 
Consequently, the Tribunal then drew a conclusion that Germany 
had lost its sovereignty to the Allies because, after the complete 
disintegration of the German Government followed by the unconditional 
surrender of the German armed forces and the occupation of the German 
territory, there was an inevitable necessity for the Allies to exercise supreme 
governmental powers not only for administrative but, in the first place, also 
for humanitarian reasons. In the judgment it is stated as follows:
97
 
It is this fact of the complete disintegration of the government in 
Germany, followed by unconditional surrender and by occupation of the 
territory, which explains and justifies the assumption and exercise of 
supreme governmental powers by the Allies. The same fact distinguishes 
the present occupation of Germany from the type of occupation which 
occurs when, in the course of actual warfare, an invading army enters and 
occupies the territory of another state, whose government is still in 
existence and is in receipt of international recognition, and whose armies, 
with those of its allies, are still in the field. In the latter case, the 
occupying power is subject to the limitations imposed upon it by the 
Hague Convention and by the laws and customs of war. In the former 
case (the occupation of Germany) the Allied Powers were not subject to 
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those limitations. By reason of the complete breakdown of government, 
industry, agriculture, and supply, they were under an imperative 
humanitarian duty of far wider scope to reorganize government and 
industry and to foster local democratic governmental agencies throughout 
the territory. 
Hence, in the view of US Military Tribunal III, after the war 
Germany was not a sovereign state anymore and Control Council Law No. 
10, as well as other codes enacted by the Military Governments, was a valid 
law because the Allies were the new holders of governmental power in 
Germany. However, the Tribunal seemed to be inconsistent in its 
explanation. In the judgment, the Tribunal contradicted itself within 
different sections. At one place it is stated:
98
 
International law is not the product of statute for the simple reason that 
there is as yet no world authority empowered to enact statutes of universal 
application. International law is the product of multipartite treaties, 
conventions, judicial decisions and customs which have received 
international acceptance or acquiescence. 
This means that, in the view of the Tribunal, there has never been an 
international legislature. Yet, at another place, the judgment stated as 
follows:
 99
 
Since the IMT Charter and C. C. Law 10 are the products of legislative 
action by an international authority, it follows of necessity that there is no 
national constitution of any one state which could be invoked to 
invalidate the substantive provisions of such international legislation. 
Although the judgment additionally explained that Control Council 
Law No. 10 “may be deemed to be a codification rather than original 
substantive legislation”100, this statement has to be seen as conflicting with 
the first one. Eventually, at still another place, the judgment stated:
101
 
In its aspect as a statute defining crime and providing punishment the 
limited purpose of C. C. Law 10 is clearly set forth. It is an exercise of 
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supreme legislative power in and for Germany. It does not purport to 
establish by legislative act any new crimes of international applicability. 
However, these conflicting conclusions do not need to be discussed 
further as the judgment itself offered an explaining statement 
additionally:
102
 
For our purposes, however, it is unnecessary to determine the present 
situs of „residual sovereignty‟. It is sufficient to hold that, by virtue of the 
situation at the time of unconditional surrender, the Allied Powers were 
provisionally in the exercise of supreme authority, valid and effective 
until such time as, by treaty or otherwise, Germany shall be permitted to 
exercise the full powers of sovereignty. We hold that the legal right of the 
four Powers to enact C. C. Law 10 is established and that the jurisdiction 
of this Tribunal to try persons charged as major war criminals of the 
European Axis must be conceded. 
Thus, in the end, it remains that US Military Tribunal III held the 
opinion that Control Council Law No. 10 was a valid act, based either on 
the overtaking of the German legislative power by the Allies or in another 
way after the unconditional surrender on 8 May 1945. According to the 
Tribunal‟s judgment, Germany lost its full powers of sovereignty because of 
the complete breakdown of political and civil structures within Germany 
after the war. 
 
(ii) Dissenting view of Judge Blair 
 
Judge Blair evaluated the issue of Germany‟s legal status in a 
different way. Although he agreed that the Allies had the legitimacy to enact 
Control Council Law No. 10 and the Tribunal had the legal jurisdiction to 
carry out the trial, he disagreed with the explanation for it. He argued:
103
 
No authority or jurisdiction to determine the question of the present status 
of belligerency of the occupation of Germany has been given this 
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Tribunal. This question of present belligerency of occupation rests solely 
within the jurisdiction of the military occupants and the executives of the 
nations which the members of the Allied Control Council represent. … If, 
however, any possible questions are here present for determination with 
respect to (1) the character of the present status of occupation of 
Germany; and (2) the present status of belligerency, such questions can 
only relate to the rights of the victorious belligerent to exercise control 
over Germany. Such matters as regard the American Zone are controlled 
by both the written and unwritten laws, rules, and customs of warfare and 
by the rights and obligations of a victorious occupant under international 
law. 
Accordingly, he referred to existing US rules, especially to several 
articles of the Basic Field Manual on Rules of Land Warfare, which were 
published in 1940 by the Judge Advocate General of the US Army:
104
 
Under the foregoing rules of military occupation [Articles 273 to 275, 
285, and 286 of the United States Basic Field Manual on Rules of Land 
Warfare], there is no rule which would, because of the unconditional 
surrender of the German armed forces, transfer the sovereignty of 
Germany to the Allied occupants, or to either of them, in their respective 
zones of occupation. 
Certainly, the binding nature of these purely US rules is questionable 
but Judge Blair also referred to existing international law:
105
 
It may here be pointed out that the report of 1919 by the Commission on 
the Responsibility of the Authors of War and Enforcement of 
Penalties[
106
] lists among other war crimes in violation of international 
law or of the laws and customs of land warfare, „(10) the usurpation of 
sovereignty during military occupation.‟ 
Hence, with respect to both of these regulations, he concluded that 
Germany remained fully sovereign after 8 May 1945, and the Allies 
exercised their governmental power only provisionally until Germany, 
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purged from influences from Nazism and militarism, could take back its 
place in the world community:
107
 
There has been no act or declaration of the Allied Powers, either before or 
since their occupation of Germany under the terms of the unconditional 
surrender, which could possibly be construed as showing that they intend 
by the subjugation and occupation of Germany to transfer her sovereignty 
to themselves. To the contrary every declaration that has been made by 
the Allied Powers with respect to their occupancy of Germany and the 
enactment of laws for her control during the occupation has emphasized 
the fact that the ultimate purpose of such occupancy is to destroy the Nazi 
form of government and militarism in Germany so that as thus extirpated 
from these influences she may take her place in the comity of the nations 
of the world. 
Consequently, he explained that the jurisdiction and power of 
Tribunal III to try and punish war criminals was given by “established 
international law relating to warfare” already;108 the Allied laws, 
additionally, determined the punishable crimes and the rules of procedure 
only.
109
 
Furthermore, Blair analysed Control Council Law No. 10 and 
Ordinance No. 7 with their referrals to the parts of the Moscow Declaration, 
the London Agreement and the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal, which expressed the Allied concept to try and punish the German 
war criminals and which authorised the zone commanders to establish 
military tribunals, and declared:
110
 
As so created and established this and other similar military tribunals are 
international in character and jurisdiction. … The jurisdiction and power 
of this and similar tribunals to try and punish war criminals find full 
support in established international law relating to warfare. This law is 
that during hostilities and before their formal termination belligerents 
have concurrent jurisdiction over war crimes committed by the captured 
enemy persons in their territory or against their nationals in time of war. 
Accordingly, it has been generally recognized that belligerents during the 
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war may legitimately try and punish enemy persons charged with 
infraction of the rules of war, if the accused is a prisoner of war and if the 
act charged has been made a penal offense by the generally accepted laws 
and customs of war. In such cases the accused usually is tried before the 
court, commission, or tribunal set up by and adjudged in accordance with 
the laws and procedure of the victor. After armistice or peace agreement 
the matter of punishment of war crimes is determined by the terms 
thereof. 
According to this, Blair referred to an article about the London 
Agreement by Lord Chief Justice Wright published in 1946. Therein, 
Wright stated that the listed crimes in the Agreement “are not crimes 
because of the agreement of the four Governments, but that the 
Governments have scheduled them as coming under the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal because they are already crimes by existing law.”111 
Blair then concluded that similar holdings can be made for Control 
Council Law No. 10 as it recognised the same basic crimes and, therefore, 
Control Council Law No. 10 was a valid act because it was
112
 
an expression of the treaties, rules, and customs of international law on 
crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity; each is in 
effect and purpose a listing of crimes in violation of pre-existing 
international law and each „to that extent is itself a contribution to 
international law‟. 
In stating that, Blair referred to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 
1907, the Peace Conference of 1919 and the Versailles Treaty, the various 
treaties of mutual guarantee, arbitration and nonaggression and the Kellog-
Briand Pact of 1928.
113
 
Finally, Blair‟s opinion can be summarised as follows: although 
Germany did not lose its sovereignty after 8 May 1945, the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal as well as the legitimacy of the Allies to rule about the German 
territory was granted by treaties, rules and customs of existing international 
law. 
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(iii) Evaluation 
 
According to the German historian Klaus Baestlein, the four Allied 
Powers officially took over the state authority in Germany with the Berlin 
Declaration on 5 June 1945.
114
 It was a novelty that neither a peace 
agreement nor an annexation followed but, in fact, the state population and 
the state territory continued to exist while the Allies exercised the state 
authority.
115
 
Baestlein expressed a view, which was supported by the vast 
majority of international legal experts since World War II. However, many 
German jurists disagreed and argued that the Allies did not become the 
holders of the state authority, but only provisional administrators in a 
fiduciary or managing sense, which implied that they were not legitimated 
to enact new laws and rules for the German territory.
116
 
Later on, even the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany 
adopted this way of thinking and acted like the legal successor of the Third 
Reich with exclusive power of representation.
117
 A final clarification of this 
issue did not happen until the signing of the two-plus-four treaties on the 
occasion of the German unification in 1990, in which the Federal Republic 
of Germany officially accredited the legal takeover of the state authority by 
the Allies through the Berlin Declaration on 5 June 945.
118
 
However, in my opinion, the German critics cannot be taken 
seriously because after World War II the whole German society had 
collapsed. There was no functioning government on state or local level, no 
functioning administration and no functioning jurisdiction. The existing 
laws of Nazi Germany were obviously inappropriate for a new start, and the 
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majority of German jurists in 1945 were either loyal Nazis or sympathisers. 
According to Nathan Stoltzfus and Henry Friedlander, an estimated 90 per 
cent of all German judicial officials had been members of the Nazi Party.
119
 
Ingo Muller, additionally, gives the examples of Westphalia, were 93 
per cent of the court personnel had been members of the Nazi Party or its 
subsidiary organisations, Bamberg, where 302 out of 309 members of the 
Court of Appeal had been in the Party, and Schweinfurt, where the number 
of Party members was 100 per cent.
120
 Hence, in Mueller‟s view: “The 
unconditional surrender of the Great German Reich not only brought an end 
to institutionalized terror; it brought an end to the entire judicial system.”121 
Therefore, at the time, there was no other option than the 
establishment of a new legal order by the Allies. In the end, it does not 
matter whether the Allies did this by overtaking Germany‟s full sovereignty 
or by ruling on a provisional basis only. It is a matter of fact that the 
German Reich disappeared after the war and, in 1947, Germany had lost its 
practical sovereignty because there was no self determination possible 
anymore. 
In terms of victor‟s justice, this means that the accusation of an 
illegal overtaking of Germany‟s state authority by the Allies is proved 
wrong for the primary reason that there would have been no alternative 
besides abandoning the German people to their fate, which would probably 
have been meant chaos and death. 
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(c) The implementation of a purely US court 
 
As early as January 1947, three months after the rulings of the 
International Military Tribunal, the US Government rejected the official 
appeal from the French authorities for a second Allied tribunal.
122
 The 
reason was that the American authorities, especially the US Chief 
Prosecutor for the first trial and one of the creators of the London 
Agreement, Robert H Jackson, disliked the methods of the Soviet 
prosecution and favoured trials by US tribunals only.
123
 
Thus, on 14 February 1947, the Military Governor for the American 
occupation zone in Germany, Lieutenant General Clay, issued General 
Order No. 11, which constituted US Military Tribunal III to try high ranked 
German jurists.
124
 Based on Ordinance No. 7, this order named the members 
of the Tribunal and the place of trial at Nuremberg.
125
 Although Article III 
section (1) (d) of Control Council Law No. 10 contained the possibility of 
trying the defendants in front of a German court, the US authorities made no 
use of it in this case.
126
 
Hence, the accusation of victor‟s justice was brought up soon. The 
mostly German critics argued that the judges of the Nuremberg Tribunals 
were not in a position to judge the German problem objectively, because 
they were citizens of a victorious state and, therefore, were not free from 
national resentment and passion.
127
 Also, some German lawyers asserted 
that for victors to try the defeated was in contradiction to international 
law.
128
 Accordingly, two major arguments were brought up: one was based 
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on an historical background; the other was related to the principle of 
separation of powers. 
 
(i) Historical experience 
 
The first argument was a weak one and related to the Acts of State 
doctrine, which
129
 
is based on the idea that an individual cannot be made responsible for an 
act which he performed as an instrument or „organ‟ of his state, since 
responsibility for such violations rests on the „collectivity of individuals,‟ 
which is the state. 
It was claimed that war crimes trials historically were supposed to be 
held by national courts of the defendants‟ nationality only.130 Before World 
War I, the German opinion, strongly supported by the Reichsmilitaergericht 
(Reich Military Tribunal), was that “only the soldier‟s native state possesses 
penal jurisdiction over those crimes which he committed before he was 
taken prisoner, even if those crimes were directed against the enemy state or 
its citizens.”131 This view was also supported by Article 3 of the Hague 
Convention of 1907, which said that the state “shall be responsible for all 
acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.”132 
In contrast, British thoughts on this point were different even before 
World War I, as British courts held that they had jurisdiction over such 
cases.
133
 Therefore, after World War I, at the Peace Conference in Paris in 
1919, the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and 
on Enforcement of Penalties was established to find a method for action 
against enemy nationals accused of having committed war crimes.
134
 
                                                          
129
 Woetzel, above n 14, 68. 
130
 See generally Lueders, above n 127, 127-135. 
131
 Ibid, 129. 
132
 Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), 
above n 80, art 3. 
133
 Woetzel, above n 14, 26. 
134
 Ibid, 27. 
 49 
In many ways, this Paris Conference resembled the London 
Conference in August 1945.
135
 Although favoured by the French and British 
Government, the American delegates mentioned that an international 
tribunal would not have a current penal law which it could apply, because 
no regulation of international law and no state treaty rendered the violations 
of the customs of war and the law of war an international crime which could 
be punished.
136
 This view was closer to the German opinion than to the 
views of the other Allies. As a result, the idea of an international tribunal 
was finally overthrown and the extradition of war criminals to the military 
jurisdiction of the defeated enemy power was decided.
137
 
Unlike the London Conference after World War II, the Paris 
Conference was supposed to work out peace treaties between the Allies and 
the defeated nations. In the case of Germany, the result was the Treaty of 
Versailles from 28 June 1919.
138
 It was not a real agreement but a directive 
of provisions to the Government of the new German Weimar Republic.
139
 
However, although Articles 228 to 230 of the treaty recognised the 
right of the Allied and Associated Powers to try persons accused of 
violating the laws and customs of war before military tribunals and obliged 
the German Government to hand over these persons and furnish all 
documents and materials that could be used as evidence,
140
 these punitive 
provisions were never realised in the sense that they were intended.
141
 
In February 1920, a list with 896 names of German nationals who 
were to be handed over for trial was submitted to the German delegate at the 
Paris Conference, Baron von Lersner.
142
 The list included high ranking 
officials like Chancelor Bethman, Marshal Hindenburg, Marshal Ludendorff 
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and the Imperial Crown Prince.
143
 Baron von Lersner was indignant at this 
and resigned in protest.
144
 
The list was then handed to the German Government, which from 
then on made every effort to prevent the handing over of the designated 
persons.
145
 After discussion, the Allies finally declared themselves willing 
to accept the proposal of Germany‟s Government to try these individuals 
themselves at the Reich‟s Supreme Court in Leipzig.146 
The outcome was disastrous. From an abridged list of 45 names the 
Allies had submitted to the Germans, only twelve persons were tried and six 
were convicted and sentenced to terms of imprisonment from two months to 
four years.
147
 In the following years, 1,744 preliminary investigations were 
initiated by the German prosecution, but only 13 proceedings led to an 
indictment at the Leipzig Supreme Court.
148
 
The Allies protested strongly and announced that they will conduct 
these and further trials by themselves according to Article 228 to 230 of the 
Treaty of Versailles, but they did not again request the extradition of the 
accused persons.
149
 In the end, very few trials were held against defendants 
in absentia in Belgium and France.
150
 The German Emperor Wilhelm II, 
who had fled to the Netherlands after the war, was never extradited and died 
there in 1941.
151
 
Thus, it is obvious that this bad experience of the Leipzig Trials had 
caused the Allies of World War II, which were, except for the Soviet Union, 
the same as in World War I, to arrange the war crimes trials against the 
German Nazis under their own aegis. 
Furthermore, it has to be taken into consideration that the supporters 
of the German critics on the purely US tribunals tended to forget historical 
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facts. Although the German Military Penal Code during World War I 
expressed a different view, the German Reich and its military tribunals had 
also tried Allied prisoners of war who were guilty of disregarding the Hague 
Convention on land warfare during the time prior to their seizure.
152
 This 
was in accordance with the practice of the Allies, which was legal not only 
in England but in the whole Anglo-Saxon sphere of law already before 
World War I.
153
 
During World War II, this practice was also committed by German 
military courts.
154
 The German politician Lueders, who later on became a 
high ranked official in the Ministry of the Interior in West Germany, in 
1946, stated as follows:
155
 
In the same manner in which many German soldiers are today tried before 
English, American, French, and Russian military tribunals, many Allied 
soldiers were tried before German military courts a few years ago. This is 
easily overlooked when today the war crimes trials of the present are 
criticized in this country with slashing opinions. 
Conclusively, it has to be said that the criticism of the 
implementation of a purely US court with arguments based on historical 
facts was a double-edged sword from the very beginning. One cannot argue 
with certain parts of history ignoring other parts, which, when highlighted, 
give a completely different view of the facts. 
 
(ii) The violation of the principle of separation of powers 
 
On 19 November 1945, all defence counsels at the trial before the 
International Military Tribunal made a joint application in which, among 
other things, the composition of the court was criticised.
156
 It said:
157
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The Judges have been appointed exclusively by States which were the one 
party in this war. This one party to the proceeding is all in one: creator of 
the statute of the Tribunal and of the rules of law, prosecutor and judge. It 
used to be until now the common legal conception that this should not be 
so; just as the United States of America, as the champion for the 
institution of international arbitration and jurisdiction, always demanded 
that neutrals, or neutrals and representatives of all parties, should be 
called to the Bench. 
This criticism was made in all Nuremberg Trials by the defence. It 
was based upon the principle of separation of powers, which generally 
means that the three branches of government, legislature, executive and 
judiciary, have to be separated from each other, and that no branch should 
be able to perform a function belonging to another, and no individual should 
hold office in more than one branch.
158
 In international criminal law this 
means that legislator, prosecutor and judge should not come from the same 
country.
159
 
In the Justice Case, US Tribunal III stated explicitly that it was 
entitled to enforce international law, which was superior to any German law. 
It said:
160
 
The Nuernberg Tribunals are not German courts. They are not enforcing 
German law. The charges are not based on violation by the defendants of 
German law. On the contrary, the jurisdiction of this Tribunal rests on 
international authority. It enforces the law as declared by the IMT Charter 
and C. C. Law 10, and within the limitations on the power conferred, it 
enforces international law as superior in authority to any German statute 
or decree. 
Therefore, international law rather than German or US law was 
applied by the Tribunal, and the principle of separation of powers in 
international law should have been respected. However, it was not and, 
therefore, this was itself a violation of international law. The legislation in 
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form of the London Agreement, Control Council Law No. 10 and Ordinance 
No. 7 was made by the Americans as part of the Allies or all alone, the 
prosecution counsel was American and all four judges were US nationals. 
Hence, besides the common question why a German court was not 
appointed to deal with the case, it was primarily criticised that no neutral or 
German judges were included in the personnel of the court.
161
 An 
international representation in the Justice Case would have required the 
appointment of a German judge and of judges from neutral and other 
countries.
162
 However, several reasons for the decision of the US authorities 
against an international representation or a German court have to be taken 
into account: 
Firstly, the experience with the disaster of the Leipzig Trials after 
World War I spoke against the idea that the Americans give out of hand the 
whole trial to the German judicature and a German court.
163
 Furthermore, in 
1947, before the trial, nobody really knew how infiltrated the German 
judicature was by Nazis and Nazi ideology. As expressed by Professor 
Robert K Woetzel: “Eleven years of National Socialism and five years of 
war had reduced the German judiciary to such a feeble and corrupt state that 
it could not be trusted, at the outset, to resume operations.”164 
Indeed, during the trial, the incredible amount of atrocities in the 
name of German law and the widespread of support for the Nazi ideas 
among German jurists came to light and, in retrospect, justified the US 
decision against a German court.
165
 Additionally, it may also have been 
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problematic to find a judge who would have accepted sitting in judgment of 
his former colleagues.
166
 
Secondly, as concluded above, the sovereignty of Germany in 1947 
was legally exercised by the Allied Powers in their respective occupation 
zones.
167
 Therefore, even if the Tribunal did not apply German criminal law, 
it was appointed legally by the state authority at the time.
168
 Moreover, it 
consisted of judges who were not involved in the legislation process before; 
and all four members worked as civil judges in the United States and were 
never involved in any activities of the US authorities responsible for the 
German war criminals question.
169
 They were flown in exclusively for the 
trial and left Germany afterwards.
170
 
Thirdly and most importantly, the exclusion of neutral judges, for 
example from the World War II neutral countries Switzerland, Sweden or 
Portugal, was legally irrelevant and would have made no difference to the 
trial because the judges, whatever their nationality was, were obliged to 
apply the laws of the London Agreement and its annexed Charter, Control 
Council Law No. 10 and Ordinance No. 7 as the legal basis of their 
jurisdiction.
171
 
However, although the neutral countries may have refused to 
participate in the trial for the simple reason of their neutrality,
172
 the 
acceptance of the court in public opinion surely would have been enhanced 
if judges from neutral countries or even from Germany had been 
included.
173
 
Finally, besides the legal arguments, it cannot be overlooked that 
Germany practically was a collapsed society in 1947. It was still too soon 
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after the war for a new and functioning judicial administration to be 
established and that one could speak of a denazificated judicature yet. 
Nevertheless, it remains the argument that at least judges from 
neutral countries could have been appointed as members of the Tribunal. 
The counterargument that those would probably have denied their 
participation is a purely theoretical one, because the Americans never did 
ask. Therefore, although there is a consensus among international law 
experts as well as among German jurists that the appointed judges handled 
the case with real objectivity,
174
 one cannot deny that it makes a difference 
whether nationals from a victorious belligerent state or citizens of a neutral 
state preside over the vanquished. 
 
B The Moral Necessity of the Trial 
 
World War II caused over 50 million deaths, compared to World 
War I with ten million.
175
 The killings, devastations, losses and suffering in 
Europe were not only larger than in World War I, but they took a new 
dimension as a result of the Nazi racist ideology against the Jews and the 
Slavic peoples of Eastern Europe.
176
 
This sick Nazi ideology was not only brutally exercised during the 
war in the occupied territories but also, at the same time and earlier, in 
Germany itself. In this, the German judiciary and most legal professionals 
were at least willing partners if not enthusiastic executors.
177
 Some authors 
go as far as saying that most German judges over-identified with the Nazi 
regime, and have seen themselves as fighters on the internal battlefront with 
the responsibility to punish the enemy within.
178
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Ingo Mueller, although controversial, estimated that 80,000 death 
sentences were passed by German courts during the Nazi reign from 1933 to 
1945.
179
 This number seems small compared to the millions of victims of 
the SS or Gestapo, but if one looks at Germany‟s allies Italy and Japan, 
which were also ruled over by Fascist governments during this period of 
time, it becomes clear that this brutality was unparalleled.
180
 In Italy, civil 
courts passed only 29 death sentences in 5,319 trials and in Japan, only two 
persons were sentenced to death in approximately 600 trials.
181
 
During National Socialism, the German law was obviously 
transformed into an instrument of terror. This was not done against the will 
of the German judiciary but with its active help and support. Mueller drew 
the conclusion that the German judiciary was “a smoothly functioning part 
of the National Socialists‟ system of intimidation.”182 German jurists first 
helped to transform the existing laws of the Weimar Republic, which 
Tribunal III described as “a civilized and enlightened system of 
jurisprudence”183, into an instrument of Nazi politics, and then executed it in 
a way which had never deserved to be named the enforcement of law.
184
 
In 1945, the German law was based on a degenerated legal system 
with the only purpose to spread the National Socialist ideology and 
exterminate any existing opposition, whether for their political opinion, 
religious belief, race or nationality.
185
 Thus, it becomes clear that the Allies 
had to do something to make clear that the crimes, perpetrated in the name 
of law, could not stay unpunished. 
The decision for holding trials was based on a simple reason, 
expressed by the US Secretary of War, Henry L Stimson, in 1947 with 
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respect to the major trial, but is also applicable to the subsequent Nuremberg 
proceedings, especially to the Justice Trial:
186
 
There were three different courses open to us when the Nazi leaders were 
captured: release, summary punishment, or trial. Release was unthinkable; 
it would have been taken as an admission that there was here no crime. 
Summary punishment was widely recommended. It would have satisfied 
the immediate requirement of the emotions, and in its own rough-hewn 
way it would have been fair enough, for this was precisely the type of 
justice that the Nazis themselves had so often used. But this fact was in 
reality the best reason for the rejecting such a solution. The whole moral 
position of the victorious Powers must collapse if their judgments could 
be enforced only by Nazi methods. Our anger, as righteous anger, must be 
subject to the law. We therefore took the third course and tried the captive 
criminals by a judicial proceeding. We gave to the Nazis what they had 
denied their own opponents – the protection of the law. 
The idea was also to reorient and re-educate the German people. US 
authorities thought that the trial-proceedings would offer a great opportunity 
to demonstrate the evils of totalitarianism and the virtue of democracy to the 
German public.
187
 Morally, this was a wise idea because many Germans 
were still in doubt whether they followed an evil ideology or only lost a war. 
The big advantage of a trial was to make public for the first time what really 
happened in the name of law during the Nazi reign, and it gave the victims a 
possibility to speak. 
Today, the atrocities carried out by German courts before and during 
World War II are well known and documented because the Justice Trial 
brought it to light. Nobody knows what would have happened to Nazi law 
documents if they were not used as evidence for the trial immediately after 
the war. The importance of a trial in regard to these aspects is best expressed 
by the words of Hans Ehard, Bavarian Prime Minister and Minister of 
Justice in the German Federal Parliament between 1946 and 1966, in an 
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article he wrote as a critique of the proceedings at the International Military 
Tribunal:
188
 
The blush of shame must rise in the face of every German if he hears the 
incontrovertible proof thereof and sees how cowardly cruelty, currish 
fealty, insane obsession debased honor and humanity and forfeited the 
German reputation. One would like to tell every German to read these 
documents, particularly those people who forget too soon and would like 
to avert their eyes from the horrors of the near past. 
Finally, a last moral aspect in favour of a trial has to be seen in the 
international law novelty to punish so called desk perpetrators. According 
to Helmut Kramer, the jurists of the Third Reich represented this type of 
criminals at best.
189
 He describes desk perpetrators as people which have 
built up a remarkable distance to the execution of the crime itself and, as a 
matter of fact, in nearly all cases neither the judges of the Reich People‟s 
Court nor the judges of the Special Courts were present at the execution of 
death sentences they had passed.
190
 To try those persons for the first time in 
history was not only a way to deal with the Nazi past, but an opportunity to 
show that in the future everybody, even when obliged by his own 
government, has to be responsible for his or her actions to the world 
community. 
In summary, for me, it is obvious that a trial against German jurists 
and the German judiciary after World War II was absolutely necessary from 
a moral point of view. Alternatives like leaving it with the German post-war 
judiciary, summary punishment or doing nothing were unthinkable for the 
shown reasons. The atrocities committed by German courts in the name of 
law needed a strong response and reaction by the world community to 
establish and renew values of morality and ethics not only in Germany but 
worldwide. A trial open to public view was the best way to answer. 
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C Conclusion 
 
It remains that only one issue could be seen as a violation of 
international law here and, therefore, could give support for the reproach of 
victor‟s justice: the violation of the principle of separation of powers. 
US Military Tribunal III was established as a war crimes tribunal 
with the authority to apply international law, but all four judges were 
citizens of one country. Moreover, this country was not a neutral state but a 
victorious belligerent. American judges applied international law against 
non-American citizens and, therefore, the Tribunal‟s decision for many 
people has the stigma of vengeance. 
No doubt, in public opinion it would have been better if neutral 
judges were on the bench or German judges were included, but it is 
questionable if this would have been a real possibility according to the 
existing situation after the war. However, only the exclusion of neutral 
judges I would evaluate as a minor failure. The exclusion of German jurists 
was absolutely understandable as, in 1947, it was not clear at all which 
judges from German courts were morally and personally adequate for such 
an important trial. 
Furthermore, it has to be considered that international law generally 
recognises the right of the victorious belligerent to judge over the citizens of 
the defeated state.
191
 The German philosopher Karl Jaspers stated with 
respect to the trial at the International Military Tribunal: “The trial is due to 
the fact that we did not free ourselves from the criminal regime but were 
liberated by the Allies.”192 The German historian Golo Mann stated a little 
bit more soberly: “Sieger-Justiz ohne Zweifel und dadurch beeintraechtigt, 
dass nach den „Kriegsverbrechen‟ der Sieger niemand fragen durfte; aber 
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wer sonst haette den Prozess fuehren sollen?” (Victor‟s justice, without 
doubt, occurred because nobody was allowed to ask for war crimes 
committed by the victorious powers; but who else should have carried out 
the lawsuit?).
193
 
By answering the question whether the trial against the leading 
German jurists of the Nazi era was necessary from a moral point of view, I 
refer to the explanations in the respective chapter above. Nevertheless, I 
want to emphasise that, firstly, the trial brought to light for the first time 
details of the crimes committed in the name of justice in Nazi Germany and, 
secondly, it brought back civilised principles to the judicature on German 
territory after 12 years of judicial barbarity. A punishment without a trial 
would have only continued the brutality of the years of war and, therefore, 
would have been a bad solution. 
Overall, I conclude this chapter with a statement of Lueders, which 
in my opinion is a good summary of what any critic of the Nuremberg Trials 
should always keep in mind:
194
 
Independent of general international law, we Germans cannot raise any 
objections against these proceedings - from the legal standpoint - because 
with the unconditional surrender we have agreed to all measures of the 
Allies which are compatible with the commandments of humanity and 
that part of the principles of international law which is indispensable as a 
moral minimum. 
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III INVOLVED PARTIES 
 
The laws, codes, internal directives, political plans, preparation, 
proceeding and outcome of a trial, in the end, always depend on the 
personalities of the involved people. The personal experiences, emotional 
connections and individual backgrounds of the parties involved are 
important factors in a lawsuit. 
The major participants in the Justice Trial were the four Tribunal 
members, the members of the prosecution counsel and the 15 defendants 
together with their lawyers.
195
 When asking whether victor‟s justice 
occurred in the Justice Trial, it is especially important to have a look at these 
people and their individual backgrounds. The appointment of certain judges, 
the professional background of the prosecutors and the selection of the 
defendants poses the question: why these people and not others? 
Morally, the trial, within the framework of all subsequent 
Nuremberg proceedings, was a trial not only of individuals from the 
German legal profession but of the whole German system of law under the 
Nazi Government with tens of thousands of participants. The reasons for the 
selection of the specific defendants as representatives of the Nazi judiciary, 
and the individual qualifications of the judges and prosecutors and their 
personal relationship to US post-war politics provide the information, which 
makes it possible to evaluate the trial on a more personal basis. 
However, in the end, it will be concluded that a charge of victor‟s 
justice on these issues cannot be made for several reasons; most 
importantly, the exemplary impartiality of the Tribunal members and the 
thorough and non-arbitrary selection of the defendants by the prosecution. 
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A The Tribunal 
 
Based on Control Council Law No. 10, the US Military Government 
for Germany enacted Ordinance No. 7 on 18 October 1946 to establish rules 
for the creation and procedure of military tribunals within the American 
zone of occupation in Germany.
196
 Article II section (b) of the Ordinance 
provided: “Each such tribunal shall consist of three or more members to be 
designated by the Military Governor. One alternate member may be 
designated to any tribunal if deemed advisable by the Military Governor. 
...”197 
Accordingly, between 25 October 1946 and 24 December 1947 the 
Military Governor appointed 32 judges for the 12 tribunals of the 
subsequent Nuremberg proceedings.
198
 For the Justice Trial, Military 
Tribunal III was created by General Order No. 11 on 14 February 1947, 
which designated four judges as members of the Tribunal, namely 
Carrington T Marshall as Presiding Judge, James T Brand and Mallory B 
Blair as Judges, and Justin W Harding as Alternate Judge.
199
 For reasons of 
illness, Presiding Judge Marshall was relieved on 19 June 1947, and Brand 
was appointed Presiding Judge of the Tribunal from then on.
200
 Harding was 
promoted to be a regular judge on the same day.
201
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1 The judges and their qualifications 
 
Article II section (b) of Ordinance No. 7 stated further that
202
 
all members and alternates shall be lawyers who have been admitted to 
practice, for at least five years, in the highest courts of one of the United 
States or its territories or of the District of Columbia, or who have been 
admitted to practice in the United States Supreme Court. 
This statute was based on the idea that military courts martial 
normally do not render opinions,
203
 and therefore, “judgments by 
professional, civilian judges would command more prestige both within 
Germany and abroad, in the legal profession and with the general public 
alike.”204 The recruitment and selection of judges for the subsequent 
Nuremberg Trials was executed by the US War Department and the Office 
of the US Military Government for Germany (OMGUS).
205
 In the end, as 
stated above, 32 judges were appointed for the 12 trials. 
Yet, the selection process was difficult and not without criticism. 
Contrary to Article II of Ordinance No. 7, US Supreme Court Chief Justice 
Harlan F Stone had prohibited Supreme Court justices from serving on any 
subsequent war crimes tribunal, after the first Nuremberg Trial was 
finished.
206
 The reason was that the Chief Prosecutor for the United States in 
the first trial, Robert H Jackson, was a Supreme Court Justice himself and, 
during his absence in Europe, the court often found itself deadlocked on 
major decisions.
207
 Stone wanted to avoid this happening again.
208
 
To make it worse, Stone‟s successor as Chief Justice, Fred Vinson, 
extended the ban on federal judges as well.
209
 Hence, only state judges were 
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left to ask.
210
 In the end, 25 of the 32 appointed judges were state court 
judges, of whom 14 had served on the highest court of a State and the others 
in State intermediate appellate or trial courts.
211
 The other seven judges 
included prominent practicing attorneys and a law school dean.
212
 
Although a major concern about this selection was that none of these 
judges had extensive experience in international law or military laws, it was 
widely seen as an advantage that they had the status of Washington 
outsiders, a projection of homespun wisdom and impartiality.
213
 However, 
in some cases the character of the judges was criticised by prominent US 
lawyers like Abraham Pomerantz,
214
 and the Chief Prosecutor for the 
subsequent trials, Telford Taylor, told Robert H Jackson in a memorandum 
in 1946, after he was sent to a mission to the United States to recruit jurists 
for the prosecution teams in the subsequent trials:
215
 
With few exceptions, the lawyers recruited have been poor. I do not refer 
to Pomerantz and Robbins. ... Most of the rest, however, are utterly 
vacuous political hacks. They are of no earthly use to us and if they aren‟t 
very unhappy already they are going to be very shortly. ... it is quite bad 
enough to have such persons visited upon us as lawyers, but it would be 
fatal in the case of the judges. I think that no judge should be sent over 
here without the personal approval of yourself or Judge Patterson[
216
]. 
The four selected judges for Tribunal III in the Justice Case were all 
state court judges. Marshall was the former Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court of Ohio, Brand was a Justice of the Supreme Court of Oregon, Blair 
was an Associate Justice of the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas and 
Harding was a former Assistant Attorney General of the State of Ohio and a 
District Judge in Alaska.
217
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Hence, it was not the elite of American jurists which sat in 
Nuremberg to judge over their German colleagues, but very experienced and 
highly regarded professional judges and prosecutors from civil courts in the 
American provinces.
218
 
 
2 Independence of the judges from US post-war politics 
 
After the selection of the judges many law experts became nervous 
about the neutrality of the judges. This was a legitimate concern. Firstly, the 
judges of Tribunal III were all from the United States; it was not only their 
home country, but also they necessarily had strong professional ties to the 
ideals of US law and politics. Secondly, they were no experts in 
international law; a possibly weak knowledge of the rules and customs of 
international law may have made them more susceptible to the views of the 
US Government in post-war Germany. 
Yet, the ambitions of the US Government for post-war Germany 
were not necessarily bad. Certainly, a major purpose of the war crimes 
programme was the punishment of the Nazi perpetrators, but it was also 
intended to use the trials as an integral part of a policy to reorient the 
Germans by demonstrating to the German public the evils of totalitarianism 
and the virtues of democracy.
219
 
Furthermore, it was hoped that the trials would result in a future code 
of conduct for governments and armies.
220
 Thus, it is a matter of fact that 
the punishment of the defendants was not the only reason for the trials, and 
the danger of non-impartiality of the judges in favour of the suggestions of 
the prosecution was therefore limited. 
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However, one certain fact makes very clear that the judges of 
Tribunal III were and acted independently from governmental opinions and 
influences: 
The indictment in the Justice Case, filed by the prosecution on 4 
January 1947, contained 34 charges and was based on a comprehensive 
analysis of German judicial material, which had been brought together in so 
called Document Centres of the US Army in Germany since the end of the 
war.
221
 The charges were summarized into four counts: (1) conspiracy to 
commit war crimes and crimes against humanity; (2) war crimes; (3) crimes 
against humanity; and (4) membership of certain defendants in criminal 
organisations.
222
 
By order from 11 July 1947, Tribunal III basically dropped count 
one, after the defendants had challenged it.
223
 It stated:
224
 
It is the ruling of this Tribunal that neither the Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal nor Control Council Law No. 10 has defined conspiracy 
to commit a war crime or crime against humanity as a separate 
substantive crime; therefore, this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to try any 
defendant upon a charge of conspiracy considered as a separate 
substantive offense. 
By looking at the importance this count had in the view of the US 
officials who developed the US war crimes trial programme including the 
legislation, it becomes clear that only truly independent judges would have 
made such a decision. 
With reference to the trial before the International Military Tribunal, 
the Canadian historian Michael R Marrus stated that the charge of 
conspiracy “was an American product from first to last”225. Against strong 
objections of the French and Soviets, the US representatives at the London 
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Conference 1945 introduced the concept of conspiracy in the London 
Agreement and its annexed Charter.
226
 
The whole conspiracy idea was based on the thoughts of Henry L 
Stimson and one of his assistants, a young New York lawyer named Murray 
Bernays, and it was fully adopted by Jackson and Taylor who were deeply 
convinced by the scheme.
227
 Conspiracy was the term the US jurists wanted 
to come up trumps with at Nuremberg.
228
 It was imagined not only as the 
crucial point of the American indictment before the International Military 
Tribunal, but also as an essential point of the indictments within the 
subsequent trials.
229
 
Therefore, it was no surprise within the trial before the International 
Tribunal that the American prosecution took responsibility for count one 
(conspiracy), while the British prosecuted count two (crimes against peace) 
and the French and Soviets jointly prosecuted count three (war crimes) and 
count four (crimes against humanity).
230
 
However, it remains that Tribunal III rejected the whole concept of 
conspiracy, which could have been seen not only as an insult to the 
prosecution but also to the Tribunal members‟ own superior, the head of the 
US War Department, Stimson. 
 
3 Conclusion 
 
There is no doubt that by present standards the judges of Tribunal III 
lacked the background, which would qualify them for an international war 
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crimes trial. However, it has to be considered that they were the most 
qualified US judges available at the time. 
Regardless of whether judges from neutral countries would have 
been more suitable candidates, the members of Tribunal III acted with high 
diligence and impressive impartiality. According to Baestlein, the judges in 
the Justice Trial had not heard much about the circumstances in Germany 
during the war, and were confronted almost completely unprepared with the 
onset of barbarity in Germany‟s modern era between 1933 and 1945;231 
before their eyes it opened up how a “Volk der Dichter und Denker” (a 
nation of poets and philosophers) left the circle of civilised nations and 
immediately turned into a “Volk der Richter und Henker” (a nation of 
judges and hangmen).
232
 
Although understandably shocked by this, the judgment and 
sentences of Tribunal III indicate an instinctive feeling and great care in 
evaluating the situation of German law and lawyers during the Nazi 
regime.
233
 Considering the given facts the defendants were tried for, the 
Tribunal, in the end, showed an exemplary impartiality. Therefore, I 
conclude with the words of Lueders, written in regard to the trial before the 
International Military Tribunal, but which, in my opinion, are equally valid 
for the Justice Trial:
234
 
At the beginning many may have thought the Nuremberg judges were not 
fit for the task because as citizens of the victorious states they would not 
face the defendants free from hatred, passion, and national prejudice. 
Many may therefore have thought of a trial by German judges as more 
just. But today, when the judgment of Nuremberg and the reaction to it 
among the German population is known, only malevolent persons and 
hardened National Socialists can doubt the real objectivity of these 
judges. 
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B The Prosecution 
 
On 2 May 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US Government 
created the Office of the Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis 
Criminality (OCCPAC).
235
 Supreme Court Justice Robert H Jackson was 
appointed Chief of Counsel and, accordingly, became the Chief Prosecutor 
for the United States in the major trial against the Nazi leaders before the 
International Military Tribunal.
236
 
In November 1945, the Subsequent Proceeding Division within 
OCCPAC (SPD-OCCPAC) was established to prepare the American zone 
trials under Control Council Law No. 10.
237
 Colonel Telford Taylor was 
named head of the division.
238
 Later on, in March 1946, Taylor was also 
named the successor of Jackson and received the military rank of Brigadier 
General,
239
 but it was not until October 1946, after the International Military 
Tribunal had come to a close, when Taylor replaced Jackson.
240
 
During Jackson‟s term, Taylor was subordinate of and accountable 
to Jackson, who himself reported directly to US President Truman.
241
 Yet, 
after the major trial was finished and Jackson had resigned, this changed.
242
 
On 24 October 1946, the OCCPAC was dissolved and succeeded by the 
Office of the Chief of Counsel for War Crimes (OCCWC), which was 
created as a division of the Office of the US Military Government for 
Germany (OMGUS).
243
 Taylor was appointed as the new Chief of Counsel 
and Chief Prosecutor for the United States by Military Governor General 
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McNarney,
244
 and from now on, was no longer accountable to the President 
but to the Military Governor.
245
 
 
1 The prosecutors and their qualifications 
 
As mentioned before, Chief Prosecutor Taylor was not convinced 
about the quality of his staff for the subsequent trials.
246
 As well as being 
hard for the War Department to find adequate judges, it was hard for the 
OCCWC to find qualified prosecutors.
247
 It was even harder as the task of 
recruiting and selecting suitable lawyers for all 12 subsequent trials was on 
Taylor and his office alone, alongside with all the other executive and 
administrative tasks necessary to hold trials of such dimensions, including 
the selection of the defendants, interrogations of witnesses and suspects, 
handling of linguistic problems, cooperation with other governments, 
organisation of all physical facilities, technical and other equipment, staff 
recruitment and so forth.
248
 
Consequently, in his Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on 
the Nuernberg War Crimes Trials under Control Council Law No. 10, he 
retrospectively complained about the huge amount of administrative 
responsibilities, which were imposed solely on the prosecution.
249
 His 
complaint was confirmed by the figures, which are truly impressive: 
In total, 1,200 court sessions were held by the 12 tribunals, and the 
transcripts of these proceedings exceeded 330,000 pages;
250
 in July 1946, 
the staff of OCCWC numbered 113, by the end of the year 1,000 and at its 
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peak in October 1947 1,774;
251
 an enormous amount of pages was translated 
by OCCWC throughout the trials, 133,762 pages alone between September 
1947 and September 1948;
252
 an average of 175,000 copies were made per 
month;
253
 the prosecution offered 605 different document books with a total 
amount of over 6 million pages, including 46,000 copies of these books;
254
 
and approximately 10,000 interrogations were conducted by OCCWC 
between October 1946 and October 1948.
255
 
By looking at these figures, it becomes clear what Taylor meant 
when he stated: “The task which the Division faced was enormous and 
complex, and the recruitment problem was correspondingly difficult.”256 
The recruitment of lawyers was only one part of the duties of OCCWC, and 
perhaps, explains the overall lack of quality of the selected persons. 
However, in the Justice Case, Taylor had formed at an early stage a 
prosecution team mainly from personnel of the Ministries Division within 
OCCWC,
257
 and placed it under the direction of Charles M LaFollette, who 
was appointed Deputy Chief Counsel.
258
 Besides Taylor as the Chief of 
Counsel, LaFollette became the face of the prosecution in the Justice Trial. 
They were assisted by the Associate Counsels Robert D King and Alfred M 
Wooleyhan, and Assistant Counsel Sadie B Arbuthnot.
259
 
Due to limited space, a broad look will be undertaken only in regard 
to Taylor‟s and LaFollette‟s biographies. Nevertheless, it is well-recognised 
that the work and success of the prosecution counsel depended on the whole 
team and not on these two persons only. 
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(a) Taylor 
 
Telford Taylor was born in 1908 and died in 1998.
260
 He was a 
superior student and graduated from Harvard Law School in 1932.
261
 Due to 
his brilliance, he soon became a protégé of the prominent professor and 
Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter.
262
 Before Taylor joined the Army 
in October 1942, he worked in various federal offices of the United States, 
including the Department of Justice, which gave him many appearances 
before the Supreme Court and put him in first contact with Robert H 
Jackson.
263
 
During the war, he worked for the US Army Intelligence Service in 
England, which helped him to gain expertise on Germany that he later used 
at the war crimes trials.
264
 In 1944, he was appointed Military Attaché in the 
US Embassy in London, and in 1946, he became an assistant of the Chief 
Prosecutor for the first Nuremberg Trial Jackson.
265
 
Despite the increasing calls for vengeance after the revelations of 
Nazi atrocities mounted, Taylor, together with Jackson, remained committed 
to conducting fair proceedings within a defined legal framework.
266
 
Throughout his life, Taylor was a strong advocate of the new international 
law, which was created with his help in the London Agreement and its 
annexed Charter, even when it was uncomfortable for the Allies itself; for 
example, he condemned the lifelong imprisonment of Rudolf Hess
267
 in 
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Berlin‟s Spandau Prison by saying that “such long-continued incarceration, 
especially in a huge prison where he was the sole inmate, was a crime 
against humanity.”268 
In the decades after the Nuremberg Trials, Taylor became famous 
and highly considered for his criticism of US politics and actions in 
Vietnam, Nicaragua and Bosnia.
269
 He also was among the first opponents 
of Senator McCarthy‟s Anti-Communism programme in the United States in 
the 1950s.
270
 
Taylor left the Army in 1949, highly decorated by the United States 
and several foreign governments, and returned to New York to practice 
law.
271
 Until his death, he taught at prominent law schools like Columbia, 
Harvard, Yale and Cardozo;
272
 and he was the author of several books, 
including The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials (1992) and the award 
winning Munich: The Price of Peace (1979).
273
 
 
(b) LaFollette 
 
Charles M LaFollette was born in 1898 and died in 1974.
274
 He 
served in the US Army during World War I and, afterwards, studied law at 
Vanderbilt University.
275
 In 1925, he was admitted to the bar and 
commenced practice in Evansville/Indiana.
276
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LaFollette was a prominent lawyer as well as a politician, and he was 
a member of the Indiana State House of Representatives from 1927 to 
1929.
277
 In 1943, he was elected as a member of the Republican Party for 
the US House of Representatives.
278
 He served two terms until 3 January 
1947, but was not a candidate for re-election, due to his assignment as 
Deputy Chief of Counsel in Nuremberg.
279
 
Like Taylor, LaFollette was strongly convinced of the necessity of a 
fair trial in respect to the historic significance of the Nuremberg war crimes 
trials and, therefore, became a strong advocate against the accusation of 
victor‟s justice. In 1948, he stated:280 
I believe that not only a real contribution was made to the body of 
international law by the trial of this case but also that valuable lessons can 
be learned by the legal profession and by laymen all over the world from 
the evidence produced there. If a person distrusts the fairness of the 
procedure he undervaluates the important principles of international law 
announced and applied in this case. 
After the Justice Trial was finished, LaFollette became the Director 
of the US Office of Military Government for Wuerttemberg-Baden in 
Southwest Germany.
281
 He held this position from December 1947 to 
January 1949, before returning to the United States where he went back in 
his old life as a lawyer and politician.
282
 
 
2 Conclusion 
 
Between the creation of OCCWC on 24 October 1946 and its 
deactivation on 20 June 1949,
283
 its staff accomplished an outstanding 
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performance in both quantity and quality of the work of the prosecution 
counsel in all 12 subsequent trials. The task, the division was confronted 
with, could have just as well been a lifetime process, but it was all managed 
and finished in less than three years. 
All US officials agreed that the trials should be completed quickly 
after the war, but most of them had underestimated the size and difficulty of 
the programme.
284
 As a result, there was not enough time and resources to 
recruit the best of the best for the prosecution teams. Additionally, military 
rules like the spousal ban made it extra hard to find willing lawyers, until it 
was overturned.
285
 However, the evidence given by German documents was 
so overwhelming that it was a much easier job to prosecute than to judge.
286
 
In the Justice Trial, the leading figures for the prosecution were 
Charles M LaFollette and Telford Taylor. Whether or not LaFollette had a 
good legal knowledge of international law and the functioning of the 
German law system, he was limited to the principles and rules set by the 
London Agreement, its annexed Charter, Control Council Law No. 10 and 
US Ordinance No. 7 anyhow. 
Also, it is likely that the knowledge about the German judiciary and 
the role of the German jurists in general was poor outside Germany at the 
time. By preparing the indictment, Taylor, LaFollette and their team had to 
study the German legal documents, which were captured by the Allied 
forces all over Europe during and after the war, intensively. As a result, they 
automatically became experts of the German law system under the Nazis. 
Additionally, Taylor was regarded as one of the best US jurists of his 
generation, and he proved this by excellent performances in court during the 
subsequent trials.
287
 As Herbert Wechsler, a prominent legal scholar himself 
who had worked together with Taylor in Nuremberg, put it: “If I was asked 
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to name the person of my generation whom I most admired, I would 
promptly answer Telford Taylor. … wise counselor, persuasive advocate, 
careful scholar, all the qualities that signify distinction … were his 
degree.”288 
 
C The Defendants 
 
From the very beginning, it was planned by the US authorities that 
the defendants in the Nuremberg Trials should represent all major segments 
of the Third Reich, including government officials, SS, police and Party 
officials, military leaders, bankers and industrialists.
289
 
When the organisation of the trials began, it was soon realised that 
only a few persons out of the hundreds of thousands of potential candidates 
could possibly be tried.
290
 Including those individuals which were members 
of a Nazi organisation declared criminal by the International Military 
Tribunal, the total number was no less than an estimated two million 
persons in all of Germany and approximately 500,000 in the US occupation 
zone.
291
 
There was no way for OCCWC to deal with such an amount of 
people and, therefore, the vast majority of these cases were excluded from 
the Nuremberg proceedings and handled under the so called denazification 
programme.
292
 However, there were still several thousands of persons 
left.
293
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The selection of the defendants was the exclusive responsibility of 
the Chief of Counsel Telford Taylor,
294
 who had realised early that only a 
maximum of a few hundred persons could be tried, but these
295
 
should be those highly placed individuals who bore the greatest 
responsibility for formulating and ordering the execution of the criminal 
policies which directly led to and instigated the aggressive wars and mass 
atrocities launched and committed under the authority of the Third Reich. 
With these self-made high expectations, Taylor started the selection 
process by firstly making a list of several thousand suspects, and then 
reducing this list on and on until he held 570 persons in confinement.
296
 In 
the end, with the assistance of his large staff, 185 individuals were finally 
selected for indictment at the 12 subsequent Nuremberg Trials.
297
 
Concerning the Justice Case, 16 leading Nazi jurists were selected, 
but only 14 were actually tried.
298
 Carl Westphal committed suicide in his 
cell in Nuremberg, and a mistrial was declared in Karl Engert‟s case 
because of illness.
299
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1 Selection criteria 
 
As mentioned above, it was the intention of Taylor and his staff to 
bring to trial the leaders and key figures of Nazi Germany‟s judiciary.300 
However, its highest leaders could no longer be prosecuted: Reich Minister 
of Justice Franz Guertner had died in 1941; his successor, Otto Georg 
Thierack, had committed suicide in a British internment camp in 1946; 
Erwin Bumke, President of the Reichsgericht, had also committed suicide as 
the US Army was entering the city of Leipzig in 1945; and the infamous 
President of the People‟s Court, Roland Freisler, had been killed in Berlin in 
an air raid in March 1945.
301
 
Hence, the principal defendant in the dock was Franz 
Schlegelberger, Acting Reich Minister of Justice from 29 January 1941 to 
20 August 1942.
302
 The other defendants included several more high-
ranking officials of the Reich Ministry of Justice, the Chief Prosecutor of 
the People‟s Court and several prosecutors and judges of both the People‟s 
Court and Special Courts.
303
 
The defendants in the Justice Trial were selected for different 
reasons, but mainly because they were the highest-ranking available 
officials among the German jurists. Nevertheless, after the most prominent 
faces of the German judiciary had disappeared, the selection process was a 
difficult task for the prosecution. 
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(a) General aspects 
 
In general, the prosecution had based its final selection of the 
individuals to be indicted in the 12 subsequent trials on four basic factors: 
Firstly, the collection and analysis of written and oral evidence, and 
what the evidence showed concerning the activities of particular 
individuals.
304
 The existence of substantial evidence was an absolute 
necessity, because it was a firm policy of OCCWC not to indict anyone 
without such.
305
 
Secondly, the use of deductive and inductive methods of 
investigation based on the knowledge of the prosecution staff members 
about the organisation and functioning of the law system in the Third 
Reich.
306
 The staff members were expected to familiarise themselves as 
rapidly as possible with it.
307
 Additionally, a special section within OCCWC 
was set up to compile a list of who’s who of leading German politicians, 
civil servants, military men, business men and others.
308
 
The third factor was the availability of individuals.
309
 Many war 
crime suspects were not located until a year or more after the end of the war, 
and some were under arrest but not available for trial or were held under 
arrest in other occupation zones and not available for the US authorities.
310
 
Fourthly, the number of individuals to be tried depended on the 
overall policy and on administrative factors such as time, staff and 
money.
311
 For legal and policy reasons, the trials were planned to be 
completed without unnecessary delay, when the evidence was still fresh and 
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the general public was still interested.
312
 Administrative issues were of a 
more practical nature but inevitable, for example, the size of the defendants‟ 
docks in the courtrooms.
313
 
Altogether, these criteria helped the prosecution to separate the 
wheat from the chaff. Nevertheless, tribute had to be paid in regard to the 
limited facilities available at the location where the trials were held, the 
Nuremberg Palace of Justice.
314
 Accordingly, Taylor stated self-critically in 
1949:
315
 
It should be made perfectly clear that the individuals indicted under Law 
No. 10 were a small minority of those who, on the basis of the available 
evidence, appeared and probably could be proved to be guilty of criminal 
conduct. … The responsibility for the selection of defendants in the 
Nuernberg trials under Law No. 10 was mine alone, and the blame for any 
mistakes that were made is equally mine. 
 
(b) Individual aspects 
 
The selection of the specific defendants in the Justice Trial was 
based on a mixture of availability of the persons and severity of their 
offences. As mentioned before, the highest leaders of the German judiciary 
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could no longer be tried,
316
 and therefore, the next level of jurist leaders 
came into focus. 
Primarily, these were eight high ranked officials of the Reich 
Ministry of Justice and members of both the People‟s Court and Special 
Courts.
317
 The prosecution put its focus especially on these institutions 
because the Ministry was the administrative supreme authority within the 
German law system, and the People‟s Court as well as the Special Courts 
had been a special creation of the Nazis with a focus on so called political 
offences.
318
 
 
(i) Officials of the Reich Ministry of Justice 
 
The Ministry of Justice was hierarchically structured, and the eight 
selected defendants for the Justice Trial all held high positions within the 
institution.
319
 
Josef Altstoetter was Chief of the Civil Law and Procedure Division 
in the Reich Ministry of Justice; he also was a member of the SS.
320
 
Wilhelm von Ammon was the Ministerial Counsellor of the Criminal 
Legislation and Administration Division in the Reich Ministry of Justice; he 
also was the coordinator of proceedings against foreigners for offences 
against Reich occupational forces abroad.
321
 
Guenther Joel was Legal Adviser to the Reich Minister of Justice 
concerning criminal prosecutions; also, he was the Chief Public Prosecutor 
of Westphalia at Hamm and a member of the SS and SD.
322
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Herbert Klemm was State Secretary in the Reich Ministry of Justice; 
he also was the Director of the Legal Education and Training Division in the 
Ministry, Deputy Director of the National Socialist Lawyers League and a 
member of the SA.
323
 
Wolfgang Mettgenberg held the position of Representative of the 
Chief of the Criminal Legislation and Administration Division in the Reich 
Ministry of Justice; in particular, he supervised criminal offences against 
German occupational forces in occupied territories.
324
 
Curt Rothenberger held the position of State Secretary in the Reich 
Ministry of Justice; additionally, he was Deputy President of the Academy 
of German Law and a Regional Leader of the National Socialist Lawyers 
League.
325
 
Franz Schlegelberger was a State Secretary in the Ministry of 
Justice, before becoming the Acting Reich Minister of Justice from 29 
January 1941 to 20 August 1942.
326
 
Carl Westphal was Ministerial Counsellor of the Criminal 
Legislation and Administration Division in the Reich Ministry of Justice; he 
was responsible for questions of criminal procedure and penal execution 
within the Reich; additionally, he was the Ministry coordinator for nullity 
pleas against adjudicated sentences.
327
 
 
(ii) Members of the National Socialist People‟s Court 
 
The Volksgerichtshof (People‟s Court) was established on 24 April 
1934, and was created to further the aims of National Socialism.
328
 
                                                          
323
 Ibid, 16. 
324
 Ibid. 
325
 Ibid. 
326
 Ibid. 
327
 Ibid, 16-17. 
328
 Mueller, above n 120, 140. 
 83 
Subdivided into a number of senates and departments, its tribunals consisted 
each of two judges and five officials of the Nazi Party.
329
 
Contrary to the widespread opinion of the general public, the 
People‟s Court was not the superior court of Germany (that was the 
Supreme Court in Leipzig) but an elite court with virtually exclusive 
jurisdiction over cases of treason and high treason, espionage and 
undermining of national defence.
330
 The People‟s Court soon became 
infamous for its severe sentences; between 1937 and 1944, 14,319 
defendants were indicted, of whom 5,191 received the death penalty.
331
 
Six of the defendants in the Justice Trial had been members of the 
People‟s Court and worked there either as judges or public prosecutors. 
Paul Barnickel was a Senior Public Prosecutor of the People‟s Court; 
at the same time he was a member of the SA.
332
 
Karl Engert was Vice President of the People‟s Court; additionally, 
he held the position of Chief of the Penal Administration Division and of the 
secret Prison Inmate Transfer Division in the Reich Ministry of Justice; he 
also was a member of the SS and the NSDAP Leadership Corps.
333
 
Ernst Lautz was the Chief Public Prosecutor of the People‟s Court.334 
Guenther Nebelung was Chief Justice of the Fourth Senate of the 
People‟s Court; he also was a member of the SA and of the NSDAP 
Leadership Corps.
335
 
Hans Petersen was a Lay Judge of both the First Senate and the 
Special Senate of the People‟s Court; he was a member of the SA.336 
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Oswald Rothaug was a Senior Public Prosecutor of the People‟s 
Court; before, he had been the former Chief Justice of the Special Court in 
Nuremberg; he also was a member of the NSDAP Leadership Corps at 
regional level.
337
 
 
(iii) Members of National Socialist Special Courts 
 
On 21 March 1933, soon after the Nazis had taken over the German 
Government, so called Sondergerichte (Special Courts) were erected within 
each of the 26 Court of Appeals districts in Germany.
338
 They soon became 
an effective tool against the political opposition, as the defendants had no 
right to appeal verdicts and the sentences took effect immediately.
339
 During 
the war, Special Courts were also erected in the occupied territories.
340
 
The courts had jurisdiction over all crimes that threatened the 
National Socialist state and ideology, such as violations of all directives of 
the national government, incitement to such violations that caused public 
danger, high treason, arson, sabotage and aggravated insurrection.
341
 Like 
the People‟s Court, the Special Courts became infamous for their harsh 
sentences, including more than 15,000 death penalties.
342
 In fact, the Special 
Courts fulfilled the dream of the Nazi leaders “of a judicial system in which 
the harshest of sentences could be imposed after a minimum of 
formalities”343. 
Three of the defendants in the Justice Trial had been members of 
Special Courts, including Oswald Rothaug who, by the end of the war, was 
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a Public Prosecutor at the People‟s Court.344 The remaining two defendants 
were Hermann Cuhorst and Rudolf Oeschey. 
Hermann Cuhorst was Chief Justice of the Special Court in Stuttgart 
and Chief Justice of the First Criminal Senate of the District Court in 
Stuttgart; he also was a member of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party 
and a sponsoring member of the SS.
345
 
Rudolf Oeschey was a Judge of the Special Court in Nuremberg and 
successor of the defendant Rothaug as Chief Justice of the same court; he 
was a member of the NSDAP Leadership Corps at regional level and an 
executive of the National Socialist Lawyers League.
346
 
 
2 Conclusion 
 
The selection of the defendants in the Justice Trial was done with 
great care and accuracy by the prosecution. Furthermore, the selection 
criteria were legitimate and comprehensible. However, it is interesting that 
no legal scholar or defence lawyer was indicted. 
In the case of lawyers it is perhaps understandable, because they had, 
at least formally, the function of defending defendants against the 
accusations of the National Socialist State, but scholars had been an 
important factor of spreading the Nazi ideology and the decline of law 
during the Third Reich.
347
 
Certainly the most prominent Nazi scholar was the so called state 
thinker of the Third Reich Carl Schmitt. As early as 1934 he stated: “The 
whole of German law today … must be governed solely and exclusively by 
the spirit of National Socialism … Every interpretation must be an 
                                                          
344
 See Part III C 1 (b) (ii) Members of the National Socialist People‟s Court. 
345
 Justice Case, above n 9, 15. 
346
 Ibid, 16. 
347
 Mueller, above n 120, 68. 
 86 
interpretation according to National Socialism.”348 Together with other 
leading National Socialist professors, for example Ernst Forsthoff, Ernst 
Rudolf Haber and Theodor Maunz, he was the originator of the new Nazi 
doctrines in the field of law.
349
 
It is an embarrassing fact for post-war Germany that the majority of 
these professors retained their positions or returned to them in the 1950s, 
Maunz even became a co-editor and co-author of the leading commentary to 
the new German Basic Law of 1949,
350
 but in regard to the Nuremberg war 
crimes trials they could hardly be accused. 
Although they helped to build the legal basis for the Nazi state, they 
did not participate directly in the Nazi legislation or the execution of these 
laws. Therefore, in the end, it makes more sense that Ministry officials and 
judges were indicted rather than those who were responsible only indirectly. 
Furthermore, the selection of the individual defendants cannot be 
seen as arbitrary. No doubt that there were many other judges or officials in 
the German judiciary who could also have been selected for the trial, 
especially among the Special Court Judges, but it could never be an 
acceptable argument against the selection of the 16 defendants. The limited 
resources simply made it impossible for the US Military Government to try 
all potential war criminals at Nuremberg. 
Also, it cannot be said that the selection process spared highly 
respected persons or prominent individuals. Schlegelberger, for example, 
was held in high esteem by the public. He had an excellent reputation, and 
many people labelled him as the last decent jurist under Hitler.
351
 I agree 
with Taylor who stated:
352
 
The trials under Law No. 10 … explored the record and judged the 
conduct of a large number of men, who were not „professional Nazis‟ but 
who occupied key positions in the Third Reich, such as career diplomats, 
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doctors, lawyers and judges, businessmen, and military leaders. Whatever 
mistakes were made at Nuernberg, and no doubt there were many, I do 
not think it can ever be seriously charged that wealth, prestige, or the 
„garments of respectability‟ served to protect from indictment any 
individual against whom substantial evidence appeared to exist, or that 
any group or category was singled out for either favourable or severe 
treatment. 
Overall, it is obvious that the 185 indictments in the subsequent 
Nuremberg Trials constituted only a minute fraction of the hundreds of 
thousands of suspected Nazi criminals who remained at large,
353
 but nobody 
can seriously complain that those, who were finally indicted in the Justice 
Case, did not belong there. 
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IV TRIAL-PROCEEDINGS 
 
After the indictment had been filed on 4 January 1947, and the 
defendants had been arraigned on 17 February 1947, the Justice Trial 
officially opened on 5 March 1947 with the opening statement of the 
prosecution.
354
 The trial needed 129 court sessions, lasted 11 month and the 
English transcript of the proceedings comprised 10,964 mimeographed 
pages.
355
 The final statements of the defendants were heard on 18 October 
1947, and the judgment and sentences were delivered on 3 and 4 December 
1947.
356
 
In this chapter, firstly, the charges against the defendants and their 
compatibility with existing international law and principles at the time will 
be analysed. In terms of victor‟s justice, it will be asked whether the charges 
were only a creation of the victorious Allies to hide the exercise of 
vengeance behind a smokescreen of legality or were the proper expression 
of international criminal law. 
A conclusion will be drawn stating that the charges did change but 
not violate international law and, therefore, justified the trial. However, the 
fact that they were applied only on the defeated Germans has to be 
evaluated as an example of victor‟s justice. 
Secondly, the chapter will look at certain aspects of the trial-
proceedings and asks the question whether the defendants were treated 
fairly. It will be concluded that the defendants received a fair trial and the 
Americans, herewith, set a remarkable example for the proceedings of 
subsequent international tribunals. 
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A The Creation of a New International Criminal Law 
 
The charges against the defendants in the Justice Trial were based on 
the crimes defined in Article II section (1) of Allied Control Council Law 
No. 10, which by itself had its origins in the London Agreement and the 
London Charter.
357
 Herein, the Allies had established four new categories of 
crimes to try and punish the German war criminals: (a) crimes against 
peace; (b) war crimes; (c) crimes against humanity; and (d) membership in 
criminal organisations.
358
 
Especially the categories of crimes against peace and crimes against 
humanity became a target of heavy criticism by many legal experts,
359
 but 
only the category of crimes against humanity is relevant here as no 
defendant in the Justice Trial was charged with crimes against peace. 
The criticism and also the arguments of the defence, not only in the 
Justice Trial but in all Nuremberg Trials were based on two principal 
subjects: (1) the violation of the ex post facto principle; and (2) the excuse 
of just obeying superior orders in relation to the issue of individual 
liability.
360
 Additionally, the tu quoque argument was raised and questioned 
the legitimacy of the whole concept of the Allied war crimes trials 
programme.
361
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1 The charges and their development 
 
In his opening statement for the Justice Trial, Chief Prosecutor 
Telford Taylor declared:
362
 
… the root of the accusation here is that those men, leaders of the German 
judicial system, consciously and deliberately suppressed the law, engaged 
in an unholy masquerade of brutish tyranny disguised as justice, and 
converted the German judicial system to an engine of despotism, 
conquest, pillage, and slaughter. 
The indictment of the trial contained 34 allegations, which were 
arranged under four counts: (a) conspiracy to commit war crimes and crimes 
against humanity; (b) war crimes; (c) crimes against humanity; and (d) 
membership in criminal organisations.
363
 All defendants were charged with 
the first three counts, only seven of the defendants were charged with the 
fourth count.
364
 
Basically, the indictment charged the defendants with participation 
in a common design involving the assumption by the Ministry of Justice of 
total control over the administration of justice and the use of the judicial 
process as a weapon for the persecution and extermination of all opponents 
of the Nazi regime and for the persecution and extermination of races.
365
 
Taylor outlined the core of the charges in his opening statement as 
follows:
366
 
In summary, the defendants are charged with judicial murder and other 
atrocities which they committed by destroying law and justice in 
Germany, and by then utilizing the emptied forms of legal process for 
persecution, enslavement, and extermination on a vast scale. 
                                                          
362
 Justice Case, above n 9, 31. 
363
 Ibid, 17-26; See also Part III A 2 Independence of the judges from US post-war politics. 
364
 Justice Case, above n 9, 17-26. 
365
 Katrina Gustafson “Altstoetter and others (The Justice Trial)” in Antonio Cassese (ed) 
The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2009) 582. 
366
 Justice Case, above n 9, 32-33. 
 92 
And in an essay, written in 1949 and part of his Final Report, he 
added more specifically:
367
 
The indictment charged that the defendants in the Ministry of Justice had 
participated in drafting and enacting unlawful orders and decrees, such as 
those which discriminated against Poles, Jews, and others in occupied 
territory, and the notorious „Nacht und Nebel‟ (Night and Fog) decree 
under which civilians in the occupied territories were spirited away to 
Germany for secret trial before special „courts.‟
368
 The defendants were 
also charged with imprisoning and killing Jews, and other members of 
groups to which the Nazis were hostile, by trials which were a flagrant 
travesty of the judicial process, and divers other offenses. 
 
(a) Conspiracy to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity 
 
All defendants were charged with conspiracy to commit war crimes 
and crimes against humanity, and the unlawful participation in the 
formulation and execution of plans to commit war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.
369
 
As mentioned before, the conspiracy charge was a favourite of the 
American prosecution at Nuremberg.
370
 It was introduced in the London 
Charter against the resistance of the French and Soviet delegations, and it 
became the count for which the American prosecutors took responsibility at 
the trial before the International Military Tribunal.
371
 Consequently, the 
charge of conspiracy also became an important part of the indictment at the 
Justice Trial. 
Attacked by legal experts during the trial of the major war criminals 
before the International Military Tribunal already, it was mainly criticised 
that the concept of conspiracy was a new one to continental law and had 
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developed in Anglo-Saxon law only.
372
 Furthermore, the critics argued that 
“members and leaders of bands of criminals may be made responsible for all 
crimes of the band, even if they cannot be shown to have participated 
actively in each individual crime”, but in the case of Nazi crimes it “does 
not provide any clear limit and is too little adapted to political reality” as it 
would “make every leading National Socialist responsible for all crimes of 
the regime.”373 
On these grounds, the charge of conspiracy was objected by the 
defence in several cases of the subsequent Nuremberg Trials.
374
 On 9 July 
1947, five US military tribunals, including Tribunal III which was in charge 
for the Justice Trial, held a joint session to hear the arguments of both 
defence and prosecution in regard to the sufficiency of counts, which 
charged defendants with conspiracy to commit war crimes and crimes 
against humanity as a separate offence.
375
 
In the end, Military Tribunal III disregarded the count, because it 
found that it had no jurisdiction under the London Charter or Control 
Council Law No. 10 to try conspiracy as a substantive crime.
376
 
Additionally, the Tribunal stated:
377
 
This Tribunal has held that it has no jurisdiction to try any defendant for 
the crime of conspiracy as a separate substantive offense, but we 
recognize that there are allegations in count one of the indictment which 
constitute charges of direct commission of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. However, after eliminating the conspiracy charge from count 
one, we find that all other alleged criminal acts therein set forth and 
committed after 1 September 1939 are also charged as crimes in the 
subsequent counts of the indictment. We therefore find it unnecessary to 
pass formally upon the remaining charges in count one. Our 
pronouncements of guilt or innocence under counts two, three, and four 
dispose of all issues which have been submitted to us. 
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Thus, in the view of Military Tribunal III, the lack of jurisdiction did 
not lead to a lack of punishment of certain actions of the defendants, 
because those actions were also covered by the other counts. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that count one included crimes 
committed in the period between January 1933, the time when the Nazis 
took over power in Germany, and April 1945, the time when World War II 
came to an end, whereas the other counts charged only crimes committed 
between September 1939, the start of the war, and April 1945.
378
 As a result, 
the judgment of the Justice Trial, at the end, was limited to crimes 
committed during World War II, and did not include any evaluation of 
actions of the defendants in times of peace. 
 
(b) War crimes 
 
Count two charged all the defendants with war crimes, including 
plunder, murder, torture, illegal imprisonment and brutalities, atrocities and 
other inhumane acts, against thousands of civilians of territories occupied by 
Germany during the war and against soldiers of countries at war with 
Germany, committed during the period between September 1939 and April 
1945.
379
 
The main allegations were that the Ministry of Justice had 
participated in the execution of Hitler‟s Night and Fog Decree and the Nazi 
programme of racial purity, had aided and implemented the unlawful 
annexation and occupation of Czechoslovakia, Poland and France, and had 
granted immunity to and amnesty for Nazi Party members who had been 
prosecuted and convicted of major crimes.
380
 
Codified for the first time in international law by Article 6 (b) of the 
London Charter and Article II section (1) (b) of Control Council Law No. 
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10,
381
 this count was less subject to legal controversies during the 
Nuremberg Trials than other charges, because it was principally based on 
well-established traditional law like the Hague Convention of 1907 and 
annexed regulations concerning the laws and customs of war on land.
382
 
However, it established individual criminal responsibility at the 
international level, whereas the Hague Regulations of 1907 had provided 
that only states could be liable for compensation for acts committed by 
members of their armed forces.
383
 
In its judgment, Military Tribunal III evaluated the concept of war 
crimes as established in the London Charter and Control Council Law No. 
10 not as the creation of a new offence, but the first extensive embodiment 
of acts in violation of the laws and customs of war.
384
 It stated:
385
 
Here we observe the controlling effect of common international law as 
such, for the statutes by which we are governed have adopted and 
incorporated the rules of international law as the rules by which war 
crimes are to be identified. 
The concept of war crimes was limited to cover criminal acts against 
non-Germans only and, therefore, did not include atrocities committed by 
Germans against their own nationals.
386
 According to Tribunal III, this was 
expressed very clearly in Article 6 of the London Charter which restricted 
the listed acts of war crimes towards the population, soldiers or property “of 
or in occupied territory” only.387 
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Similarly, the Tribunal interpreted Article II section (1) (b) of 
Control Council Law No. 10, which at one place limited several war crimes 
acts towards the “civilian population from occupied territory.”388 
 
(c) Crimes against humanity 
 
Under count three, all defendants were charged with crimes against 
humanity, including murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, 
illegal imprisonment, torture, persecution on political, racial and religious 
grounds, ill-treatment and other inhumane acts against German civilians and 
nationals of occupied territories, committed between September 1939 and 
April 1945.
389
 
The allegations were basically similar to those charged under count 
two, with the addition of the accusation that special health courts perverted 
eugenic and sterilisation laws or policies which resulted in the systematic 
murder and ill-treatment of thousands of persons, and the accusation that 
German family and inheritance laws were changed by the Ministry of 
Justice for the sole purpose of confiscating Jewish properties.
390
 Count 
three, therefore, was wider than count two and, most notably, included 
criminal acts committed against German nationals.
391
 
The charges of count three were based on Article 6 (c) of the London 
Charter and Article II section (1) (c) of Control Council Law No. 10.
392
 
When looking at the definitions of war crimes and crimes against humanity 
in these regulations, it becomes clear that war crimes may also constitute 
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crimes against humanity, because the same offences may amount to both 
types of crime.
393
 
Yet, the concept of crimes against humanity is broader than war 
crimes in that criminal acts can be committed in either peace or war against 
one‟s own citizens.394 In its judgment, Military Tribunal III stated:395 
[The sections of crimes against humanity as defined in the London 
Charter and Control Council Law No. 10] supplement the preceding 
sections on war crimes and include within their prohibition not only war 
crimes, but also acts not included within the preceding definition of war 
crimes. In place of atrocities committed against civilians of or in or from 
occupied territory, these sections prohibit atrocities „against any civilian 
population‟. … C.C. Law 10 clearly demonstrates that acts by Germans 
against German nationals may constitute crimes against humanity within 
the jurisdiction of this Tribunal to punish. 
However, Tribunal III also narrowed down the scope of crimes 
against humanity by saying that isolated offences do not constitute crimes 
against humanity, and that the proof of systematic governmental 
organisation of the acts is a necessary element of the crime. It stated:
396
 
We hold that crimes against humanity as defined in C.C. Law 10 must be 
strictly construed to exclude isolated cases of atrocity or persecution 
whether committed by private individuals or by governmental authority. 
As we construe it, that section provides for punishment of crimes against 
German nationals only when there is proof of conscious participation in 
systematic government organized or approved procedures amounting to 
atrocities and offenses of the kind specified in the act and committed 
against populations or amounting to persecutions on political, racial, or 
religious grounds. 
The concept of crimes against humanity was discussed among legal 
experts before, during and after the Nuremberg Trials. Prior to Nuremberg, 
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crimes against humanity did not exist as a legal category.
397
 It was codified 
for the first time in the London Charter for the International Military 
Tribunal, because some of the atrocities committed by the Nazis during 
World War II, such as the planned and systematic persecution and 
extermination of the European Jews and Gypsies and many other inhumane 
acts based on political, racial or religious grounds, did not qualify as war 
crimes under existing international law.
398
 
Yet, there was uncertainty whether the new concept of crimes 
against humanity as established in the London Charter was just the 
codification of common international law or the creation of something 
completely new.
399
 
Critics like Otto Kranzbuehler, a German lawyer who represented 
Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz in the trial against the major war criminals 
before the International Military Tribunal, and who was one of the leading 
defenders in the cases of the subsequent Nuremberg Trials against the 
German industrialists Friedrich Flick (Case 5) and Alfried Krupp (Case 
10),
400
 stated that the typical feature of this crime was its characterisation as 
a governmental crime and, therefore, “the acceptance of this crime 
necessarily includes the liability of the perpetrators, namely the 
government.”401 As a result, he argued: “Such a crime clearly offers a 
possibility for intervention by any foreign power in the domestic policy of a 
defeated country before and during the war, depending only on vastly 
undefined moral concepts.”402 
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In Kranzbuehler‟s view, the concept of crimes against humanity was 
a new one and violated international law by granting foreign governments 
the right to interfere into a state‟s sovereignty.403 Military Tribunal III had a 
different view. It stated:
404
 
The force of circumstance, the grim fact of world-wide interdependence, 
and the moral pressure of public opinion have resulted in international 
recognition that certain crimes against humanity committed by Nazi 
authority against German nationals constituted violations not alone of 
statute but also of common international law. 
Regarding the novelty of crimes against humanity and the possibility 
of interventions into another state‟s sovereignty, it is true that the 
codification of the concept was new. However, historically, the concept was 
not new at all. 
In 1827, for example, England, France and Russia intervened in the 
Greco-Turkish warfare to end the atrocities;
405
 in 1840, President Van Buren 
intervened in Turkish affairs on behalf of the prosecuted Jews of Damascus 
and Rhodes;
406
 in 1861, the French intervened in Lebanon to check on 
religious atrocities;
407
 and in 1915, during World War I, a joint declaration 
of Great Britain, France and Russia explicitly described the Turkish 
massacres of Armenians as “crimes against humanity and civilisation.”408 
Additionally, the first Hague Convention of 1899 on Laws and Customs of 
War on Land invoked humanity as a norm and, according to Caroline 
Fournet, considered “„the laws of humanity‟ as being the mould of 
„principles of international law.‟”409 
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Also, it is a matter of fact that the elements of the newly defined 
crimes against humanity were similar to those which constituted murder, 
torture, rape and other atrocities that were and are universally proscribed.
410
 
In the end, therefore, it cannot be said that the concept of crimes 
against humanity was something completely new or unknown prior to 1945. 
Faced with the horrors committed during World War II, the Allies were not 
to repeat their failure in regard of punishing war criminals after World War 
I, and created the London Charter to let the existing concept of crimes 
against humanity finally emerge into positive international law.
411
 
Military Tribunal III concluded its evaluation of this issue with the 
following statement, which is a good summary of the outcome of the legal 
analysis above:
412
 
Whether the crime against humanity is the product of statute or of 
common international law, or, as we believe, of both, we find no injustice 
to persons tried for such crimes. They are chargeable with knowledge that 
such acts were wrong and were punishable when committed. 
 
(d) Membership in criminal organisations 
 
Seven of the defendants were charged with membership in an 
organisation declared criminal by the International Military Tribunal. The 
charges were based on Articles 9 and 10 of the London Charter, and Article 
II section (1) (d) of Control Council Law No. 10.
413
 
In its judgment, the International Military Tribunal had declared the 
following Nazi organisations as criminal: the Leadership Corps of the Nazi 
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Party, the Gestapo,
414
 the SD
415
 and the SS
416
. Altstoetter, Cuhorst, Engert 
and Joel were charged with membership in the SS; Cuhorst, Oeschey, 
Nebelung and Rothaug were charged with membership in the Leadership 
Corps of the Nazi Party; and Joel was charged with membership in the 
SD.
417
 
The count was criticised by legal experts for that it was based purely 
on the judgment of the International Military Tribunal and, according to the 
famous British General and lawyer J H Morgan, “the „views‟ of a military 
tribunal can neither change International Law nor create it.”418 
Yet, it has to be asked, in absence of a world authority in 1945, who 
if not this tribunal, which consisted of members of the four most powerful 
countries at the time and, furthermore, was fully authorised by the 
Governments of those four and 19 other countries who had signed the 
London Agreement, should have been able to judge instead.
419
 
However, the International Military Tribunal itself limited the use of 
the count only to persons who had knowledge of the criminal purposes or 
acts of the organisation, and those who voluntarily became members and 
were not drafted by the State for membership.
420
 The Tribunal introduced a 
test to determine the guilt or innocence of an individual member of a 
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criminal organisation. Hereafter, members were to be declared criminal only 
when they
421
 
became or remained members of the organisation with knowledge that it 
was being used for the commission of acts declared criminal by Article 6 
of the Charter, or … were personally implicated as members of the 
organisation in the commission of such crime. 
As a result, the final decision whether the individual member was 
guilty or not always remained at the respective court‟s own discretion.422 
Therefore, although just membership in a specific organisation could bring 
one to trial, the count itself cannot be evaluated as a violation of 
international law as the decision for guilt or innocence exclusively depended 
on the member‟s personal contribution to the crimes committed by the 
organisation. 
In its judgment, Military Tribunal III, furthermore, demonstrated 
clearly that the decision of the International Military Tribunal in respect to 
criminal organisations had no bias and the courts retained their 
independence. It stated:
423
 
C.C. Law 10 provides that we are bound by the findings as to the criminal 
nature of these groups or organisations. However, it should be added that 
the criminality of these groups and organisations is also established by the 
evidence which has been received in the pending case. Certain of the 
defendants are charged in the indictment with membership in the 
following groups or organisations which have been declared and are now 
found to be criminal, to wit: The Leadership Corps, the SD, and the SS. In 
passing upon these charges against the respective defendants, the Tribunal 
will apply the tests of criminality set forth above. 
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2 The ex post facto principle (nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine 
lege) 
 
The major point of criticism regarding the Justice Trial and all other 
Nuremberg Trials was the reproach that the newly defined crimes in the 
London Charter and Control Council Law No. 10, especially the category of 
crimes against humanity, violated the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, 
nulla poena sine lege (no crime without law, no punishment without law).
424
 
The doctrine, also known as the ex post facto principle, postulates 
“that a person may only be held criminally liable and punished if, at the 
moment when he performed a certain act, the act was regarded as a criminal 
offence by the relevant legal order.”425 
The principle derived from the era of the Enlightenment and reflects 
the idea of separation of powers after the French political thinker 
Montesquieu, who basically said that the judiciary must judge only where 
the legislation had enacted a corresponding law to protect the individual as 
the owner of inherent inviolable rights from unforeseeable and arbitrary use 
of power by the state.
426
 
The German penal code, created in 1871 and with many amendments 
used ever since, holds onto this principle until today.
427
 Only during the 
Nazi regime was the principle suspended from German criminal law.
428
 
Thus, it is an irony of fate that the defendants in the Justice Trial 
claimed protection under this principle, although they ignored it as a 
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defence plea during their terms in office and had celebrated its official 
suspension in 1935 as progress within the Nazi judicature.
429
 Military 
Tribunal III commented: “The defendants claim protection under the 
principle nullum crimen sine lege, though they withheld from others the 
benefit of that rule during the Hitler regime.”430 
Nevertheless, the objections of the defence were understandable 
from a formal point of view, and the Tribunal extensively dealt with this 
issue.
431
 
The defendants primarily claimed that they had no guilty knowledge, 
which means that they lacked any feeling of doing wrong because they 
acted in conformity with the given law, and argued that “heute nicht 
Unrecht sein kann, was gestern Recht war” (it cannot be wrong today, what 
was right yesterday).
432
 
Against this, Military Tribunal III stated as follows:
433
 
Under written constitutions the ex post facto rule condemns statutes 
which define as criminal, acts committed before the law was passed, but 
the ex post facto rule cannot apply in the international field as it does 
under constitutional mandate in the domestic field. Even in the domestic 
field the prohibition of the rule does not apply to the decisions of common 
law courts, though the question at issue be novel. International law is not 
the product of statute for the simple reason that there is as yet no world 
authority empowered to enact statutes of universal application. 
International law is the product of multipartite treaties, conventions, 
judicial decisions and customs which have received international 
acceptance or acquiescence. It would be sheer absurdity to suggest that 
the ex post facto rule, as known to constitutional states, could be applied 
to a treaty, a custom, or a common law decision of an international 
tribunal, or to the international acquiescence which follows the event. To 
have attempted to apply the ex post facto principle to judicial decisions of 
common international law would have been to strangle that law at birth. 
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This argument in favour of the non-applicability of the ex post facto 
principle in international law was shared by the International Military 
Tribunal and many legal experts.
434
 
The legal theorist and German jurist Gustav Radbruch agreed that 
the principle could not be applied in the cases at Nuremberg, but he argued 
with a different approach which became known as the Radbruch 
Formula.
435
 Emerging from the public dispute over the role of law in Nazi 
Germany between the theories of naturalism, which “seeks to connect law 
with a higher moral code”436, and positivism, which “is content to identify 
law in an amoral, descriptive fashion”437, Radbruch‟s Formula reads as 
follows:
438
 
The conflict between justice and legal certainty may well be resolved in 
this way: The positive law, secured by legislation and power, takes 
precedence even when its content is unjust and fails to benefit the people, 
unless the conflict between statute and justice reaches such an intolerable 
degree that the statute, as „flawed law‟, must yield to justice. It is 
impossible to draw a sharper line between cases of statutory lawlessness 
and statutes that are valid despite their flaws. One line of distinction, 
however, can be drawn with utmost clarity: Where there is not even an 
attempt at justice, where equality, the core of justice, is deliberately 
betrayed in the issuance of positive law, then the statute is not merely 
„flawed law‟, it lacks completely the very nature of law. For law, 
including positive law, cannot be otherwise defined than as a system and 
an institution whose very meaning is to serve justice. 
In short, Radbruch‟s Formula can be expressed as follows: Although 
appropriately enacted and socially effective, laws lose their legal character 
or their legal validity when they are extremely unjust. Radbruch had 
developed this approach exclusively in respect to the Nazi laws and 
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concluded: “Measured by this standard, whole portions of National Socialist 
law never attained the dignity of valid law.”439 
Similar views were expressed by other legal experts,
440
 but 
Radbruch‟s Formula gained universal attention and was applied by several 
courts in later trials, for example, by German civil courts in the Wall-
shooters’ trials after the unification of Germany.441 
With respect to the Radbruch Formula, the validity of positive law is 
not unrestricted. When justice is violated in an extreme manner, statutes can 
turn into non-law and, in reverse, non-law can turn into positive or, at least, 
applicable law. Consequently, retrospective laws can become applicable if 
an inadequacy between justice and legal certainty emerges. An example 
would be, if one is acting in a way that he or she knows is unjust but not 
punishable and uses the benefits of the ex post facto principle to betray its 
original aim, the creation of justice. 
In both approaches, the non-applicability of the ex post facto 
principle in international law and the idea of the Radbruch Formula, 
defendants do not benefit from the principle because it has to stand back in 
favour of the creation of justice as the ultimate purpose. For the Justice Trial 
this meant that it had to be balanced out whether the general predictability 
and undermining of law or an unjust verdict would have been the smaller 
risk. 
Insofar as the defendants acted in the confidence of a penal code that 
did not recognise their actions as crimes, they were disappointed in their 
legal certainty by Control Council Law No. 10. This confidence, however, 
was limited already because representatives of the countries occupied by 
Germany and the four Allies had declared in multiple official statements 
throughout the war, starting as early as 1940, that the persons responsible 
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for the atrocities committed in their countries will be punished.
442
 This 
could not be remained unnoticed by the defendants. 
Additionally, as expressed by Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, one of the 
British prosecutors at the first Nuremberg Trial, the defendants must have 
been aware of that their actions were criminal:
443
 
With regard to „crimes against humanity‟, this at any rate is clear: the 
Nazis, when they persecuted and murdered countless Jews and political 
opponents in Germany, knew that what they were doing was wrong and 
that their actions were crimes which had been condemned by the criminal 
law of every civilised State. 
Furthermore, the newly constituted crime against humanity, from its 
content, corresponded with the existing German penal laws, because 
deprivation of liberty, battery, rape and murder had always been punishable 
crimes.
444
 In this context, Military Tribunal III stated:
445
 
Many of the laws of the Weimar era which were enacted for the 
protection of human rights have never been repealed. Many acts 
constituting war crimes or crimes against humanity as defined in C.C. 
Law 10 were committed or permitted in direct violation also of the 
provisions of the German criminal law. It is true that this Tribunal can try 
no defendant merely because of a violation of the German penal code, but 
it is equally true that the rule against retrospective legislation, as a rule of 
justice and fair play, should be no defence if the act which he committed 
in violation of C.C. Law 10 was also known to him to be a punishable 
crime under his own domestic law. 
After all, a violation of the ex post facto principle by Control 
Council Law No. 10, therefore, is only a violation in a very formal sense, 
because no actions were criminalised by the law that were not already 
punishable before. 
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3 Individual liability 
 
The London Charter, for the first time in history, established the rule 
that individuals are liable for their actions under international criminal 
law.
446
 
There had been efforts before to introduce individual responsibility 
in international law, for example, the Treaty of Versailles, but the overall 
failure to prosecute the war criminals after World War I, including the 
unsuccessful attempt to capture the German Emperor Wilhelm II, led to the 
stagnation of this concept.
447
 As a result, the Acts of State doctrine remained 
the dominating principle in international law, meaning that only states are 
subject to international law and individuals cannot be made responsible for 
their actions, which they performed as an instrument or organ of the state.
448
 
The new approach of the London Charter soon became the target of 
the defence in all Nuremberg Trials, who claimed that the concept violated 
international law, and the defendants could be held individually responsible 
only under national law.
449
 Additionally, the defence in the Justice Trial 
claimed that the defendants could not be held personally liable, because they 
were not responsible for the transformation of the German law into an 
instrument of the Nazis.
450
 
Related to the classical plea of just obeying superior orders, it was 
argued that the different decrees, orders, directives, decisions and 
instructions had been solely based on the decisions of Hitler.
451
 After the so 
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called Fuehrer Principle, which had been established in all governmental 
areas of Nazi Germany after the Nazis had taken over power, Hitler was the 
supreme legislator as well as the supreme judge.
452
 His will, therefore, was 
the final authority, and his orders constituted law directly.
453
 
However, there was an unusual consensus among legal experts and 
the judges of the Nuremberg Tribunals – certainly caused by the growing 
knowledge about the atrocities committed by the Nazis all over Europe – 
that individuals have to be held responsible for their actions. 
Military Tribunal III referred to the judgment of the International 
Military Tribunal, which had stated as follows:
 454
 
It was submitted that international law is concerned with the actions of 
sovereign States, and provides no punishment for individuals; and further, 
that where the act in question is an act of State, those who carry it out are 
not personally responsible, but are protected by the doctrine of the 
sovereignty of the State. In the opinion of the Tribunal, both these 
submissions must be rejected. That international law imposes duties and 
liabilities upon individuals as well as upon States has long been 
recognized ... Crimes against international law are committed by men, not 
by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such 
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced. 
According to Robert K Woetzel, an individual may be held 
responsible for a crime under international law, when it “is an act which 
injures not only the state against which it is directed, but the whole 
international community.”455 
The different Nuremberg Tribunals argued similarly and “insisted 
that inhumane acts such as murder, deportation, enslavement, and 
persecution on the basis of racial and religious grounds shocked the 
conscience of every decent human being.”456 They concluded “that those 
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who participated in such conduct could not claim that they did not realize 
the illegality of their actions.”457 
Additionally, the Nuremberg Tribunals dealt with the question 
whether the doctrine of individual liability was legally introduced in 
international law by the London Charter. Military Tribunal III stated:
458
 
International law is not the product of statute. Its content is not static. The 
absence from the world of any governmental body authorized to enact 
substantive rules of international law has not prevented the progressive 
development of that law. After the manner of the English common law it 
has grown to meet the exigencies of changing conditions. It must be 
conceded that the circumstance which gives to principles of international 
conduct the dignity and authority of law is their general acceptance as 
such by civilized nations, which acceptance is manifested by international 
treaties, conventions, authoritative textbooks, practice, and judicial 
decisions. 
This reasonable argument makes sense, especially when one looks at 
the new dimensions of crimes committed by Nazi Germany, which were 
without precedent in world history.
459
 
The world community was challenged to make a necessary reaction, 
and the London Charter as part of the London Agreement was the result of a 
joint decision of the three most powerful nations at the time, the United 
States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, and 19 other nations of the 
civilised world.
460
 Also, it has to be taken into consideration that Germany 
practically had lost its self determination after the war, and the existing 
German Nazi laws were obviously inappropriate to use.
461
 
Additionally, in support of individual liability under international 
law, J H Morgan, generally in opposition to the Nuremberg Trials, may be 
cited here with a comment he made on the plea of just obeying superior 
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orders by the defendants in the trial of the major war criminals before the 
International Military Tribunal:
462
 
The general directive, the „superior orders‟, of Hitler were so infamous 
that any officer with any sense of honour would sooner have died a 
soldier‟s death by shooting than obey them. These paladins of the German 
Army preferred to live – to live only to die a felon‟s death by hanging. 
They had had their alternative. 
Although not related to the non-military defendants of the Justice 
Trial, this statement makes clear that the establishment of individual liability 
under international law was supported by the vast majority of international 
legal experts. 
In the end, the concept of individual liability cannot be seen as a 
violation of international law and, therefore, also not as an occurrence of 
victor‟s justice. 
 
4 The tu quoque argument 
 
During the first Nuremberg Trial before the International Military 
Tribunal, Hermann Goering, the infamous Reichsmarschall and second 
most powerful Nazi after Hitler, stated: “The victor will always be the 
judge, and the vanquished the accused.”463 
Although this was just another polemic expression of Goering‟s 
general opinion about the trial, he, in fact, was right. At Nuremberg, only 
German war criminals were tried and any charges that the Allies had also 
committed war crimes and crimes against humanity were rejected by the 
tribunals as outside the terms of the London Charter and, therefore, outside 
their mandate.
464
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As a result, the different tribunals were charged with the 
pronouncement “that it is wrong to try Germans for crimes while the same 
crimes have been or are being committed by individuals of other nations.”465 
This accusation was based on the most classical approach of victor‟s justice: 
the argument of tu quoque (you, also), which denounces that the standards 
of law applied to the defeated Germans were not applied to the victorious 
Allies.
466
 
Article 6 of the London Charter limited the jurisdiction of the 
International Military Tribunal “to try and punish persons who, acting in the 
interests of the European Axis countries” only.467 The 12 US military 
tribunals at Nuremberg, including Tribunal III, relied heavily on the Charter 
and followed the same path.
468
 
Nevertheless, it is a matter of fact that the Allies also committed war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, for example, the American and British 
strategic bombings on exposed German cities like Hamburg and Dresden in 
1945, the failure of American submarines to pick up survivors in the Pacific 
Ocean, the dropping of the Atomic bombs on Japan by the US Air Force and 
the numerous atrocities committed by the Russians, including the massacre 
of Polish soldiers in Katyn Forest and the mistreatment of prisoners of 
war.
469
 
Military Tribunal III acknowledged these facts by stating:
470
 
It must be admitted that Germans were not the only ones who were guilty 
of committing war crimes; other violators of international law could, no 
doubt, be tried and punished by the state of which they were nationals, by 
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the offended state if it can secure jurisdiction of the person, or by an 
international tribunal if of competent authorized jurisdiction. 
However, it also denied its own jurisdiction for the trial of non-
German nationals, because Control Council Law No. 10 “is limited” and 
“specifically directed to the punishment of German criminals.”471 
In his opening speech for the prosecution in the first Nuremberg 
Trial before the International Military Tribunal, Robert H Jackson had 
stated:
472
 
We must never forget that the record on which we judge these defendants 
today is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass 
these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own lips as well. 
And in another place:
473
 
And let me make clear that while this law is first applied against German 
aggressors, the law includes, and if it is to serve a useful purpose it must 
condemn aggression by any other nations, including those which sit here 
now in judgment. 
Yet, these high demands were never realised. After World War II, no 
member of the Allied armed forces had faced criminal responsibility for war 
crimes, although the Allies were aware of that such had been committed;
474
 
Curtis LeMay, an US Air Force pilot who had targeted 63 Japanese cities 
for annihilation by American bombing, once said: “I suppose if I had lost 
the war, I would have been tried as a war criminal. Fortunately, we were on 
the winning side.”475 
As a result, it remains that the value of the achievements of 
Nuremberg is impaired by the failure of the Allies to pursue any prosecution 
of their own. Therefore, one has to agree with Professor M Cherif Bassiouni 
who stated: “This is not to say that those who were prosecuted did not 
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deserve it, but rather that on the Allies‟ side there were many similar crimes 
that warranted prosecution, but were conveniently overlooked.”476 
It is important to say here that such similar crimes were not even 
close to some of the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany, for example, 
the organisation and execution of the Holocaust, and therefore, it is not 
intended to compare German and Allied war crimes on the same level; but 
under the provisions of the London Charter and Control Council Law No. 
10, it is likely that Allied actions, such as the atomic bombing of Japanese 
cities or the mistreatment of prisoners of war, constituted crimes against 
humanity. 
In his evaluation of the Nuremberg Trials, Otto Kranzbuehler 
stated:
477
 
In the entire public political appraisal of the Nuremberg proceedings one 
fact must be regarded in the right light: the fact that proceedings of this 
kind have been, and in the near future will be, conducted against members 
of defeated nations only. 
Although may not intended by the creators of the London Charter, this 
statement truly describes a negative side of Nuremberg‟s legacy and 
confirms the words of Goering. 
Hence, the refusal of the Allies to bring to trial members of their 
own nations, in the end, caused a valid reproach of the Nuremberg Trials as 
an example of victor‟s justice. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
The counts within the Justice Trial were based on a code that was 
legally enacted by the Allies with support from the world community.
478
 
The difficulties of punishing war crimes and crimes against humanity under 
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international law before World War II were surmounted by the codification 
of these laws. Nevertheless, it was widely criticised as a violation of 
international law. 
Indeed, the new criminal concepts changed the traditional 
international law, but it did not violate it. As shown above, neither was the 
ex post facto principle, in its basic idea, violated, nor did the establishment 
of individual responsibility violate any law. 
The scope of German atrocities was unique and without precedent in 
world history and made it necessary to change the antiquated rules of 
international criminal law. Thus, in respect to the issues of the ex post facto 
principle and individual liability, the appointment and proceedings of the 
tribunals at Nuremberg, including Military Tribunal III, were not examples 
of victor‟s justice. 
A different story, unfortunately, was the refusal of the United States 
and the other Allied Governments to bring to trial nationals of their own 
countries for crimes which fell under the same categories of crimes as 
defined in the London Charter and Control Council Law No. 10, and which 
the defendants in the Justice Trial were accused of. 
This has to be evaluated as an example of victor‟s justice, because 
here obviously not the rule of law but the rule of the victors prevailed. 
 
B Fairness of the Trial 
 
In 1949, the Chief Prosecutor of the subsequent Nuremberg Trials, 
Telford Taylor, stated in an essay:
479
 
The procedures at Nuremberg were largely the product of evolution based 
on actual experience there. Certainly some difficult and unusual problems 
arose out of the mixture of different legal systems and the novelty of the 
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situation, and there is room for honest differences of opinion on a number 
of points. But the fundamental fairness of the trials was patent to the 
observer and will, I believe, be apparent to anyone who examines the 
record of the proceedings. 
Indeed, besides some German critics,
480
 there is a broad consensus 
that the Nuremberg Tribunals were characterised by a sense of fairness and 
impartiality.
481
 According to Jonathan Friedman, all Nuremberg Trials 
“adopted numerous safeguards from Anglo-American legal tradition, 
including the right to counsel, the presumption of innocence, and the rule 
that conviction is dependent upon proof of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”482 
Furthermore, in the Justice Trial, the defence was granted free access 
to the US Army Document Centres,
483
 and the prosecution furnished the 
defence with German-language copies of their exhibits before they were 
submitted into evidence.
484
 
As a result, the defence in the Justice Trial offered 518 affidavits, of 
which the prosecution called only three for cross-examination, compared to 
76 affidavits offered by the prosecution, of which the defence called 64.
485
 
Additionally, the defence offered 1,452 documentary exhibits compared to 
only 641 of the prosecution;
486
 and from the 138 witnesses heard by the 
Tribunal, the majority was called by the defence.
487
 
In its judgment, Military Tribunal III stated:
488
 
Whenever possible, and in substantially all cases, applications of defense 
counsel for the production in open court of persons who had made 
affidavits in support of the prosecution, have been granted and the affiants 
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have appeared for cross examination. Affiants for the defense were cross 
examined orally by the prosecution in comparatively few cases. 
The differences in the numbers can be easily explained by the fact 
that the captured German documents offered huge amounts of incriminating 
evidence against the defendants, and the prosecution only needed to present 
the most serious ones, whereas the defence could hardly find any 
exonerating material.
489
 However, it shows clearly that the defendants were 
not handicapped in their defence and, in the end, also the defence counsels 
in the Justice Trial agreed that the basic principles of due process were not 
violated at the proceedings.
490
 
Furthermore, the US administration created a social environment for 
the defendants and their lawyers, which, compared to the general living 
conditions in 1947 in the war-damaged city of Nuremberg, could be 
described as almost luxurious. As described in Telford Taylor‟s Final 
Report, the “prison temperature ... the caloric content of the food, and other 
conditions in the jail” were constantly checked,491 and the492 
[d]efense counsel were paid 3,500 RM (Reichsmark) per defendant per 
month ... Defense counsel who did not live in Nuremberg were provided 
with billets through arrangements made by the Defense Center. They 
were also entitled to three meals per day at a cost of only 50 pfennigs per 
meal, and were issued gratis a carton of cigarettes each per week. They 
were also provided with office space, furniture, and office supplies in the 
Palace of Justice. Witnesses requested by defense counsel were procured 
and were housed, fed, and paid ... without cost to the defense. When 
defense counsel found it necessary to travel to interview witnesses or for 
other reasons connected with the trial, railway transportation or the 
necessary amount of gasoline for privately owned automobiles was 
furnished free of charge. Extensive clerical and translation assistance, 
together with a great variety of other services, was also rendered. 
Nevertheless, besides these positive aspects of the trial-proceedings, 
two issues were always considered disadvantages for the defendants: firstly, 
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that the proceeding was based on the Anglo-American tradition with the 
tools of examination, cross-examination and re-examination, which the 
German lawyers were not familiar with;
493
 and secondly, the lack of any 
appellate instance to affirm or void the judgments.
494
 
The missing of an appellate court created a constant headache for the 
US authorities who wanted the Nuremberg Trials not only as an institution 
to punish the German war criminals but also as a model to demonstrate the 
virtue of democracy.
495
 In the end, this problem was solved by the 
implementation of substitutes, such as the granting of extensive clemency 
and regular administrative sentence reviews, what turned out to be only 
advantageous for the convicted defendants of the Justice Trial, as they were 
all released early from prison in the 1950s.
496
 
The other aspect, the unfamiliarity of the defence counsels with the 
Anglo-American style of procedure, concerned many jurists before the start 
of the trial. However, the fact that the Tribunal was established as an 
international and not a German court,
497
 and the ability of the defence to 
cope with the proceedings, let the initial disadvantage vanish. 
According to Henry L Stimson,
498
 
the law demands three things: that the defendant be charged with a 
punishable crime; that he have full opportunity for defense; and that he be 
judged fairly on the evidence by a proper judicial authority. Should it fail 
to meet any of these three requirements, a trial would not be justice. 
A show trial, on the other hand, Gary J Bass describes as follows:
499
 
[A] show trial has no chance of returning an acquittal, keeps the judges in 
thrall to the prosecution and behind that the state, cares little for 
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procedure or standards of evidence, and has a propensity toward the quick 
execution. 
When looking at these definitions, the proceedings of the Justice 
Trial have to be considered as fair. The defendants were charged with 
punishable crimes, and they received a fair proceeding. Although naturally 
disadvantaged by a lack of experience with some rules of the Anglo-
American procedures, the defendants and their lawyers received the same 
privileges as the prosecution and, therefore, were granted all benefits which 
constitute a fair trial. 
Additionally, it has been shown already that Military Tribunal III 
acted independently and impartially.
500
 Hence, the overall outcome is that 
the defendants were treated fairly in all aspects of a modern trial. 
Furthermore, the release of the protocols of the Justice Trial and of 
all other Nuremberg Trials in the volumes of the so called Blue, Red and 
Green Series established their methods of procedure as an example for later 
tribunals in international criminal law,
501
 and simultaneously, disprove the 
assumption that trials initiated by the winners of a war are always show 
trials and an example of victor‟s justice. 
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V JUDGMENT OF THE TRIBUNAL 
 
In the Justice Trial, like in all other Nuremberg Trials, the judgment 
was not only about punishing war criminals, it was also a profound analysis 
and evaluation of the atrocities done in the name of law in Nazi Germany 
and of the involvement of the legal profession. 
At first, this chapter examines the analysis of the Nazi legal system 
carried out by Military Tribunal III and deals with the question whether 
victor‟s justice occurred due to a distorted illustration of the laws and legal 
practice of Nazi Germany. It will be concluded that the Tribunal undertook 
a very careful examination by reflecting only on the given facts without 
making things out to be worse or better, and therefore, there is no sign of 
victor‟s justice on this issue. 
Secondly, this chapter investigates whether the Tribunal evaluated 
the defendants‟ role in the Nazi legal system, upon which the final judgment 
was based on, appropriately, and whether the convicted defendants received 
adequate sentences. A conclusion will be drawn stating that the analysis of 
the Tribunal had been impressively accurate and, moreover, the sentences 
have to be seen as very moderate compared to the individual guilt of some 
of the defendants, and compared to sentences which were given in other 
Nuremberg Trials. 
 
A General Remarks 
 
Germany‟s development from a democracy into one of the harshest 
dictatorships on earth was perfectly recorded in many documents issued by 
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the Nazi officials themselves.
502
 Additionally, the racist and unlawful laws 
enacted by the Nazi Government were published and available at all times. 
The evidence of the prosecution in the Justice Trial, therefore, was 
based mainly on contemporaneous documents discovered in German 
archives by the Allies after the war, and on many discriminatory Nazi laws 
which spoke for themselves.
503
 
In analysing these laws and documents, Tribunal III had not much 
opportunity but keeping to the true facts. It stated: “In rendering this 
judgment it should be said that the case against the defendants is chiefly 
based upon captured German documents, the authenticity of which is 
unchallenged.”504 
 
1 The Tribunal’s analysis of the German law under the Nazis 
 
The defendants in the Justice Trial argued that they could not be 
convicted because they had acted within the authority and by the command 
of German laws and decrees.
505
 
The Tribunal referred to Control Council Law No. 10, which 
provided punishment for crimes against humanity “whether or not the acts 
were in violation of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated.”506 
It then stated:
507
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503
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The very essence of the prosecution case is that the laws, the Hitlerian 
decrees and the Draconic, corrupt, and perverted Nazi judicial system 
themselves constituted the substance of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity and that participation in the enactment and enforcement of them 
amounts to complicity in crime. 
Hence, before evaluating the individual guilt of the defendants, 
Tribunal III looked at the existing German law and its development under 
the Nazi Government. 
 
(a) Ermaechtigungsgesetz (Enabling Act 1933) 
 
The Weimar Constitution of Germany from 11 August 1919 
contained not only generally accepted provisions of international law but 
also fundamental rights, which were guaranteed to all Germans.
508
 The 
weak point of the Constitution was Article 48, which provided that the 
Reich President was empowered to suspend certain fundamental rights 
either completely or partially, if the safety and order of the German Reich 
was considerably disturbed or endangered.
509
 
Based on this Article, Reich President von Hindenburg and Hitler, 
the new Reich Chancellor, on 28 February 1933, promulgated a decree that 
expressly suspended basic rights of the Weimar Constitution and, in 
addition, provided that the Reich Government might temporarily take over 
the powers of the highest State authority to restore public security.
510
 
A month later, on 24 March 1933, an intimidated Reichstag, the 
German Federal Parliament, enacted the Gesetz zur Behebung der Not von 
Volk und Reich (Law concerning the Relief of Distress of the Nation and the 
Reich), commonly known as Ermaechtigungsgesetz (Enabling Act 1933), 
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which in fact opened the door for the Nazi Government to overrule the 
Constitution itself.
511
 It provided that laws decreed by the government may 
deviate from the constitution, and that laws of the Reich can be enacted by 
the government apart from the procedures provided by the constitution.
512
 
As a result, on 14 July 1933, a law was enacted declaring the 
NSDAP to be the only political party, and making it a crime to maintain or 
form any other political party.
513
 Also, on 30 January 1934, the Reichstag 
passed a law ruling that the sovereign powers of the German States are fully 
transferred to the Federation.
514
 The provisions of the Enabling Act were 
reconfirmed by Acts of the Reichstag on 30 January 1937 and on 30 January 
1939.
515
 
The Tribunal stressed that the Enabling Act 1933 was the starting 
point of
516
 
the legal and judicial process by which the entire judicial system was 
transformed into a tool for the propagation of the National Socialist 
ideology, the extermination of opposition thereto, and the advancement of 
plans for aggressive war and world conquest. 
 
(b) Arbitrariness in criminal law 
 
After the obstacle of the Weimar Constitution was hurdled, the 
criminal law in particular was changed in many ways to become an 
                                                          
511
 Justice Case, above n 9, 987. 
512
 Gesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich vom 24. Maerz 1933 (Law 
concerning the Relief of Distress of the Nation and the Reich from 24 March 1933) 25 
RGBl 1933 I 141, arts 1 and 2; See also Justice Case, above n 9, 987. 
513
 Gesetz gegen die Neubildung von Parteien vom 14. Juli 1933 (Law against the creation 
of Political Parties from 14 July 1933) 81 RGBl 1933 I 479, paras 1 and 2; See also Justice 
Case, above n 9, 987. 
514
 Gesetz ueber den Neuaufbau des Reichs vom 30. Januar 1934 (Law for the 
Restructuring of the Reich from 30 January 1934) 11 RGBl 1934 I 75, arts 1 and 2; See 
also Justice Case, above n 9, 987-988. 
515
 Justice Case, above n 9, 988. 
516
 Ibid. 
 125 
instrument of Nazi politics and ideology. Military Tribunal III described this 
process as follows:
517
 
Beginning in 1933, there developed side by side two processes by which 
the Ministry of Justice and the courts were equipped for terroristic 
functions in support of the Nazi regime. By the first, the power of life and 
death was ever more broadly vested in the courts. By the second, the 
penal laws were extended in such inconclusive and indefinite terms as to 
vest in the judges the widest discretion in the choice of law to be applied, 
and in the construction of the chosen law in any given case. 
On 4 April 1933, just two months after the Nazis took over 
government, the death sentence was introduced in German criminal law by 
the Gesetz zur Abwehr politischer Gewalttaten (Law for the Protection 
against Violent Political Acts). It authorised the death penalty for a number 
of crimes, particularly adding that it applies “whenever milder penalties had 
been prescribed hitherto.”518 
A year later, on 24 April 1934, the definition of high treason was 
also greatly expanded, and the death sentence was implemented as a 
possible punishment.
519
 
A significant step was the Gesetz zur Aenderung des 
Strafgesetzbuches (Law Concerning the Alteration of the Penal Code) from 
28 June 1935. It abolished the general rule that criminal statutes should be 
definite and certain, and allowed judges to sentence following a similar law 
if no specific law could be applied directly.
520
 
The transformation of the law continued: On 17 August 1938, the 
death sentence was authorised and made mandatory to the crime of 
undermining German military efficiency;
521
 in 1939, different ordinances 
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and decrees like the Feindsenderverordnung (Decree to Stop Deliberate 
Listening to Foreign Stations) and the Verordnung gegen Volksschaedlinge 
(Decree against Public Enemies) were enacted, implementing new crimes 
that could be punished by death;
522
 on 5 December 1939, the death penalty 
was extended to various crimes of violence, even when those were 
committed before the decree became valid what, in fact, was the 
abolishment of the ex post facto principle;
523
 and on 4 September 1941, the 
death penalty was also provided for dangerous habitual criminals and sex 
criminals.
524
 
However, the transformation of the German law system into an 
instrument of the Nazi Party culminated on 20 August 1942, when Hitler 
issued a decree to establish a strong National Socialist Administration of 
Justice, if necessary in deviation from any existing law.
525
 Finally, on 5 May 
1944, influenced by the heavy German war defeats, came the quasi-
suspension of all legal restrictions for judges as to the degree of penalty.
526
 
At this point, law and justice had been replaced by judicial 
arbitrariness. Tribunal III summarised as follows:
527
 
The statutes which we have reviewed were merely steps in the process of 
increased severity of the criminal law and in the development of a loose 
concept concerning the definition of crime. … [The decree of 20 August 
1942] was especially evident in the statutes concerning the „sound 
sentiment of the people‟, crime by analogy, and undermining the military 
efficiency of the nation. In place of the control of law there was 
substituted the control of National Socialist ideology as a guide to judicial 
action. 
 
 
 
                                                          
522
 Ibid, 991-992. 
523
 Ibid, 992. 
524
 Ibid. 
525
 Ibid, 993. 
526
 Ibid, 992-993. 
527
 Ibid, 993. 
 127 
 
(c) Discrimination against minorities 
 
On 7 April 1933, a law of the Reich Government provided that 
Communists and people of non-Aryan descent, which in the eyes of 
National Socialist ideology were mainly Jews, may be refused permission to 
practice law.
528
 The Gesetz zum Schutze des deutschen Blutes und der 
deutschen Ehre (Law for the Protection of German Blood and German 
Honour) from 15 September 1935, also known as the infamous Nuremberg 
Laws, prohibited marriages and sexual intercourse between Jews and 
Aryans.
529
 These laws were the starting point of legislation that almost 
completely expelled Jews from public service and public life.
530
 
On 4 December 1941, the Verordnung ueber die Strafrechtspflege 
gegen Polen und Juden in den eingegliederten Ostgebieten (Decree 
concerning the Organisation and Criminal Jurisdiction against Poles and 
Jews in the Incorporated Eastern Territories) came into effect.
531
 It provided 
special regulations for allegedly criminal acts committed by Jews or Poles, 
for example: “The death penalty, or in less serious cases imprisonment, shall 
be imposed on any Jew or Pole … [i]f he urges or incites to disobedience to 
any decree or regulation issued by the German authorities.”532 
In the view of Tribunal III, this decree “marks perhaps the extreme 
limit to which the Nazi Government carried its statutory and decretal 
persecution of racial and religious minorities.”533 However, the decree was 
only the climax of the establishment of injustice within the German 
judiciary. 
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On 1 July 1943, the 13. Verordnung zum Reichsbuergergesetz (13
th
 
Regulation under the Reich Citizenship Law) was issued, which provided 
that allegedly criminal actions of Jews were to be punished directly by the 
police without any indictment and proceeding.
534
 
This was the final step of depriving the Jews of their human rights 
and almost completely outlawing them in everyday life. 
 
(d) Expansion of the German law on occupied territories 
 
Besides the special regulations for allegedly criminal acts of Jews 
and Poles, the decree from 4 December 1941 also introduced another 
important element to the Nazi judiciary, which Tribunal III described as 
“the extension of German laws to occupied territory, to purportedly annexed 
territory, and to territory of the so-called protectorates.”535 
In March and September 1938 and in March 1939, already before the 
start of World War II, the German Army had invaded Austria and parts of 
Czechoslovakia (the Sudetenland and Bohemia and Moravia) and had 
incorporated them into the German Reich.
536
 During World War II, also all 
or portions of Poland, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, Greece and Russia were occupied and annexed to 
the German Reich.
537
 
The German criminal law had always been applicable to German 
nationals but, beginning in April 1939, different statutes extended the 
draconic and discriminatory German laws, which had been put into force in 
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the old Reich, to the occupied territories.
538
 For example, on 14 April 1939, 
an act provided that
539
 
[p]ersons who are not German nationals are subject to German 
jurisdiction for offenses – (a) to which German criminal law applies, (b) if 
they are prosecuted under a private action provided the action has been 
brought by a German national. 
Since 5 September 1939, the Verordnung gegen Volksschaedlinge 
(Decree against Public Enemies) was made “applicable in the Protectorate 
of Bohemia and Moravia and also for those persons who are not German 
citizens”540; and on 25 November 1939, another Verordnung gegen 
Wehrmittelbeschaedigung (Decree against Damage to War Materials) was 
explicitly made applicable also to non-Germans of the Protectorate Bohemia 
and Moravia.
541
 
On 6 May 1940, the Verordnung ueber den Geltungsbereich des 
Strafrechts (Decree on the Extension of the Application of Criminal Law) 
made German criminal law applicable to crimes which were committed by 
foreigners abroad;
542
 and on 25 November 1941, the Verordnung ueber die 
Beschlagnahme juedischen Vermoegens (Decree concerning the 
Confiscation of Jewish Property) was made applicable in the Protectorate of 
Bohemia and Moravia and the incorporated Eastern territories.
543
 
 
(e) Courts and the law of procedure 
 
Similar to the substantive law, the Nazis also extended the law of 
procedure and the German court system. 
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Besides the newly created People‟s Court and the Special Courts, 
whose jurisdictions were rapidly extended,
544
 the Nazis also erected courts 
martial, Police courts and SS courts. Contrarily to the traditional civil 
courts, which struggled with their loss of jurisdiction in many areas, these 
courts did not really deserve to be called courts at any time. 
Good examples are the courts martial, which were erected in the 
occupied Eastern territories to apply the provisions of the Decree against 
Poles and Jews from 4 December 1941. Article XIII section (2) of the 
decree provided the death sentence as the only punishment imposed by these 
courts, which resulted in proceedings that often consisted of nothing else but 
the delivery of a judgment.
545
 
Changes within the law of procedure began with the centralisation of 
the clemency powers to the President of the Reich on 16 February 1934.
546
 
However, only a decree promulgated by Hitler on 21 March 1942, regarding 
the simplification of the administration of justice, brought fundamental 
changes to the procedure.
547
 
To realise the provisions of this statute, subsequent decrees were 
issued by the responsible Ministers of Justice Schlegelberger (on 13 August 
1942) and Thierack (on 15 February 1945), limiting the participation of 
lawyers in criminal proceedings and expanding the jurisdictions of courts 
martial.
548
 
In the view of Tribunal III, this did not only make it easy to punish 
alleged criminals, but it also ensured that “the will of Hitler became a 
dominating force in the Ministry of Justice and in the courts.”549 
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(f) The execution of the law in Nazi Germany 
 
The law in action in Nazi Germany was primarily based on the so 
called Fuehrer Principle, which seriously affected officials of the Ministry 
of Justice, prosecutors and judges.
550
 Tribunal III stated:
551
 
Two basic principles controlled conduct within the Ministry of Justice. 
The first concerned the absolute power of Hitler in person or by delegated 
authority to enact, enforce, and adjudicate law. The second concerned the 
incontestability of such law. 
This evaluation was based on the testimony of a witness for all of the 
defendants, Professor Hermann Jahrreiss, who had stated that “restrictions 
under German law did not exist for Hitler. He was legibus solutus in the 
same meaning in which Louis XIV claimed that for himself in France.”552 
 
(i) Hitler as supreme judge 
 
Hitler was not only the supreme legislator but also the supreme judge 
of Nazi Germany.
553
 In an address to the Reichstag on 26 April 1942, Hitler 
had declared:
554
 
I do expect one thing: That the nation gives me the right to intervene 
immediately and to take action myself wherever a person has failed to 
render unqualified obedience. … I therefore ask the German Reichstag to 
confirm expressly that I have the legal right to keep everybody to his duty 
and to cashier or remove from office or position without regard for his 
person, or his established rights, whoever, in my view and according to 
my considered opinion, has failed to do his duty. … From now on, I shall 
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intervene in these cases and remove from office those judges who 
evidently do not understand the demand of the hour. 
On the same day, the Reichstag had resolved:
555
 
… the Fuehrer must have all the rights postulated by him which serve to 
further or achieve victory. Therefore – without being bound by existing 
legal restrictions – in his capacity as leader of the nation, Supreme 
Commander of the Armed Forces, governmental chief and supreme 
executive chief, as supreme justice, and leader of the Party – the Fuehrer 
must be in a position to force with all means at his disposal every 
German, if necessary, whether he be common soldier or officer, low or 
high official or judge, leading or subordinate official of the Party, worker 
or employee, to fulfil his duties. In case of violation of these duties, the 
Fuehrer is entitled after conscientious examination, regardless of so-called 
well-deserved rights, to mete out due punishment, and to remove the 
offender from his post, rank and position, without introducing prescribed 
procedures. 
With this clear manifestation of Hitler‟s will and of the Nazi 
ideology as the only valid German law, it is quite surprising that the reaction 
among the leading German jurists was not some kind of opposition or 
resignation from their positions in reaction to the limitation of their power 
and independence, but instead massive support of this new principles. The 
defendant Rothenberger, for example, once stated:
556
 
Here is a man [Hitler] who in his position represents the ideal of the judge 
in its perfect sense, and the German people elected him for their judge – 
first of all, of course, as „judge‟ over their fate in general, but also as 
„supreme magistrate and judge‟. 
And at another place, in 1943, Rothenberger summarised his legal 
philosophy as follows: “The judge is on principle bound by the law. The 
laws are the orders of the Fuehrer.”557 
Rothenberger shared this view with his co-defendant Schlegelberger, 
who had expressed his opinion already on 10 March 1936: “It should be 
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emphasised, however, that in the sphere of the law, also, it is the Fuehrer 
and he alone who sets the pace of development.”558 Additionally, both 
defendants were flanked by Minister of Justice Thierack, who had said on 5 
January 1943: “So also with us the conviction has grown in these 10 years 
in which the Fuehrer has led the German people that the Fuehrer is the chief 
justice and the supreme judge of the German people.”559 
As a result, it can be said that Hitler not only acted like the supreme 
judge of Nazi Germany, but was also seen and accepted as such by 
Germany‟s judiciary. 
 
(ii) Execution of Hitler‟s will 
 
The concrete execution of the Fuehrer Principle within the German 
judicature was realised by the so called Richterbriefe (Judges‟ Letters), 
which were issued by the Reich Minister of Justice and systematically 
distributed to all German judges.
560
 
The letters were made as instructions for judges as how to decide 
certain cases by discussing particular decisions, which had been filed in 
various courts and had failed to be in line with National Socialist 
ideology.
561
 The first of these letters was issued on 1 October 1942 and 
reminded the judges “that Hitler was the supreme judge and that „leadership 
and judgeship have related characters.‟”562 
Soon after the first Judges‟ Letters were distributed, Minister of 
Justice Thierack also started issuing so called Anwaltsbriefe (Lawyers‟ 
Letters).
563
 In the view of Military Tribunal III, those were made primarily 
to warn the defence counsels “that they avoid any criticism of National 
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Socialist justice and refrain from too much ardor in the defense of persons 
charged with political crimes.”564 
All these actions pursued only one goal: to manipulate the German 
judges in their decisions in favour of National Socialist ideology. However, 
it was no guarantee. Therefore, Hitler and his top-ranking associates often 
interfered in the finding of individual criminal sentences and objected to 
many judgments themselves, until they were revised into a decision 
convenient to Hitler‟s opinion.565 
Among many others, one example is the case of the Jew Markus 
Luftgas, who was originally sentenced to two and a half years imprisonment 
for hoarding eggs.
566
 After an objection from Hitler, the State Secretary and 
Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Hans-Heinrich Lammers, wrote to 
Schlegelberger on 25 October 1941: “The Fuehrer wishes that Luftgas be 
sentenced to death.”567 Schlegelberger replied on 29 October 1941: “I have 
handed over to the Gestapo for the purpose of execution the Jew Markus 
Luftgas who had been sentenced to 2½ years of imprisonment.”568 
Additionally, Hitler also delegated this direct exertion of influence to 
the Reich Minister of Justice. In defiance of all principles of an independent 
judiciary, he explicitly authorised him “to deviate from any existing law” in 
August 1942.
569
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(iii) Outcome 
 
From a substantive law point of view, all changes illustrated in this 
chapter finally resulted in the replacement of the old principle “no penalty 
without a law” by a new principle “no crime without punishment”570. 
This new philosophy in Nazi Germany‟s jurisdiction was specifically 
made clear by the infamous Reich Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels, 
who addressed the members of the People‟s Court in a speech on 22 July 
1942:
571
 
While making his decisions the judge had to proceed less from the law 
than from the basic idea that the offender was to be eliminated from the 
community. During a war it was not so much a matter of whether a 
judgment was just or unjust but only whether the decision was expedient. 
The State must ward off its internal foes in the most efficient way and 
wipe them out entirely. 
Altogether, Tribunal III concluded that the described occurrences, in 
fact, led to the “utter destruction of judicial independence and 
impartiality”572. It further pointed out: “The function of the Nazi courts was 
judicial only in a limited sense. They more closely resembled administrative 
tribunals acting under directives from above in a quasi-judicial manner.”573 
However, the Tribunal also stated that the Nazi law system divided 
the judges in two categories:
574
 
In the first we find the judges who still retained ideals of judicial 
independence and who administered justice with a measure of impartiality 
and moderation. Judgments which they rendered were set aside by the 
employment of the nullity plea and the extraordinary objection. The 
defendants they sentenced were frequently transferred to the Gestapo on 
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completion of prison terms and were then shot or sent to concentration 
camps. The judges themselves were threatened and criticized and 
sometimes removed from office. In the other category were the judges 
who with fanatical zeal enforced the will of the Party with such severity 
that they experienced no difficulties and little interference from party 
officials. 
A prominent example for the few German judges who belonged to 
the first category was Lothar Kreyssig, a judge at the Brandenburg County 
Court.
575
 He had formally protested the secret killings of handicapped and 
the detentions in concentration camps by sending letters of complaints to the 
President of the Prussian Supreme Court;
576
 he had issued injunctions 
against the Nazi programme of killing mentally handicapped persons;
577
 and 
he had brought charges against one of its administrators.
578
 
In 1940, he was forced to retire early and a criminal investigation 
against him took place.
579
 However, after the investigation was closed in 
1942, he was left in peace by the Nazi authorities.
580
 
Although this case may not be valid as a guarantee that every judge 
had the opportunity to resist without fearing life or health threatening 
consequences,
581
 it confirms the Tribunal‟s view that, although the whole 
law system in Nazi Germany was transformed into an instrument of 
National Socialist policy, the individual judge himself had still been able to 
adhere to moral and ethical values and to resist to become an accomplice of 
the Nazis, at least until removed from office. 
Yet, the Tribunal realised that in such a case the removal from office 
was only a matter of time and, therefore, declined the suggestion that the 
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defendants who had been working as judges could be entitled to benefit 
from the Anglo-American doctrine of judicial immunity. The Tribunal 
argued reasonably as follows:
582
 
The doctrine that judges are not personally liable for their judicial actions 
is based on the concept of an independent judiciary administering 
impartial justice. Furthermore, it has never prevented the prosecution of a 
judge for malfeasance in office. If the evidence sited supra does not 
demonstrate the utter destruction of judicial independence and 
impartiality, then we „never writ nor no man ever proved‟. 
 
2 The Tribunal’s evaluation of the legality of Nazi laws 
 
No doubt, the rigorous laws and court decisions in Nazi Germany 
were immoral and generally did not really deserve to be called lawful, but 
the judges of Tribunal III tried to free their minds completely from such 
conclusions, and evaluated these laws and decisions from a purely legal 
point of view. In the judgment, they stated:
583
 
The Tribunal is keenly aware of the danger of incorporating in the 
judgment as law its own moral convictions or even those of the Anglo-
American legal world. This we will not do. We may and do condemn the 
Draconic laws and express abhorrence at the limitations imposed by the 
Nazi regime upon freedom of speech and action, but the question still 
remains unanswered: „Do these Draconic laws or the decisions rendered 
under them constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity?‟ 
To find an answer, the Tribunal concentrated on cases in which the 
death penalty had been imposed by German courts.
584
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(a) Habitual criminals 
 
Based on the penal code, German courts sentenced habitual 
criminals to death in many cases during World War II. Tribunal III 
compared this fact to a likely situation in other countries, including the 
United States, and concluded that the imposed death penalties by German 
courts in such cases could not be classified as a crime against humanity.
585
 
The Tribunal argued as follows:
586
 
In many civilized states statutory provisions require the courts to impose 
sentences of life imprisonment upon proof of conviction of three or more 
felonies. We are unable to say in one breath that life imprisonment for 
habitual criminals is a salutary and reasonable punishment in America in 
peace times, but that the imposition of the death penalty was a crime 
against humanity in Germany when the nation was in the throes of war. 
 
(b) Plunder in German territory 
 
Similar to the treatment of habitual criminals, the penal code of Nazi 
Germany provided the death penalty also for plunderers. Especially during 
the war, German courts had often imposed this hardest possible punishment 
on persons who had looted in the ruined German cities after Allied air raids. 
Military Tribunal III evaluated these codes and sentences as 
necessary in the specific situation of Germany during the war.
587
 It stated:
588
 
Anyone who has seen the utter devastation of the great cities of Germany 
must realize that the safety of the civilian population demanded that the 
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werewolfes who roamed the streets of the burning cities, robbing the 
dead, and plundering the ruined homes should be severely punished. 
As a result, the Tribunal concluded that the imposed death sentences 
by the judiciary in cases of plundering did not constitute crimes against 
humanity.
589
 
 
(c) Crimes against the wartime economy 
 
Tribunal III evaluated cases in which German courts had sentenced 
people to death for hoarding or for violating war economy decrees similarly 
to cases of plundering. The Tribunal‟s view was that the threat and 
enforcement of capital punishment was required to secure the chances of 
individual survival of the civilian population during times of war, when all 
kind of goods, especially food, were rare and of high value.
590
 
The Tribunal‟s argument was simple but understandable: “Every 
nation recognizes the absolute necessity of more stringent enforcement of 
the criminal law in times of great emergency.”591 
Hence, in the view of Tribunal III, the imposition of the death 
penalty by German courts in cases of crimes against the wartime economy 
had been not necessarily a crime against humanity.
592
 
 
(d) Undermining military efficiency 
 
The death sentences by German courts in cases of undermining 
military efficiency were analysed with great care by Tribunal III. 
Defendants in such cases were mostly tried for violating the limitations on 
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freedom of speech, which were imposed by the Nazi laws to protect the 
military aims of Nazi Germany during World War II.
593
 
After stressing that these limitations are generally revolting “to our 
sense of justice”594, the Tribunal said:595 
A court would have no hesitation in condemning them under any free 
constitution, including that of the Weimar republic, if the limitations were 
applied in time of peace; but even under the protection of the Constitution 
of the United States a citizen is not wholly free to attack the Government 
or to interfere with its military aims in time of war. In the face of a real 
and present danger, freedom of speech may be somewhat restricted even 
in America. Can we then say that in the throes of total war and in the 
presence of impending disaster those officials who enforced these savage 
laws in a last desperate effort to stave off defeat were guilty of crimes 
against humanity? 
The Tribunal, further, argued that the fact that Germany was waging 
a criminal war of aggression could not have any impact on the Justice Trial, 
because the defendants here were not charged with crimes against peace, nor 
has it been proven that they were part of a criminal conspiracy to plan the 
war, nor was the start of the war per se a violation of international law.
596
 
Also, in the view of the Tribunal, the actions of the German judiciary 
during the war could not all be seen as illegal just because it was a criminal 
war of aggression, otherwise “every soldier who marched under orders into 
occupied territory or who fought in the homeland was a criminal and a 
murderer.”597 
Thus, Tribunal III concluded that “the domestic laws and judgments 
in Germany which limited free speech in the emergency of war cannot be 
condemned as crimes against humanity”598. The imposed death sentences, 
therefore, although often given arbitrarily and in a discriminatory manner, 
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were principally not illegal under the existing circumstances in Germany 
during World War II.
599
 
 
(e) Treason and High Treason 
 
Generally, the crimes of treason and high treason exist in the penal 
code of almost every nation. To punish offenders with the death penalty was 
also not totally unusual in many countries of the civilised Western world at 
the time. Nevertheless, Tribunal III made a big difference in its analysis of 
those death sentences, which had been imposed on Poles who were charged 
with high treason against the German Reich. 
In many cases, Poles had been charged with high treason for the only 
reason that they attempted to escape from the Reich territory.
600
 They were 
indicted for “attempting, by violence or threat of violence, to detach from 
the Reich territory belonging to the Reich, contrary to the express provisions 
of section 80 of the law of 24 April 1934.”601 The so called territory in these 
cases consisted of portions of Poland which the German Reich had illegally 
annexed after the outbreak of World War II.
602
 
In the Tribunal‟s view, this would have meant that “every Polish 
soldier from the occupied territories fighting for the restoration to Poland of 
territory belonging to it would be guilty of high treason against the 
Reich”603. Hence, Tribunal III evaluated these cases and the underlying laws 
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as an “unwarrantable extension of the concept of high treason, which 
constituted … a war crime and a crime against humanity.”604 
 
(f) The Nacht und Nebel Erlass (Night and Fog Decree) 
 
The Night and Fog Decree was basically a personal order of Hitler 
from 7 December 1941, which provided as follows:
605
 
(a) that criminal acts committed by non-German civilians directed against 
the Reich or occupation forces endangering their safety or striking power 
should require the application of the death penalty in principle; 
(b) that such criminal acts would be tried in occupied territories only 
when it appeared probable that the death sentence would be passed and 
carried out without delay. Otherwise the offenders would be taken to 
Germany; 
(c) that offenders taken to Germany were subject to court martial 
procedures there only when a particular military concern should require 
it; 
(d) that the Commander-in-Chief in occupied territories and certain 
subordinates within their command would be held personally responsible 
for the execution of this decree; 
(e) that the Chief of the OKW[
606
] would decide in which of the occupied 
territories this decree would be applied. 
The order received its name because, under it, people were taken 
away from their homes, often by night, and disappeared “forever into the 
fog of the unknown.”607 
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The decree was executed by the Ministry of Justice in cooperation 
with the OKW and the Gestapo.
608
 Its aim was to discourage the population 
of occupied territories from military and political resistance.
609
 After having 
analysed the huge amount of exhibits, Tribunal III described the workings 
of the programme as follows:
610
 
… civilians of occupied countries accused of alleged crimes in resistance 
activities against German occupying forces were spirited away for secret 
trial by special courts of the Ministry of Justice within the Reich; that the 
victim‟s whereabouts, trial, and subsequent disposition were kept 
completely secret, thus serving the dual purpose of terrorizing the 
victim‟s relatives and associates and barring recourse to evidence, 
witnesses, or counsel for defense. If the accused was acquitted, or if 
convicted, after serving his sentence, he was handed over to the Gestapo 
for „protective custody‟ for the duration of the war. These proceedings 
resulted in the torture, ill treatment, and murder of thousands of persons. 
The Tribunal, further, emphasised that the existence of concentration 
camps was extensively used as a tool to terrorize the people in occupied 
territories.
611
 It referred to the judgment of the International Military 
Tribunal, which had described in detail the manner of operation of 
concentration camps and the appalling cruelties and horrors therein,
612
 and 
stated: “Such concentration camps were used extensively for the NN 
prisoners in the execution of the Night and Fog decree …”613. 
The prosecution charged all of the defendants in the Justice Trial 
with participation in the execution and carrying out of the Night and Fog 
Decree.
614
 Thus, Tribunal III spent a lot of its time discussing and analysing 
this issue.
615
 In the end, it concluded:
616
 
                                                          
608
 Justice Case, above n 9, 1031. 
609
 Kastner “Der Dolch des Moerders war unter der Robe des Juristen verborgen: Der 
Nuernberger Juristen-Prozess 1947”, above n 317, 701. 
610
 Justice Case, above n 9, 1031-1032. 
611
 Ibid, 1033. 
612
 Ibid; See also International Military Tribunal I, 234 et seq. 
613
 Justice Case, above n 9, 1033; NN is used as an abbreviation by Tribunal III throughout 
the judgment and refers to the Night and Fog Plan. 
614
 Ibid, 1032. 
615
 See generally Ibid, 1031-1062. 
616
 Ibid, 1057. 
 144 
The enforcement of the directives under the Hitler NN plan or scheme 
became a means of instrumentality by which the most complete control 
and coercion of a lot of the people of occupied territories were affected 
and under which thousands of the civilian population of occupied areas 
were imprisoned, terrorized, and murdered. The enforcement and 
administration of the NN directives resulted in the commission of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity in violation of the international law 
of war and international common law relating to recognized human rights, 
and of article II, paragraph 1(b) and (c) of Control Council Law No. 10. 
 
(g) Racial persecution 
 
One of the major issues in all Nuremberg Trials, and one of the most 
shocking insights about Nazi Germany after World War II, was the 
treatment of Poles and Jews by the Nazi Government.
617
 
Based on Hitler‟s rabid anti-Semitism, the Nazi movement had 
developed racial theories, which declared the supremacy of the Nordic 
German race and, at the same time, denounced especially Jews as inferior 
people.
618
 Accordingly, the official programme of the Nazi Party from 24 
February 1920 read as follows:
619
 
Only a member of the race can be a citizen. A member of the race can 
only be one who is of German blood without consideration of confession. 
Consequently, no Jew can be a member of the race. 
After the Nazis had taken over power, the Nazi racism ideology 
became official policy in Germany.
620
 In different procedures before and 
during World War II, Jews were persecuted within and outside the German 
Reich. 
The so called solution of the Jewish problem was carried out in three 
steps: (1) the elimination of the Jews from the political and economic life of 
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Germany; (2) the enforced deportation and isolation in ghettos all over 
Europe; and (3) the so called final solution, which was the Nazi term for the 
extermination of the Jews through slave labour and mass murder, today 
known as the Holocaust.
621
 
The defendants in the Justice Trial were charged with participating
622
 
in carrying out a governmental plan and program for the persecution and 
extermination of Jews and Poles, a plan which transcended territorial 
boundaries as well as the bounds of human decency. Some of the 
defendants took part in the enactment of laws and decrees the purpose of 
which was the extermination of the Poles and Jews in Germany and 
throughout Europe. Others, in executive positions, actively participated in 
the enforcement of those laws and in atrocities, illegal even under 
German law, in furtherance of the declared national purpose. Others, as 
judges, distorted and then applied the laws and decrees against Poles and 
Jews as such in disregard of every principle of judicial behaviour. 
Tribunal III analysed the given evidence and affirmed that the 
programme was actually made for the extermination of Jews and Poles, but 
that “lesser forms of racial persecution were universally practiced by 
governmental authority and constituted an integral part in the general policy 
of the Reich.”623 
The Tribunal referred to Nazi laws and decrees by which (1) Jews 
were excluded from the legal profession; (2) intermarriages between Jews 
and persons of German blood were prohibited; (3) Jews were almost 
completely expelled from public service, from educational institutions and 
from many business enterprises; and (4) upon the death of a Jew his 
property was confiscated without any compensation.
624
 
Also, it described the role of the German courts, which had punished 
sexual intercourse between Jews and German nationals with extreme 
severity, had rigorously enforced the Decree against Poles and Jews from 4 
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December 1941, had imposed different types of punishment for Poles and 
Jews from those imposed upon Germans for the same crimes, had severely 
circumscribed their rights as defendants and had imposed death sentences 
on Poles and Jews even when such punishment was not prescribed by 
law.
625
 
Last, the Tribunal mentioned the 13
th
 Regulation under the Reich 
Citizenship Law, under which allegedly criminal acts committed by Jews 
were to be punished directly by the police without any employment of 
judicial process.
626
 
In the end, Tribunal III concluded:
627
 
While the part played by the Ministry of Justice in the extermination of 
Poles and Jews was small compared to the mass extermination of millions 
by the SS and Gestapo in concentration camps, nevertheless the courts 
contributed greatly to the „final solution‟ of the problem. … The evidence 
conclusively establishes the adoption and application of systematic 
government-organized and approved procedures amounting to atrocities 
and offenses of the kind made punishable by C. C. Law 10 and committed 
against „populations‟ and amounting to persecution on racial grounds. 
These procedures when carried out in occupied territory constituted war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. When enforced in the Alt Reich 
against German nationals they constituted crimes against humanity. 
 
3 Conclusion 
 
With evidence based mainly on German records, the Tribunal was 
able to analyse and evaluate the existing law and the legal practice in Nazi 
Germany in a thorough manner. It drew the correct conclusion that many 
laws enacted by the Nazi Government and the execution of law within the 
Third Reich did not deserve to be called law at all and were, in fact, crimes 
against humanity. 
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At this, the documentary evidence speaks for itself as the democratic 
principle of an independent judicature was in fact abolished, and court 
proceedings did exist only as a leftover of democratic times without any 
meaning for the final judgment. 
The analysis of the Tribunal in relation to this issue, bears no signs 
of victor‟s justice. The chances of exercising such had been, in fact, very 
small because the Nazi laws and decrees as well as the many captured 
German documents drew a very accurate picture of the barbarity and 
inhumanity, which usurped the German law after the Nazis took over power. 
However, the objectivity of the Tribunal becomes clear by the fact that not 
all laws and actions of the German judiciary were evaluated unlawful, for 
example, the infliction of the death penalty in certain cases of habitual 
crimes and plunder during the war. 
Overall, it is remarkable how carefully Tribunal III looked at the 
details of the Nazi legal system, obviously to get a better understanding of 
the individual situation of the defendants under the Nazi regime. 
 
B Individual Verdicts and Sentences 
 
The question whether the defendants were individually guilty fuelled 
a ferocious debate throughout the Justice Trial. Based on the argument that 
they did not have much choice but to follow Hitler‟s superior orders, it was 
widely controversial in public and among legal experts whether the 16 
defendants could be held responsible for the atrocities committed in the 
name of law in Nazi Germany and its occupied territories.
628
 
Military Tribunal III stated:
629
 
No defendant is specifically charged in the indictment with the murder or 
abuse of any particular person. If he were, the indictment would, no 
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doubt, name the alleged victim. Simple murder and isolated instances of 
atrocities do not constitute the gravamen of the charge. Defendants are 
charged with crimes of such immensity that mere specific instances of 
criminality appear insignificant by comparison. The charge, in brief, is 
that of conscious participation in a nation wide government-organized 
system of cruelty and injustice, in violation of the laws of war and of 
humanity, and perpetrated in the name of law by the authority of the 
Ministry of Justice, and through the instrumentality of courts. The dagger 
of the assassin was concealed beneath the robe of the jurist. 
To prove or rebut this accusation, the Tribunal had to undertake an 
intense look at the personal and professional story of each individual 
defendant under the Nazi regime. 
The evidence against the defendants was primarily based on captured 
German documents, but also on testimonies of witnesses and statements of 
the defendants themselves.
630
 In his Final Report, Chief Prosecutor Telford 
Taylor stated:
631
 
Few of the defendants committed atrocities with their own hands, and in 
fact they were rarely visible at or within many miles of the scenes of their 
worst crimes. They made plans and transmitted orders, and the most 
compelling witnesses against them were the documents which they 
drafted, signed, initialled, or distributed. 
The evidence was of such dimension that a complete illustration 
would exceed the limited space of this paper. Therefore, only a 
representative selection of evidence and the overall evaluation of Tribunal 
III regarding each defendant‟s individual guilt will be outlined here. 
Altogether, Tribunal III sentenced four of the defendants to life 
imprisonment, six to prison terms between five and ten years and four 
defendants were acquitted.
632
 A mistrial was declared for two of the 
defendants.
633
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1 The Tribunal’s evaluation of the defendant’s role in Nazi Germany 
 
(a) Schlegelberger 
 
Born on 23 October 1875, Franz Schlegelberger was the main 
defendant in the dock.
634
 He looked back on a successful career in the 
German judicature: first, in the Weimar Republic, where he started working 
for the Ministry of Justice and became a State Secretary in 1931;
635
 and 
then, under the Nazi regime, where he stayed in this position and, upon 
Reich Minister Guertner‟s death, was appointed Acting Reich Minister of 
Justice in January 1941.
636
 
He was the highest-ranked official in the Justice Trial and also a 
professor and author of several famous books.
637
 He was known as an 
excellent jurist and was held in high esteem by legal experts.
638
 Many of his 
contemporaries described him as “the last decent jurist under Hitler”639. 
In terms of power, Schlegelberger belonged more to the second-tier 
of Nazi jurists than to the more prominent group, which included Freisler 
and Thierack.
640
 However, it turned out to be a fortunate accident of history 
that he and his cohorts were in the dock, because they were much better 
representatives of the vast majority of jurists in Nazi Germany, who were 
mostly not fanatical National Socialists but conservative loyal servants of 
the government.
641
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Indeed, Schlegelberger‟s role was typical for many jurists under the 
Nazi regime and, therefore, he became the symbolic figurehead of 
Germany‟s legal profession and its involvement in the reign of terror.642 
Tribunal III dealt carefully with Schlegelberger‟s role in Nazi 
Germany. It considered that he was not a convinced Nazi and joined the 
NSDAP in 1938 only because he was ordered to do so by Hitler 
personally.
643
 Furthermore, it accepted his defence that the German 
administration of justice was under constant assaults by Himmler
644
 and 
other advocates of the police state and, therefore, he had feared that if he 
were to resign, a worse man would have taken his place.
645
 
Indeed, this was proved when Schlegelberger‟s successor Thierack 
became Reich Minister of Justice in 1942, and the police usurped the 
functions of the administration of justice and murdered thousands of Jews 
and political prisoners.
646
 Nevertheless, Tribunal III adjudged him guilty on 
counts two and three of the indictment and sentenced him to imprisonment 
for life.
647
 
Besides the fact that he received a gift of 100,000 Reichsmark from 
Hitler as appreciation upon his retirement as Acting Minister of Justice on 
20 August 1942,
648
 the evidence against him was overwhelming.
649
 
Concerning his involvement in the unlawful Night and Fog Decree,
650
 
Tribunal III stated:
651
 
By his exhortations and directives, Schlegelberger contributed to the 
destruction of judicial independence. It was his signature on the decree of 
7 February 1942 which imposed upon the Ministry of Justice and the 
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courts the burden of the prosecution, trial, and disposal of the victims of 
Hitler‟s Night and Fog. For this he must be charged with primary 
responsibility. 
The Tribunal further stated that Schlegelberger did at least 
participate in the crimes against Poles and Jews.
652
 It referred to the Decree 
against Poles and Jews from 4 December 1941, whose first draft was made 
by Schlegelberger, and stated:
653
 
He was guilty of instituting and supporting procedures for the wholesale 
persecution of Jews and Poles. Concerning Jews, his ideas were less 
brutal than those of his associates, but they can scarcely be called 
humane. … Schlegelberger‟s draft constituted the basis on which, with 
certain modifications and changes, the law against Poles and Jews was 
enacted. In this respect he was not only guilty of participation in the racial 
persecution of Poles and Jews; he was also guilty of violation of the laws 
and customs of war by establishing that legislation in the occupied 
territories of the East. 
In the end, Tribunal III summarised Schlegelberger‟s role and its 
relevance in Nazi Germany‟s legal system as follows:654 
We are under no misapprehension. Schlegelberger is a tragic character. 
He loved the life of an intellect, the work of the scholar. We believe that 
he loathed the evil that he did, but he sold that intellect and that 
scholarship to Hitler for a mess of political pottage and for the vain hope 
of personal security. 
 
(b) Klemm 
 
Unlike Schlegelberger, Herbert Klemm was a convinced National 
Socialist.
655
 Born in 1903, he joined the NSDAP as early as 1931 and 
worked in the Ministry of Justice from 1935 to 1940.
656
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Between July 1940 and March 1941, he fulfilled his war service in 
Holland as head of the department dealing with legal matters in the 
occupied Dutch territories, and from March 1941 to 1944, he served in the 
office of the Deputy of the Fuehrer and the Party Chancellery in Munich and 
Berlin.
657
 On 4 January 1944, he was appointed State Secretary in the 
Ministry of Justice and remained in this position until Germany‟s 
surrender.
658
 
Klemm was found guilty under counts two and three of the 
indictment and was sentenced to imprisonment for life.
659
 In evaluating 
Klemm‟s actions, Military Tribunal III could rely on clear evidence 
presented by the prosecution: While Klemm worked in the Party 
Chancellery, he made suggestions for strengthening the powers of police, 
and he took part in drafting the act to make the law relating to treason 
retroactive and applying to the annexed Eastern territories.
660
 As State 
Secretary in the Ministry of Justice, Klemm was effectively involved in the 
crimes committed by the German judiciary in the last one and a half years of 
the Nazi reign.
661
 
Based on the evidence against him, the Tribunal stated:
662
 
… Klemm knew of abuses in concentration camps. He knew of the 
persecution and oppression of the Jews and Poles and gypsies. He must be 
assumed to have known, from the evidence, the general basis of Nacht 
und Nebel procedure under the Department of Justice. 
Additionally, Klemm was blamed for (1) denying clemency appeals 
of death sentences, which were obviously based on confessions made while 
getting tortured;
663
 (2) supporting and participating in the plan of the Nazi 
leaders to inspire the lynching of Allied airmen by the people of 
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Germany;
664
 and (3) as head of the department within the Ministry of Justice 
which was competent for Germany‟s penal institutions, being jointly 
responsible for the execution of approximately 800 political prisoners of the 
penitentiary at Sonnenburg in January 1945.
665
 
In conclusion, Tribunal III stated:
666
 
When Rothenberger was ousted as State Secretary because he was not 
brutal enough, it was Klemm who was chosen to carry on the Thierack 
program in closest cooperation with the heads of the Nazi conspiracy. 
Klemm was in the inner circle of the Nazi war criminals. He must share 
with his dead friend, Thierack, … and his missing friend Bormann[667], 
the responsibility, at a high policy level, for the crimes committed in the 
name of justice which fill the pages of this record. We find no evidence 
warranting mitigation of his punishment. 
 
(c) Rothenberger 
 
Curt Rothenberger was born on 30 June 1896.
668
 He joined the 
NSDAP on 1 May 1933 “for reasons of full conviction”, as he had stated 
himself.
669
 From 1935 to 1942, he was the President of the District Court of 
Appeals in Hamburg.
670
 During this period he was actively engaged as a 
Party official in several organisations of the NSDAP.
671
 
In August 1942, Rothenberger was appointed State Secretary in the 
Reich Ministry of Justice, but left the Ministry in December 1943, due to 
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bad relations with Minister Thierack.
672
 Afterwards, he served as a notary in 
Hamburg.
673
 
Rothenberger was found guilty under counts two and three of the 
indictment and was sentenced to seven years imprisonment.
674
 Based on the 
given evidence, consisting of statements of Rothenberger himself, 
documents and testimonies of witnesses,
675
 Tribunal III stated:
676
 
In conclusion, the evidence discloses a personality full of complexities, 
contradictions, and inner conflict. He was kind to many half-Jews, and 
occasionally publicly aided them, yet he was instrumental in denying 
them the rights to which every litigant is entitled. He fulminated publicly 
against the „Schwarze Korps‟[677] for attacking the courts, yet he 
reproached judges for administering justice against Party officials and 
unquestionably used his influence toward achieving discriminatory action 
favorable to high Party officials and unfavorable to Poles and Jews. He 
wrote learnedly in favor of an independent judiciary, yet he ruled the 
judges of Hamburg with an iron hand. He protested vehemently against 
the practice of Party officials and Gestapo officers who interfered with the 
judges in pending cases, but he made arrangements with the Gestapo, the 
SS, and the SD whereby they were to come to him with their political 
affairs and then he instituted „preview and review‟ of sentences with the 
judges who were his inferiors. He thought concentration camps wrong but 
concluded that they were not objectionable if third degree methods did 
not become a habit. 
Although the Tribunal took into account that Rothenberger could not 
stand the brutality of the Nazi system and was “deceived and abused by his 
superiors” Thierack and Himmler, who Rothenberger considered his 
personal enemies,
678
 it concluded:
679
 
The defendant Rothenberger is guilty of taking a minor but consenting 
part in the Night and Fog program. He aided and abetted in the program 
                                                          
672
 Schott, above n 429, 119, 148-156. 
673
 Justice Case, above n 9, 1107. 
674
 Ibid, 1118, 1200. 
675
 See generally Ibid, 1107-1118. 
676
 Ibid, 1117-1118. 
677
 Das Schwarze Korps (The Black Corps) was the weekly newspaper of the SS. Randall L 
Bytwerk “Das Schwarze Korps” www.calvin.edu (last accessed 18 March 2010). 
678
 Justice Case, above n 9, 1118. 
679
 Ibid. 
 155 
of racial persecution, and notwithstanding his many protestations to the 
contrary he materially contributed toward the prostitution of the Ministry 
of Justice and the courts and their subordination to the arbitrary will of 
Hitler, the Party minions, and the police. He participated in the corruption 
and perversion of the judicial system. 
 
(d) Lautz 
 
Born in 1887, Ernst Lautz served as Chief Public Prosecutor at the 
People‟s Court in Berlin from 20 September 1939 until the end of the 
war.
680
 He became a member of the NSDAP in May 1933, but never 
actively participated in Party affairs.
681
 In his position at the People‟s Court 
he was the supervisor of the defendants Barnickel and Rothaug.
682
 
Military Tribunal III found Lautz guilty upon counts two and three 
of the indictment and sentenced him to ten years imprisonment.
683
 It 
stressed especially that the proof of his guilt depended not solely on 
captured documents or the testimony of witnesses, but on his own sworn 
statements.
684
 
In summary, he was convicted for his involvement “in enforcing the 
law against Poles and Jews which we deem to be part of the established 
governmental plan for the extermination of those races”685, for “a violation 
of the laws and customs of war in connection with prosecutions under the 
Nacht und Nebel decree”686, and for participating “in the perversions of the 
laws relating to treason and high treason under which Poles guilty of petty 
offenses were executed.”687 
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In its evaluation of Lautz‟s role in the Nazi legal system, Tribunal III 
finally stated:
688
 
There is much to be said in mitigation of punishment. Lautz was not 
active in Party matters. He resisted all efforts of Party officials to 
influence his conduct but yielded to influence and guidance from Hitler 
through the Reich Ministry of Justice, believing that to be required under 
German law. He was a stern man and a relentless prosecutor, but it may 
be said in his favor that if German law were a defense, which it is not, 
many of his acts would be excusable. 
 
(e) Mettgenberg 
 
Wolfgang Mettgenberg was born in 1882.
689
 He held the position of 
Representative of Chief in Departments III and IV of the Reich Ministry of 
Justice, which dealt with penal legislation and penal administration.
690
 He 
was the supervisor of, and worked close together with, the defendant von 
Ammon, who was in charge of the Night and Fog section within 
Mettgenberg‟s subdivision.691 
Mettgenberg was found guilty under counts two and three of the 
indictment and was sentenced to ten years imprisonment.
692
 The Tribunal 
convicted him primarily for his leading role in the accomplishment of 
Hitler‟s Night and Fog Decree. Based on Mettgenberg‟s own affidavit,693 it 
stated:
694
 
… the defendant Wolfgang Mettgenberg frankly and fully admits his 
connection with the Hitler Night and Fog decree. His statements show 
that he exercised wide discretion and had extensive authority over the 
entire plan from the time the Night and Fog prisoner was arrested in 
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occupied territory and continuously after his transfer to Germany, his 
trial, and execution or imprisonment. 
Overall, Tribunal III then concluded:
695
 
The evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that that he acted as a 
principal, aided, abetted, and was connected with the execution and 
carrying out of the Hitler Night and Fog decree in violation of numerous 
principles of international law … 
 
(f) von Ammon 
 
Wilhelm von Ammon was born in 1903 and joined the SA, the 
leading military force of the Nazi Party before and in the early years of the 
Nazi Government,
696
 in December 1933, shortly after the Nazis had taken 
over power in Germany.
697
 
He started his service in the Reich Ministry of Justice in 1935 and 
was promoted Ministerial Counsellor in 1943, under the supervision of the 
defendant Mettgenberg.
698
 As stated above, von Ammon was responsible for 
the Night and Fog cases within Mettgenberg‟s subdivision.699 He was also a 
member of the NSDAP, which he joined in 1937.
700
 
Tribunal III found von Ammon guilty under counts two and three of 
the indictment and sentenced him to ten years imprisonment.
701
 Similarly to 
Mettgenberg, von Ammon was primarily charged with various 
responsibilities in the execution of Hitler‟s Night and Fog Decree. 
Among other things, von Ammon was especially responsible for the 
decision of distributing the Night and Fog cases among the several Special 
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Courts and the People‟s Court, and von Ammon was granted a large degree 
of autonomy by Mettgenberg in his handling of individual cases, including 
the authority to confirm death sentences.
702
 
Like Mettgenberg, von Ammon also proved the charges against him 
by his own testimonies.
703
 Thus, the Tribunal got a detailed overall picture 
of von Ammon‟s responsibility and stated as follows:704 
The defendant von Ammon held an executive position of responsibility 
involving the exercise of personal discretion. Within the ministry he was 
in charge of the section which handled Night and Fog cases. … We have 
already quoted a note signed by von Ammon wherein he remarked that it 
was „rather awkward‟ that the defendants should learn the details of their 
charges only during the trial and commented on the insufficiency of the 
translation facilities in the trial of French NN prisoners. Von Ammon is 
chargeable with actual knowledge concerning the systematic abuse of the 
judicial process in these cases. 
 
(g) Joel 
 
Born in 1903,
705
 Guenther Joel took office in the Ministry of Justice 
in 1933 as a Junior Public Prosecutor and rose to the rank of Ministerial 
Counsellor in 1941.
706
 Between 1937 and 1943, he was the Personal 
Referent
707
 of Reich Minister Guertner and his successor Thierack in special 
cases.
708
 
In 1943, Joel left the Ministry after he was appointed Attorney 
General to the Supreme Provincial Court of Appeals in Hamm.
709
 Quickly, 
in August 1943, he was promoted Chief Prosecutor of the Court of Appeals 
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in Hamm, responsible for a huge territory, including all of Westphalia and 
the district of Essen.
710
 In this position he stayed until the end of the war. 
Joel was a Party man
711
. He entered the NSDAP in May 1933 and 
became a member of the SS in January 1938.
712
 From 1937 to 1943, he 
acted as Liaison Officer between the Ministry of Justice and the SS, SD and 
Gestapo.
713
 
Tribunal III adjudged Joel guilty under counts two, three and four of 
the indictment and sentenced him to ten years imprisonment.
714
 He was 
convicted for his actions as a Referent in the Ministry of Justice, in which he 
dealt with many cases tried under the Decree against Poles and Jews from 4 
December 1941, including the review and passing of death sentences for 
Poles and Jews who had committed alleged crimes against the Reich or the 
German occupation forces.
715
 
Also, he was convicted for his work as Liaison Officer between the 
Ministry and the SS and Gestapo, which “was productive and satisfactory in 
the carrying out of the plan or scheme of racial persecution and 
extermination of Poles and Jews.”716 Furthermore, the Tribunal blamed him 
for his work as Chief Prosecutor of the Court of Appeals in Hamm, in which 
he was in charge of the Night and Fog programme.
717
 Lastly, he was 
convicted for his membership in the SS and SD, which the judgment of the 
International Military Tribunal had declared to be criminal organisations.
718
 
Many documents proved his guilt and, therefore, in its judgment the 
Tribunal concluded:
719
 
The defendant Joel is chargeable with knowledge that the Night and Fog 
program from its inception to its final conclusion constituted a violation 
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of the laws and customs of war. … As Referent in the department of 
justice and as liaison officer between the department and the SS, Joel 
obtained extensive information and exercised far-reaching power in the 
execution of the law against Jews and Poles. He therefore took an active 
part in the execution of the plan or scheme for the persecution and 
extermination of Jews and Poles. Concerning Joel‟s membership in the SS 
and SD, a consideration of all of the evidence convinces us beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he retained such membership with full knowledge 
of the criminal character of those organizations. 
 
(h) Rothaug 
 
Oswald Rothaug was born on 17 May 1897.
720
 He worked as a 
lawyer, public prosecutor and local court judge before he was appointed 
Director of the District Court in Nuremberg in April 1937.
721
 In this 
position, which he held until May 1943, he was Chairman of the Court of 
Assizes, of a penal chamber and of the Nuremberg Special Court.
722
 In May 
1943, he was promoted Senior Public Prosecutor at the People‟s Court in 
Berlin.
723
 
Rothaug joined the NSDAP in 1938.
724
 He was an active Party 
member and an “honorary collaborator” of the SD.725 Furthermore, he was 
Executive Chief of the Lawyers‟ League in the District of Franconia.726 
Rothaug became symbolic of the worst excesses of the racist and evil 
Nazi ideology which took over the German judiciary after 1933.
727
 Military 
Tribunal III described him and the defendant Oeschey as “judges who with 
fanatical zeal enforced the will of the Party”728. 
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The evidence against Rothaug was voluminous and verified his 
“attitude of virulent hostility” towards Poles and Jews.729 Many documents 
and witness statements of his own associates, including judges, prosecutors, 
defence lawyers and medical experts, proved his guilt.
730
 Hence, the 
Tribunal found Rothaug guilty on count three of the indictment and 
sentenced him to imprisonment for life.
731
 
The judgment was primarily based on three exemplary cases, which 
were tried in front of the Special Court at Nuremberg with Rothaug as the 
Presiding Judge: 
In the first trial, Rothaug adjudged two Polish girls of minor age 
within one hour for alleged sabotage and sentenced them to death, although 
they had repudiated their confessions made during the interrogation by the 
Gestapo and their lawyer had objected that a proper defence was impossible 
because he was summoned by Rothaug just two hours before the start of the 
trial.
732
 They were executed just four days after the trial.
733
 
In the second trial, a 25 year old Polish farmhand was accused to 
have made indecent advances to his employer‟s wife.734 He was sentenced 
to death under the Decree against Poles and Jews from 4 December 1941 
and was subsequently executed.
735
 Rothaug‟s judgment included the words: 
“The whole inferiority of the defendant, I would say, lies in the sphere of 
character and is obviously based on his being a part of Polish subhumanity, 
or in his belonging to Polish subhumanity.”736 
The third trial was the well-known case of Leo Katzenberger, a 68 
year old Jewish merchant and the head of the Jewish community in 
Nuremberg.
737
 He was accused of racial pollution with the 30 year old 
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German woman Irene Seiler, who had given a sworn statement that 
Katzenberger and her family had been close friends for many years and that 
their relationship was only a friendly and fatherly one without any sexual 
intercourse.
738
 
After the indictment appeared to fail, because there was no evidence 
at all, Rothaug organised that the case was to be tried before his Special 
Court.
739
 He ordered that Katzenberger be indicted with racial defilement in 
combination with a charge under the Decree against Public Enemies, which 
was the only possibility to give a death sentence, and that Seiler was 
indicted with the charge of perjury, so she was precluded as a witness for 
Katzenberger.
740
 
Prior the start of the trial, Rothaug told the medical counsellor of the 
court that Katzenberger “would be beheaded anyhow”741 and, on the 
doctor‟s objection that his guilt was questionable, he replied: “It is sufficient 
for me that the swine said that a German girl had sat upon his lap.”742 
During the recess after the introduction of evidence was concluded, Rothaug 
talked to the prosecutor and urged him to ask for a death sentence for 
Katzenberger.
743
 He also gave him suggestions for arguments.
744
 In the end, 
Katzenberger was sentenced to death, and Seiler was sentenced to two years 
imprisonment.
745
 
In its conclusion, Tribunal III evaluated Rothaug‟s role in the Nazi 
judicial system as follows:
746
 
From the evidence it is clear that these trials lacked the essential elements 
of legality. In these cases the defendant‟s court, in spite of the legal 
sophistries which he employed, was merely an instrument in the program 
of the leaders of the Nazi State of persecution and extermination. That the 
number the defendant could wipe out within his competency was smaller 
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than the number involved in the mass persecutions and exterminations by 
the leaders whom he had served, does not mitigate his contribution to the 
program of those leaders. His acts were more terrible in that those who 
might have hoped for a last refuge in the institutions of justice found these 
institutions turned against them and a part of the program of terror and 
oppression. 
The individual cases in which Rothaug applied the cruel and 
discriminatory law against Poles and Jews cannot be considered in 
isolation. It is of the essence of the charges against him that he 
participated in the national program of racial persecution. It is of the 
essence of the proof that he identified himself with this national program 
and gave himself utterly to its accomplishment. He participated in the 
crime of genocide. … 
By his manner and methods he made his court an instrumentality of terror 
and won the fear and hatred of the population. From the evidence of his 
closest associates as well as his victims, we find that Oswald Rothaug 
represented in Germany the personification of the secret Nazi intrigue and 
cruelty. He was and is a sadistic and evil man. 
 
(i) Barnickel, Petersen, Nebelung and Cuhorst 
 
The defendants Paul Barnickel, Hans Petersen, Guenther Nebelung 
and Hermann Cuhorst were all acquitted by Military Tribunal III.
747
 A 
closer look at these defendants, therefore, is not necessary because the 
danger of victor‟s justice in the individual cases is out of question. 
Interestingly enough, though, is the fact that the Tribunal was 
generally convinced that the defendant Cuhorst committed crimes as defined 
in Control Council Law No. 10.
748
 It stated:
749
 
There are many affidavits and much testimony in the record as to the 
defendant‟s character as a fanatical Nazi and a ruthless judge. There is 
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also much evidence as to the arbitrary, unfair, and unjudicial manner in 
which he conducted his trials. 
Nevertheless, Tribunal III did not find him guilty for the only reason 
that the records of the cases, which were tried by Cuhorst as Chief Justice of 
the Special Court in Stuttgart, had been destroyed when the Palace of Justice 
in Stuttgart was burned.
750
 The decision was explained as follows:
751
 
From the evidence available, this Tribunal does not consider that it can 
say beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of inflicting 
the punishments which he imposed on racial grounds or that it can say 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he used the discriminatory provisions of 
the decree against Poles and Jews to the prejudice of the Poles whom he 
tried. 
 
(j) Oeschey 
 
Together with Rothaug, whose successor as Chief Justice of the 
Special Court in Nuremberg he became in 1943, Rudolf Oeschey was 
characterized as one of “the guiding, if not controlling, spirits of the Special 
Court at Nuernberg, which was known as the most brutal of the special 
courts in Germany.”752 
Born in 1903,
753
 Oeschey early became a member of the NSDAP in 
1931.
754
 He served in several offices of the Nazi Party until, in 1940, he was 
provisionally commissioned with the direction of the legal office of the 
NSDAP in the District of Franconia and the leadership of the District of 
Franconia in the National Socialist Lawyers League.
755
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After Rothaug‟s promotion to Berlin, Oeschey was appointed 
Director of the District Court in Nuremberg.
756
 He held this position until 
February 1945, when he was drafted into the German Army.
757
 For the 
period from 4 April 1945 to 14 April 1945, he was released to serve as 
Chairman of the Civilian Court Martial at Nuremberg.
758
 
Tribunal III found Oeschey guilty on counts three and four of the indictment 
and sentenced him to imprisonment for life.
759
 Many cases gave evidence of 
his arbitrary character, but the Tribunal analysed only two in detail:
760
 
In the first case, Oeschey found a Polish woman guilty of a violation 
under the Decree against Poles and Jews, and her boyfriend, a Ukrainian 
male, he found guilty for assisting her to commit this alleged crime after a 
harmless skirmish with their employer, a German farmer, had occurred.
761
 
Both were sentenced to death, and the evidence in the Justice Trial proved 
that Oeschey imposed his will upon his two fellow judges and had induced 
them to concur.
762
 Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded: 
In this case Oeschey, with evil intent, participated in the government-
organized system for the racial persecution of Poles. This is also a case of 
such a perversion of the judicial process as to shock the conscience of 
mankind. 
The other case was the one of Count Montgelas, who was tried and 
convicted for having allegedly made insulting remarks concerning Hitler to 
a woman in a private room.
763
 He was sentenced to death by the Nuremberg 
Civilian Court Martial with Oeschey as the Presiding Judge.
764
 By violating 
almost all rules of a fair trial, which were also valid for courts martial, this 
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case was one of the most terrifying examples of the Nazi judicial practice.
765
 
Tribunal III summarised as follows:
766
 
Thus, on the last days of the war, when the American Army was almost at 
the gates of Nuernberg, and within a month of the total collapse of 
German opposition, a sick man, after solitary confinement, is indicted on 
3 April, tried on 5 April, and shot on 6 April without the knowledge of his 
counsel in secret proceedings, and without the benefit of witnesses who 
would have testified for him. Such a mock trial is not a judicial 
proceeding but a murder. 
The most shocking facts about Oeschey‟s character were not given 
by the captured documents, but by many witnesses who had been his 
associates.
767
 Most of them described Oeschey as a racist, especially in 
regard to Poles, and a fanatical Nazi who often had announced before trial 
that the defendant will be executed.
768
 For example, a statement of Hermann 
Mueller, who was a prosecutor at the Nuremberg Special Court and a 
witness at the Justice Trial, is quoted here: “Oeschey was the most brutal 
judge that I have ever known in my life and a most willing instrument of the 
Nazi terroristic justice.”769 
Based on such statements and the documentary evidence, it was 
relatively easy for Tribunal III to get a profound picture of Oeschey‟s 
personality and his role in the Nazi judicial system. Thus, at the end of its 
analysis, it concluded: “In view of the sadistic attitude and conduct of the 
defendant, we know of no just reason for any mitigation of punishment.”770 
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(k) Altstoetter 
 
Josef Altstoetter, born in 1892, is the only defendant in the Justice 
Trial, who was found guilty on count four of the indictment only.
771
 Besides 
his professional career in the Ministry of Justice, where he was promoted 
Chief of the Civil Law and Procedure Division in 1943, he was a very active 
member within the Nazi Party.
772
 
When the Nazis took over power in Germany, he had been a member 
of the paramilitary organisation Stahlhelm, which was absorbed by the SA 
in 1934.
773
 In the following years, he developed a good relationship to 
Heinrich Himmler and, on his request, Altstoetter resigned from the SA to 
become a member of the SS in 1937.
774
 In 1938, he also joined the NSDAP, 
which later awarded him the Golden Party Badge for service to the Party.
775
 
Altstoetter was a good friend to Himmler and Ernst Kaltenbrunner
776
 
and, probably for that reason, received several promotions in the SS.
777
 The 
peak of his SS career was reached in 1944, when he was promoted to the 
rank of Oberfuehrer, which was a very high position within the 
organisation.
778
 
Tribunal III sentenced Altstoetter to five years imprisonment.
779
 It 
referred to the judgment of the International Military Tribunal, which in 
detail had described the criminal activities of the SS, such as the deportation 
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and extermination of the Jews, the widespread murder and ill-treatment of 
the civilian population in occupied territories and the brutal treatment of the 
inmates of concentration camps.
780
 
The evidence of Altstoetter‟s connection with the SS was based 
primarily on his personnel file, his correspondence with SS leaders and his 
own testimony, and it showed clearly that he knew about the crimes 
committed by the SS, for example, the evacuation of Jews in Austria.
781
 
Thus, in conclusion, the Tribunal stated as follows:
782
 
He accepted and retained his membership in the SS, perhaps the major 
instrument of Himmler‟s power. Conceding that the defendant did not 
know of the ultimate mass murders in the concentration camps and by the 
Einsatzgruppen, he knew the policies of the SS and, in part, its crimes. 
Nevertheless, he accepted its insignia, its rank, its honors, and its contacts 
with the high figures of the Nazi regime. These were of no small 
significance in Nazi Germany. For that price he gave his name as a 
soldier and a jurist of note and so helped to cloak the shameful deeds of 
that organization from the eyes of the German people. 
 
(l) Engert and Westphal 
 
Karl Engert, Vice President of the infamous People‟s Court, and Carl 
Westphal, a high official in the Reich Ministry of Justice, were both indicted 
but not tried.
783
 
Engert became seriously ill and was not able to be present in court 
for most of the trial, so Tribunal III declared a mistrial.
784
 Westphal 
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committed suicide in his cell in the Nuremberg jail after the indictment was 
issued, but before the opening of the trial.
785
 
 
2 The Tribunal’s relatively mild sentencing 
 
Many people criticised the sentences in the Justice Trial as too mild, 
which is fully understandable if one looks at other trials conducted at 
Nuremberg. Death sentences were given in the major trial before the 
International Military Tribunal, and in Case No. 1 (Medical Trial), Case No. 
4 (Pohl Trial) and Case No. 9 (Einsatzgruppen Trial) of the subsequent 
Nuremberg Trials.
786
 The Deputy Chief Prosecutor in the Justice Trial, 
Charles M LaFollette, stated in a review of the trial in 1948: “The judgment 
was attacked for its leniency by more Germans than Americans.”787 
Hence, the question arises why none of the defendants in the Justice 
Trial was sentenced to death and why most of the given prison terms, except 
for the lifelong sentences, were relatively short? Defendants like Rothaug or 
Oeschey may have been appropriate candidates for the death penalty. 
At first, the perspectives of the judges of Tribunal III have to be 
considered, because it could be a reason for the mildness of the sentences. 
Besides the fact that the members of the Tribunal were sitting opposite of 
former peers, they were confronted with a unique situation in world history, 
namely the task to evaluate the role of jurists, who usually did nothing else 
but to apply the existing laws of their country. 
Additionally, they did not judge over some ordinary cads but 
representatives of Germany‟s academic elite, who were able to speak and 
argue in a proper way and sometimes showed regret. Especially 
Schlegelberger left a good personal impression on the Tribunal.
788
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Therefore, the judges of Tribunal III had to deal with an emotional pressure 
based on the unanswerable and terrifying question: What would I have done 
in the situation of the defendants?  
Another reason was the social and political situation in 1947. In his 
Final Report, Chief Prosecutor Telford Taylor explained the differences in 
the sentences of the 12 subsequent Nuremberg Tribunals as follows:
789
 
On the whole, it was apparent to anyone connected with the entire series 
of trials under Law No. 10 that the sentences became progressively lighter 
as time went on … No doubt a number of factors played a part in this 
trend toward leniency, including waning interest on the part of the general 
public and the shift in the focus of public attention resulting from 
international events and circumstances. 
Indeed, the public interest shifted away from the war crimes trials 
after the major Nazis had been convicted by the International Military 
Tribunal, and also the US policy in regard to Germany‟s war criminals 
changed dramatically after it became clear that a new democratic Germany 
was needed as an ally in the context of the upcoming Cold War.
790
 
As analysed before, the judges of Tribunal III evaluated and judged 
with a great sense of impartiality,
791
 Nevertheless, they were human beings 
and could hardly free themselves completely from these developments. 
However, the relative mildness of the sentences passed by Tribunal III 
disprove the accusation that the verdicts in the Justice Trial were based on 
victor‟s justice. 
 
3 Conclusion 
 
The judges of US Military Tribunal III were confronted with an 
extremely difficult task: to put themselves in the position of a leading 
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German jurist under the Nazi Government and evaluate the actions that were 
done. In doing so, it has to be taken into consideration, and the judges 
probably did, that at the time, people of any nation depended much more on 
their home country than today. 
The world was not as international, and emigration was an option 
with a much bigger personal sacrifice than it is today. Most of the people in 
the 1930s were deeply rooted in the communities where they had grown up, 
and persons with a social background and standing like the defendants had 
even stronger roots to their local area, because they belonged to the guiding 
elite of those communities. Additionally, some of the defendants had 
already reached an age, which would have made it even more difficult for 
them to leave their beloved home country. 
In the end, the Tribunal evaluated the role of the defendants 
reasonably and passed appropriate sentences. Persons like Schlegelberger or 
Rothenberger did obviously struggle with the development of law and their 
role in Nazi Germany‟s judicial system. Nevertheless, they were – directly 
or indirectly – responsible for the atrocities committed in the name of law in 
Germany. 
Tribunal III did not only punish them for their actions but sent an 
important message for future generations: that individuals of such high 
intelligence and good standing should have taken their leading roles in 
society not only for their personal benefits but for the good of moral and 
conscience and, therefore, should have probably resisted or left their 
country. 
Individually, in my opinion, all defendants were adjudged in a fair 
and just manner without signs of victor‟s justice. However, regarding the 
responsibility of German judges, German Professor Eberhard Schmidt, in 
1947, stated that it was not the judiciary but the legislature who undermined 
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the justice system and, therefore, the responsibility for it cannot be heaped 
upon the judiciary but only on the legislature.
792
 
Nevertheless, it is a given fact that sometimes courts had exceeded 
the possible range of punishment in Nazi laws by “150 per cent”793, and had 
sentenced political opponents or Poles and Jews to death without any 
need.
794
 Therefore, although personally an opponent of the death penalty, I 
am convinced that the life sentences handed down by the Tribunal were 
deserved, as one can possibly argue that only defendants like Rothaug and 
Oeschey may have deserved the death penalty. 
In the case of Altstoetter, there are signs of weak evidence as he was 
convicted only for his membership in the SS, with the explanation that he 
knew about the crimes committed by this organisation. However, with 
respect to the legal basis and background of Tribunal III, including the 
obligation to apply the rules of Control Council Law No. 10 and US 
Military Ordinance No. 7, his conviction was understandable. 
When one looks at his sentence of just five years imprisonment, the 
mildest sentence of all convicted defendants in the Justice Trial, it becomes 
clear that the Tribunal took his less severe guilt into account. 
Furthermore, the acquittals of four of the defendants definitely 
disprove the accusation of victor‟s justice. Especially the case of Cuhorst 
clarifies that Tribunal III held onto fundamental principles of criminal law, 
although all available evidence and facts strongly indicated his guilt. 
The Tribunal adhered to the principle in dubio pro reo (when in 
doubt, for the accused) and acquitted him because it was not able to say 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” that he was guilty.795 Unlike the Nazi legal 
practice, which disregarded this principle among many others, it sent out a 
strong signal to future tribunals to follow the basic rules of criminal law and 
justice, free of emotional feelings and the public cry for vengeance. 
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With respect to the atrocities committed by the Gestapo and in 
concentration camps, all of the defendants had claimed that they did not 
know about it.
796
 On this, the Tribunal stated as follows:
797
 
The thousands of Germans who took part in the atrocities must have 
returned from time to time to their homes in the Reich. The atrocities 
were of a magnitude unprecedented in the world. Are we to believe that 
no whisper reached the ears of the public or of those officials who were 
most concerned? Did the defendants think that the nation-wide pogrom of 
November 1938 officially directed from Berlin and Hitler‟s 
announcement to the Reichstag threatening the obliteration of the Jewish 
race in Europe were unrelated? At least they cannot plead ignorance 
concerning the decrees which were published in their official organ, „The 
Reichsgesetzblatt‟. … They read The Stuermer[798]. They listened to the 
radio. They received and sent directives. They heard and delivered 
lectures. This Tribunal is not so gullible as to believe these defendants so 
stupid that they did not know what was going on. One man can keep a 
secret, two men may, but thousands never. 
However, in the end, Tribunal III did not settle for this assumption. 
Instead it looked accurately and in detail at each defendant‟s actions and 
responsibilities, and it relied on the individually given evidence. Therefore, 
once more, it has to be said that in regard to the evaluation of the 
defendants‟ individual roles, victor‟s justice was not exercised by the 
Tribunal. 
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VI LEGACY OF THE TRIAL 
 
From today‟s perspective, the 13 Nuremberg Trials have been one of 
the most remarkable events in world history and changed the rules of 
international law forever. 
With a focus on the Justice Trial, this chapter will firstly outline how 
Nuremberg was the starting point for the establishment of a new 
international criminal law; it will be concluded that these new rules and 
principles formed a proper basis for the future treatment of war criminals. 
Secondly, it will be analysed why the US war crimes trial 
programme, in the end, failed and whether the Justice Trial has to be seen as 
an example of victor‟s justice because it remained the only trial by the US 
Military Government against Nazi jurists after World War II. In this context, 
it will also be examined why all convicted defendants were released long 
before the end of their prison terms, although the US officials had always 
claimed that the sentences were not based on the rule of the victors but the 
rule of law. 
In the end, a conclusion will be drawn stating that in the context of 
the aftermath of World War II the Justice Trial cannot be seen as an 
example of victor‟s justice. 
 
A The Establishment of a New International Criminal Law 
 
1 Development 
 
From the very beginning at the London Conference in 1945, the 
United States intended that the trials against the German war criminals were 
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not only for punishing the perpetrators of Nazi Germany, but to establish a 
new world order in which not the states but the people were the subjects of 
the law.
799
 
Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which marked the end of the 
devastating 30 Years‟ War in Europe, it was the right of a sovereign state to 
make war against other sovereign states and to treat its own population as 
they liked.
800
 That was not good, not evil, not unfair and not illegal in the 
context of that time, it was simply the world order for 300 years.
801
 
Indeed, although international treaties and war conventions existed 
to protect the civilian population, in general only states were subject to the 
international law, and individuals like the defendants in the Justice Trial 
could not be made responsible for their actions, which they performed as an 
instrument or organ of the state.
802
 
The Nuremberg Trials changed this old world order forever. Besides 
the first trial against the major Nazi war criminals, which established that 
state leaders can be held individually responsible for aggression, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity,
803
 the subsequent Nuremberg proceedings 
additionally “established clear notions of enslavement, torture, deportation, 
slave labour, and superior responsibility, all of which helped clarify the 
content of crimes against humanity and war crimes as international crimes 
bearing individual criminal liability.”804 
The new concept of crimes against humanity and the new principle 
of individual responsibility meant a revolution in international criminal law 
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at the time.
805
 Following this, the argument of obedience to superior orders 
was once for all denied as an absolute defence in international law.
806
 
The Justice Trial, in particular, established several new doctrines: (1) 
that crimes against humanity can include crimes committed by national 
authorities against its own nationals “where such crimes were committed 
through systematic government approved procedures committed against 
populations or amounted to persecutions on political, racial, or religious 
grounds”807; (2) that judges could not benefit from the doctrine of judicial 
immunity and, therefore, would be liable for their judicial actions if the 
evidence shows that the courts “were neither independent nor impartial, but 
resembled administrative tribunals acting under directives from above in a 
quasi-judicial manner”808; and (3) that the infliction of mental cruelty, such 
as committed under the Night and Fog Decree, can constitute inhumane 
treatment.
809
 
Overall, the Nuremberg Trials laid the foundation of modern 
international criminal law. The concept of crimes against humanity served 
as a basis and inspiration for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 
1948, the Genocide Convention of 1948 and the extension of the four 
Geneva Conventions of 1949.
810
 Also, the so called Nuremberg Principles 
were adopted by the United Nations in 1950, and serve today as a solid basis 
for international war crimes tribunals.
811
 
Unfortunately for the development of international law, the Iron 
Curtain during the Cold War re-established the old principle of state 
sovereignty “so that in the 1980s the Nuremberg‟s legacy was indeed that of 
failure.”812 
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Nevertheless, after the end of Communism in Eastern Europe, the 
Nuremberg ideas revived and found their ultimate establishment within the 
creation of new international war crimes tribunals, such as the Tribunals for 
Ex-Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) in the 1990s.
813
 The provisional 
climax was reached by the Rome Statute of 1998 and the subsequent 
installation of the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002.
814
 
Additionally, the Nuremberg rules and principles formed the legal 
basis for many other courts, such as the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (1995-1998),
815
 the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (since 2002),
816
 the Special Tribunals for Lebanon (since 2009) and 
Cambodia (since 2007),
817
 the East-Timor Commission for Reception, Truth 
and Reconciliation (2002-2005),
818
 the Iraq Tribunal (2005-2006),
819
 and 
the German civil courts, who carried out the Wall-shooters’ trials against 
former East German soldiers and officials (1991-2005).
820
 
 
2 Criticism 
 
The Nuremberg Trials revolutionised the international law by 
threatening future national leaders and their subordinates with the possibility 
of being tried for starting an aggressive war or committing war crimes and 
crimes against humanity.
821
 However, it did not lead to the end of wars and 
war crimes. Between 1945 and 1998, international conflicts and tyrannical 
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regimes caused an estimated 170 million casualties, and most of the 
perpetrators of these crimes have never faced a trial.
822
 
Therefore, some critics state that the Nuremberg Trials did more 
harm than good to society and the rule of law, because the fact that only a 
very small amount of Nazi criminals were finally tried did not deter future 
perpetrators from committing war crimes but almost encouraged them.
823
 
Author Ellis Washington expressed this opinion as follows:
824
 
… the Nuremberg Trials were ultimately, pathetic show trials concocted 
by the Allies purely out of expediency and with the intent to dispense 
symbolic justice so that they could get on with the work of rebuilding 
Europe which had been so utterly devastated by the war. 
On the other hand, it has to be taken into account that the 
development of Western Europe in the second half of the 20
th
 century 
emerges as a success story.
825
 In 2005, Susanne Karstedt wrote:
826
 
None of the contemporaries who witnessed the end of World War Two, 
and saw the sheer scale of European calamity, would have dared to 
predict that only a decade later Western European economies would be 
thriving, and a union amongst the former enemies would have been 
forged in the Western parts of the continent. If anything else, this unique 
European experience demonstrates that peace and reconciliation are 
possible, even after the most horrific atrocities and unspeakable injustices, 
and even after two wars that had cost the lives of millions of European 
citizens within the lifetime of one generation, leaving nearly no family 
unaffected. 
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Nevertheless, Washington has a point, though, and as a matter of 
fact, it is obvious that the Nuremberg Trials did not deter dictators and 
tyrants from breaking the rules of international law. However, it cannot be 
said that Nuremberg did more harm than good to society as Germany and 
Western Europe in the second half of the 20
th
 century experienced their 
most peaceful and prosperous time in history. 
 
3 Conclusion 
 
The Nuremberg Trials were not perfect, but they changed the world 
order in an impressive manner. The implementation of new criminal 
concepts, such as crimes against humanity and individual responsibility, and 
– specifically introduced in the Justice Trial – the rule that judges can be 
held responsible for their actions independent from what their national law 
says and the principle that crimes committed by national authorities against 
its own citizens may also be crimes under international law, established a 
completely new system of criminal law, under which we live today. 
The transition from a system entirely premised on state sovereignty 
to a system which protects the human rights of individuals, is the biggest 
achievement in international law since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. 
Unfortunately, Nuremberg did not prevent new wars, conflicts and 
human rights violations, but nobody could have seriously expected this. In 
this context, the legacy of Nuremberg is not the prevention of such crimes 
but the clear signal that their perpetrators can never feel protected by law 
again. 
The subsequent Nuremberg Trials, additionally, made clear that this 
applies not only to the leaders but to everybody who actively participates or 
supports such crimes. I agree with Telford Taylor, who stated in 1955: “The 
great question today is not whether the Nuremberg principles are valid, but 
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whether mankind can live up to them, and whether it can live at all if it 
fails.”827 
Regarding the achievements within the substantive law, the 
establishment of several international and national tribunals since the 1990s 
have shown that the Nuremberg ideas are more relevant than ever. For 
example, the doctrines established by the Justice Trial became an important 
factor within the legal processing of East Germany‟s past by German courts 
after the end of the East German state in 1990.
828
 
Proceedings like the Wall-shooters’ trials and the Perversion-of-
justice trials against East German soldiers, officials and judges were mainly 
based on the Nuremberg ideas of protecting fundamental human rights and 
holding individuals responsible for their actions, regardless of their 
hierarchical position in society.
829
 
In summary, it has to be concluded that Nuremberg truly established 
a new international criminal law. The London Agreement with its annexed 
Charter and the following first Nuremberg Trial caused a complete 
turnaround of the existing world order towards the international recognition 
of human rights. 
Additionally, the subsequent Nuremberg Trials, including the Justice 
Trial, refined these doctrines and established many precedents for later 
trials. Eventually, the legacy of these trials is best described by author 
Jonathan Friedman who stated: “[T]he subsequent trials gave the 
prosecution of war crimes a depth in legal theory and practice that 
heretofore did not exist.”830 
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B The Failure of the US War Crimes Trial Programme 
 
Based on the London Charter and Control Council Law No. 10, the 
four Allies convicted around 5,000 war criminals after World War II in their 
respective occupation zones.
831
. However, in the context of the estimated 
hundreds of thousands of potential German war criminals, these numbers 
are very small.
832
 
With respect to the trials in the US zone, various authors take the 
view that the US war crimes trial programme failed in many ways.
833
 Mark 
Aarons, for example, stated as follows:
834
 
As the Cold War sharpened, tensions between the former Allies in the 
second half of the 1940s, the effort to bring Nazis to justice wound slowly 
down and then ground to a complete halt in the early 1950s. At this time, 
Western efforts at denazification in Germany and trials of accused war 
criminals descended into farce, as the building of West Germany was 
found to be impossible without pardoning and releasing many convicted 
mass killers. 
Indeed, the Nuremberg Justice Trial remained the only trial of the 
US authorities against members of the legal profession of Nazi Germany,
835
 
and the convicted defendants were all released in the 1950s, long before the 
end of their original prison terms.
836
 Yet, the upcoming Cold War was a 
major but not the only reason for the failure of the US programme. The 
deep-rooted opposition from Germany‟s society, and the US amnesties, 
which were based on both political and legal reasons, were also important 
factors. 
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When looking at the core question of this paper, the uniqueness of 
the Justice Trial and the early release of the convicts from prison seem only 
beneficial for the vanquished Germans, but then it has to be asked whether 
this was an arbitrary exercise of power by the US Government and, 
therefore, an example of victor‟s justice. 
It will be shown that different factors of a political and legal nature 
caused these results and, in the end, the former US authorities can be 
exonerated from the accusation that victor‟s justice had occurred. 
 
1 The upcoming Cold War 
 
Political and ideological differences between the Western Allies and 
the Soviet Union were put aside during World War II to defeat the German 
armed forces in a joint effort. Nevertheless, after the war was won, these 
differences soon started to become insurmountable obstacles in the 
relationship between the former Allies. 
Additionally, several occurrences in the second half of the 1940s 
created a hostile atmosphere especially between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, which finally culminated in the Cold War
837
 which dominated 
the world until the end of Communism in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s. 
In respect of the US war crimes trial programme, Friedman summarised 
these post-war developments as follows:
838
 
From the first trial session in October 1946 to the last review in December 
1949, the world had witnessed an escalating series of confrontations 
between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, among them the 
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Communist incursion into southeastern Europe and central Asia before 
1947, which inspired the Truman Doctrine[
839
]; the Communist coup in 
Czechoslovakia in March 1948; the promulgation of the Marshall 
Plan[
840
] one month later; the Berlin Blockade[
841
] in the summer of that 
year; the founding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on 4 April 
1949; the founding of the West German Federal Republic in May; the 
Soviets‟ detonation of a nuclear weapon in September 1949; and the 
creation of the communist German Democratic Republic (GDR) on 7 
October. 
Naturally, these occurrences strongly influenced the US policy 
towards Germany and, according to Friedman, “[a]s a result … of this 
intensifying conflict, American policy toward Germany shifted from one of 
occupation and denazification … to one of reconstruction and 
integration”842. 
Fearing that Communism could become the dominant political 
system all over Europe, the United States, together with their Allies Britain 
and France, decided early to rebuild and strengthen the area of Western 
Europe as a bulwark against Communism.
843
 The decision to establish a 
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new West German republic on the territory of the former occupation zones 
of the three Western Allies was the clearest sign of this new policy.
844
 
In return, East Germany was founded as a Communist state under 
the influence of the Soviet Union on the territory of its former zone of 
occupation, and this established the Cold War as the new world order for the 
next 40 years. 
The newly founded Federal Republic of West Germany was the 
closest neighbour of the new Communist countries of Eastern Europe and, 
therefore, became very important as an ally of the US and of the Western 
Europe defence community.
845
 To protect the Western world from 
Communism, a German contribution to the defence of the West was 
desperately needed and, to achieve this support, the Western Allies were 
aware that they “would have to pay for this by restoring the sovereignty of 
Germany.”846 
Additionally, the creation of an East German paramilitary force in 
1949, and the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 as the first proxy 
war of the Cold War conflict between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, put the question of Germany‟s rearmament on the map.847 
In this situation, the Allied scheme to prosecute and punish German 
war criminals turned from a programme into a problem. The imprisoned war 
criminals became an uncomfortable burden to both the Allied and the West 
German Governments on the path to make West Germany an equal partner 
militarily and politically.
848
 Although criticised before, the US war crimes 
trial programme now became the target of many attacks from legal experts 
and powerful political groups in both German and American society, 
including the US Congress and the new West German Parliament.
849
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Consequently, beginning in 1951, the focus of the US authorities 
was no longer on punishing war criminals and re-educating the German 
public, but rather on preventing the war criminals problem from causing 
further controversy in both the United States and Germany.
850
 As a result, 
no more trials were held under US tribunals, and clemency and sentence 
modification procedures were introduced for those Germans who had been 
already convicted and imprisoned.
851
 
With this new war criminals policy the way was cleared for the 
realisation of the political visions of the Western Allies and, in 1955, West 
Germany actually became sovereign and joined the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) with its own national army.
852
 
Yet, the Western Allies had to pay a high price for these 
achievements, which is best summarised by Frank M Buscher who stated: 
“The decision to promote German participation in the defense of Western 
Europe led to the dismantling of the war crimes program.”853 
 
2 The resistance of Germany’s post-war judiciary 
 
When the US authorities designed their war crimes trial programme, 
they had in mind that the subsequent Nuremberg Trials shall also serve as 
examples for further trials conducted by German post-war courts under 
Control Council Law No. 10.
854
 Yet, they underestimated that Germany‟s 
post-war judiciary “was embedded within a society whose members had, by 
and large, consented to the Nazi dictatorship.”855 
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Nevertheless, in the beginning, the US war crimes trial programme 
seemed promising as many Germans showed interest and had a generally 
positive opinion about the conduct of trials against Nazi perpetrators.
856
 This 
basic attitude changed in 1947, when the denazification programme of the 
Allies reached its peak and millions of Germans suddenly imagined 
themselves in the dock.
857
 
Guided by the popular motto of Schlussstrich ziehen (drawing the 
final line under the Nazi past) in the 1950s in post-war Germany, the war 
crimes trials became opposed by many leading institutions of the West 
German society, including the first government, almost all political parties, 
the Catholic and Protestant churches, many legal experts and veterans and 
refugee organisations.
858
 
Their arguments were based on different reasons and varied from 
legal ones, such as that the Nuremberg sentences “had relied on ex post 
facto law”859, to political ones, such as the claim that “a German 
contribution to Western defence would be impossible if the Americans 
insisted on executing the remaining Landsberg[
860
] death row inmates”861, to 
moral ones, such as that the war crimes trials were “a direct attack on the 
honour of the German soldier … whose only crime was that they had 
fulfilled their orders.”862 
In this atmosphere, the German post-war judiciary was no exception 
and opposed the war crimes trial programme in its own way. Although 
German post-war judges had managed to sentence around 4.500 Nazi 
criminals under Control Council Law No. 10 until the end of 1952,
863
 
members of their own profession were not among them.
864
 This situation 
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changed for the better when a new generation of German jurists entered 
offices in the 1960s and 1970s, but even then, the amount of indictments 
against Nazi judges and prosecutors was all too small compared to the 
amount of crimes committed in the name of law during the Nazi era.
865
 
Additionally, Germany‟s post-war judiciary tended to accept court 
rulings issued during the Nazi period as valid.
866
 Although a total of 
approximately 90,000 investigations were carried out against Nazi criminals 
in the area of Western Germany, only 6,500 persons were finally 
convicted.
867
 Also, it is a devastating fact that – apart from two exceptions 
regarding judges of courts martial in the closing phase of the war – no 
German judge, prosecutor, or legal official was finally convicted by a 
German post-war court for his actions during the Nazi era.
868
 
Furthermore, in the small number of trials against former Nazi 
jurists, the reasons for the acquittals given by the German courts were most 
of the time outrageous. For example, the Kassel County Court decided in a 
case against a Nazi Special Court judge that “because of the judges‟ 
fanaticism, „the possibility of blindness to injustice, based on political 
delusions … cannot be excluded.‟ The verdict was therefore „not guilty.‟”869 
The Federal Supreme Court of West Germany adopted the 
permanent view of legal scholars and officials that “a judge could be found 
guilty of murder, manslaughter, or false imprisonment only if it could be 
proved that he had knowingly broken the law.”870 In most of the cases, this 
was exactly what could not be proved and, therefore, led to the acquittal of 
the defendants.
871
 
The most prominent example of these embarrassing verdicts is the 
case of Hans-Joachim Rehse, who was the most culpable judge of the Nazi 
                                                          
865
 See generally Ibid, 274-283. 
866
 Stoltzfus and Friedlander, above n 119, 7-8. 
867
 Karstedt, above n 825, 32. 
868
 Baestlein, above n 12, 33; See also Ostendorf, above n 835, 7; Mueller, above n 120, 
274. 
869
 Mueller, above n 120, 277. 
870
 Ibid, 276; See also Ostendorf, above n 835, 8. 
871
 Ostendorf, above n 835, 8. 
 189 
People‟s Court besides Roland Freisler.872 After the Berlin County Court 
had found Rehse guilty of aiding and abetting murder and had sentenced 
him to five years imprisonment in 1967, refusing the defendants‟ argument 
of blindness to injustice as a valid defence, the case was appealed and 
brought to the Federal Supreme Court.
873
 
Its judges claimed to see “obscurities and contradictions”874, quashed 
the verdict and handed down the case to the County Court with the 
undisguised recommendation to find for acquittal.
875
 In the end, a new jury 
at the Berlin County Court acquitted not only Rehse but, according to Ingo 
Mueller, “in effect the entire Nazi People‟s Court and the entire Nazi 
judicial system.”876 
When looking at the numbers of jurists who served under the Nazi 
Government and maintained or regained their jobs in the West German 
judicial system, these judgments are not surprising. True to the motto 
Schlussstrich ziehen, the new German Parliament and Government did 
everything they could to rehabilitate not only former Nazi jurists but almost 
all members of the elites of German society who had been involved in Nazi 
crimes.
877
 
Based on Article 131 of the new German Basic Law of 1949, which 
provided that federal laws shall regulate the rights of persons “who on 8 
May 1945 were employed in the public service … and have not yet been 
reinstated or are employed in positions that do not correspond to those they 
previously held”878, the German Parliament enacted several laws which 
                                                          
872
 Mueller, above n 120, 280; See also generally Robert M W Kempner Anklaeger einer 
Epoche: Lebenserinnerungen (Ullstein Verlag, Frankfurt/Main, 1986) 423-425. 
873
 Mueller, above n 120, 280-281. 
874
 Ibid, 281. 
875
 Ibid; See also generally Urteil des Bundesgerichtshofs vom 30. April 1968 (Judgment of 
the German Federal Supreme Court (BGH) from 30 April 1968) 21 NJW 1339 (BGH -5 
StR 670/67-). 
876
 Mueller, above n 120, 281. 
877
 Christian Staas “Was damals Recht war …” (25 February 2009) Die Zeit Hamburg 
(Germany) www.zeit.de (last accessed 19 March 2010). 
878
 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany 1949 (as amended up to June 2008), art 
131. 
 190 
finally led to the reemployment of almost all judges and prosecutors of the 
Nazi judiciary in the new West German judicial system by the mid 1950s.
879
 
As a result, the West German judiciary became dominated by jurists 
who had been part of the Nazi judicial system and were, at least to a certain 
degree, jointly responsible for the terrors of the Nazis.
880
 Some authors went 
as far as saying that the West German judiciary became re-nazificated.
881
 
However, according to many legal experts and historians, the 
obvious resistance of Germany‟s post-war judiciary to deal with its own past 
can be explained not only by self-justification of potential perpetrators.
882
 
Also, the traditionally conservative world view of members of the legal 
profession, which implies that judges in any time have to act neutrally and 
have to apply the given laws to protect law and order within a state, is seen 
as an important factor.
883
 
Consequently, there was a true belief – even by many judges who 
had not been part of the Nazi legal system or were born afterwards – that 
most of the judges of the Nazi era were innocent, and only the political 
leaders and legislators of Nazi Germany could be held responsible for the 
committed cruelties.
884
 
As late as 1995, the Federal Supreme Court of Germany corrected its 
previous jurisdiction concerning Nazi perpetrators, admitted the failure of 
the West German judiciary in coming to terms with its own past and 
particularly expressed its regret over its past decisions in regard to the Nazi 
jurisdiction.
885
 Additionally, the German Parliament, in 1999, officially 
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declared the unjust judgments of the Nazi era illegal.
886
 This was an 
important symbolic sign, but too late for consequences as the vast majority 
of Nazi jurists was not alive anymore. 
In the end, it remains that the US authorities had the good idea of 
help for self-help but underestimated the unwillingness of Germany‟s post-
war society, and especially its judiciary, to face up to the past. 
 
3 The amnesties of the 1950s 
 
The convicted defendants in the Justice Trial were sentenced by a 
purely US tribunal. Therefore, they took their chances to file writs of habeas 
corpus to the US Supreme Court, who denied them in all cases by order of 2 
May 1949.
887
 However, this was not the end of the story as the convicts 
were able to benefit from US parole and clemency programmes in the 
1950s.
888
 
When the Office of the US High Commissioner for Germany 
(HICOG) was established on 6 June 1949, the Military Government of the 
US zone of occupation in Germany officially ended.
889
 Military Governor 
General Lucius Clay was succeeded by the first High Commissioner, former 
Assistant Secretary of War John J McCloy, who also took over the 
responsibility for the execution and review of sentences against the convicts 
of the 12 subsequent Nuremberg Trials.
890
 
Clay had reduced sentences in only three cases from the trials, but 
this changed dramatically under McCloy.
891
 As a response to pressure from 
German and American political leaders,
892
 McCloy established a clemency 
                                                          
886
 Staas, above n 877. 
887
 Justice Case, above n 9, 1204. 
888
 Buscher, above n 72, 31. 
889
 Friedman, above n 2, 89. 
890
 Ibid, 88-89; Buscher, above n 72, 57. 
891
 Friedman, above n 2, 89, 93. 
892
 See Part VI B 1 The upcoming Cold War and Part VI B 2 The resistance of Germany‟s 
post-war judiciary. 
 192 
review board in November 1949.
893
 After a quick review, the board 
recommended the reduction of sentences or immediate clemency in several 
cases and, on 31 January 1951, McCloy announced that “of the 101 
convicted war criminals held in Landsberg prison, 33 were to be released 
immediately, an additional 35 were to have their sentences reduced, and 16 
death sentences were to be commuted.”894 
These orders applied to all convicts of the Justice Trial, who were 
imprisoned at the US prison for war criminals in Landsberg. Due to illness, 
Schlegelberger had been released from prison in 1950 already, but all others 
– except for Rothaug, whose sentence was commuted to 20 years 
imprisonment – were at liberty again in 1951.895 Other amnesties followed 
and led also to the release of Rothaug in 1956.
896
 
During the early and mid 1950s, not only the US but the British and 
French authorities as well granted “amnesty to almost all the Nazi criminals 
they had previously sentenced.”897 One of the prosecutors at the first 
Nuremberg Trial and a leading expert within the area of Nazi crimes, Robert 
M W Kempner, described this policy of the Western Allies as a “pardoning 
fever”898. 
Indeed, from 3,643 German war criminals held in custody of the 
Western Allies and other foreign countries on 1 April 1950, only 1,033 
persons were still imprisoned on 25 August 1952.
899
 The prison population 
in Landsberg (US) became reduced from 663 to 338, in Werl (Britain) from 
379 to 132 and in Wittlich (France) from 273 to 105.
900
 By May 1955, only 
fifty prisoners remained at Landsberg,
901
 and in 1957, Britain and France 
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closed their prisons for war criminals at Werl and Wittlich, followed by the 
US prison at Landsberg in 1958.
902
 
Simultaneously, the Parliament of the new West German Federal 
Republic passed legislation, which granted amnesties to thousands of 
potential German war criminals.
903
 As one of the first laws passed by the 
new parliament, a general amnesty was granted “for all crimes committed 
during the Nazi era with a maximum penalty of one year in prison or 
less.”904. Additionally, amnesty was granted to “anyone who had „disguised 
his identity for political reasons‟ by forging documents or giving false 
information.”905 
In 1954, this legislation was even extended to cover
906
 
all crimes that had maximum sentences of up to three years and that had 
been committed „under the influence of the unusual circumstances of the 
collapse between October 1, 1944, and July 31, 1945, while carrying out 
an official or legal duty, particularly an order‟. 
Also, the law provided that “[p]enalties imposed by de-Nazification 
boards immediately after the war were erased from the criminal records”907, 
allowing Nazi criminals to rejoin the public service and enter leading 
positions in Germany again easily.
908
 
At first sight, the reasons for all these amnesties are based on the 
political situation. The upcoming Cold War and the need of a West German 
contribution to the defence of the Western world strengthened the German 
Government and weakened the Allies in regard to the war criminals issue.
909
 
Nevertheless, the political situation was not the only matter that caused the 
US amnesties. 
                                                          
902
 Ibid, 162. 
903
 See generally Mueller, above n 120, 242-243. 
904
 Ibid, 242. 
905
 Ibid. 
906
 Ibid, 243. 
907
 Ibid. 
908
 Ibid. 
909
 See Part VI B 1 The upcoming Cold War and Part VI B 2 The resistance of Germany‟s 
post-war judiciary. 
 194 
The lack of any planning for an appellate court and the fact that the 
accused could not appeal the judgments and the verdicts of the US tribunals 
made the US authorities feel uncomfortable from the beginning.
910
 
Therefore, they began to address these questions as early as 1946 with the 
result that “[e]xecutive clemency and regular administrative sentence 
reviews became substitutes for an appellate court.”911 
It allowed US officials to ensure that equal offences would be 
punished evenly, which had not always been the case, especially when one 
compares the grade of judgments in the trials at the beginning (more severe) 
and the trials at the end (more lenient).
912
 As a result, from a purely legal 
point of view, the clemency programmes truly created a good balance 
between the different decisions of the trials.
913
 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
A combination of political and legal reasons led to the dismantling of 
the US war crimes trial programme. The increasing conflict between East 
and West and the vehement resistance of leading parts of West German 
society including all the judiciary, led to a sudden stop of the prosecution of 
more German war criminals by US authorities. 
In addition with the legal problem of the absence of an appellate 
court, these factors also led to the large-scale US amnesties, from which not 
only the convicts of the Justice Trial but many other Nazi war criminals 
benefited. These facts, however, do not qualify the Justice Trial as an 
example of victor‟s justice. 
At the time of the trial, in 1947, the US authorities did not plan to 
stop their war crimes trial programme just a few years later. They also had 
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in mind that a new German post-war judiciary would continue the work of 
the US tribunals and would try war criminals under Control Council Law 
No. 10. It was not foreseeable at the time that the attitude of Germany‟s 
society towards the prosecution of war criminals would change from 
support to opposition, and that dramatic developments in international 
politics would occur in the late 1940s. 
Furthermore, nobody could expect that West Germany‟s new 
judiciary would ignore the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Trials for decades 
and would resist sentencing Nazi criminals to a large extent. One maybe 
asks then why the US authorities did not continue their war crimes trial 
programme themselves. 
After it had become clear that a German contribution to the defence 
of Western Europe was needed, West Germany‟s position in its relationship 
with the Western Allies grew strong. To continue prosecuting German war 
criminals on their own would have created the risk for the US authorities of 
losing an important ally in the new confrontation with Communism and 
was, therefore, not a realistic option. 
As a result, only a tiny minority of the tens of thousands of war 
criminals from the Nazi era was finally convicted, and the defendants in the 
Justice Trial remained – besides very few exceptions – the only members of 
the legal profession of Nazi Germany who stood trial for their actions. 
Nevertheless, the global political conditions of the late 1940s justify the 
uniqueness of the Justice Trial and exculpate the US authorities from the 
accusation that the trial was only an example of victor‟s justice. 
The early release of the convicts of the Justice Trial from prison in 
1951 and 1956, caused by generous amnesties of the US High 
Commissioner, can also not be evaluated as an example of victor‟s justice. 
Victor‟s justice, here, does not refer to any disadvantages of the German 
defendants as the amnesties were obviously only for the benefit of the 
convicts, but to the question whether the US authorities exercised their 
power as the winners of the war in an arbitrary way. 
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The necessary change of US policy towards West Germany from 
occupation and denazification to reconstruction and integration, let both 
American and German politicians put immense pressure on the US 
authorities responsible for the imprisoned war criminals to find a quick and 
practical solution. 
Additionally, the legal problem of having no appellate court made it 
necessary to run extensive clemency programmes. These were important 
reasons for the amnesties and, although the lenient results were a slap in the 
face for Nazi victims and for those who were aware of the committed 
crimes, it cannot be said that the US authorities used their power in an 
arbitrary manner. 
Obviously, the war criminals issue was heavily influenced by 
political decisions, but this should not necessarily be evaluated as negative 
because law is always strongly connected with politics. Without the Nazi 
policy, the German law system would have never been transformed into an 
instrument of terror, and without the decisions of the US Government in 
favour of trials, the German war criminals would probably have just been 
shot. 
Political decisions, therefore, need to be evaluated carefully. The 
Nazi policy for the change of the German judicial system was without doubt 
arbitrary, based on a mad ideology of racism and conquest. The US policy 
in regard to its own war crimes trials programme, in contrast, was based on 
understandable reasons. Surely, it would have been possible for the US 
authorities to maintain the programme in favour of moral and ethical values, 
but the given circumstances demanded a change. 
As a result, the US officials may be criticised for choosing the 
easiest way but, as shown above, it was definitely for a comprehensible 
reason. Hence, in my view, the United States used their power not arbitrarily 
and, therefore, the amnesties cannot be evaluated as an example of victor‟s 
justice. 
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However, the small number of convictions of Nazi perpetrators, and 
the full re-integration of most Nazi jurists in West Germany‟s society, 
caused the overall failure of the US war crimes trial programme, which casts 
a shadow over the legacy of the Justice Trial. Yet, its legacy is still 
extraordinary. 
Besides the establishment of new principles and rules in international 
criminal law, the Justice Trial, together with the other Nuremberg Trials, 
became “the world‟s first post mortem examination of a totalitarian 
regime”914, and resulted in a unique record of the Nazi judicial system and 
the involvement of its members in Nazi crimes.
915
 
It has to be asked whether Germany‟s judiciary today, known as 
independent and generally fair, would be the same without this knowledge, 
especially when considering the Schlussstrich mentality of Germany‟s 
society in the 1950s. 
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VII CONCLUSION 
 
At the end of World War II, Hans Morgenthau, known as the father 
of American realism, said:
916
 
I am doubtful of the whole setup under which these [Nuremberg] trials 
will be conducted. What, in my opinion, they should have done is to set 
up summary courts-martial. Then they should have placed these criminals 
on trial before them within 24 hours after they were caught, sentenced 
them to death, and shot them in the morning. 
To realists, “a war crimes tribunal is simply something that the 
countries that decisively win a war inflict on the helpless country that loses 
it. It is punishment, revenge, spectacle – anything but justice.”917 
Accordingly, Morgenthau‟s statement implied the concern that the 
Nuremberg Trials would be nothing else but examples of victor‟s justice 
and, therefore, would be without any value for international law and society. 
Before the trials, there was good reason for such concern, because 
the dimension of atrocities committed by Nazi Germany established a cry 
for vengeance which could not be ignored by the organisers of the trials. 
However, in the end, the trials have to be seen as generally fair, and they set 
important precedents for international criminal law. 
This work focused on the third of the subsequent Nuremberg Trials, 
the Justice Trial, which is a fascinating one not only because Hollywood 
used it as the basis for the Academy Award winning movie Judgment at 
Nuremberg, but because here, for one of the only times in history, men were 
put on trial who acted in the name of existing domestic law. 
The question whether these men were tried and – some of them – 
convicted in accordance with international law and approved rules and 
principles of due process or were just victims of victor‟s justice is the core 
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and overall question of this thesis. The term victor‟s justice describes a 
special form of vengeance, exercised behind a smokescreen of legality in a 
judicial proceeding, which in fact, is nothing else but a show trial. 
The paper has analysed and evaluated all areas of the Justice Trial in 
relation to the concept of victor‟s justice: from the creation of the legal 
basis, to the proceedings and judgments during, to the enforcement of the 
sentences after the trial. In most areas, there were no convincing examples 
of victor‟s justice. 
However, two issues have to be regarded as examples of victor‟s 
justice: firstly, the violation of the principle of separation of powers by 
establishing a court which ruled under international law but had only 
nationals of the United States as members of the Tribunal and the 
prosecution; and secondly, the refusal of the US authorities to try members 
of their own armed forces for crimes similar to some of the crimes the 
defendants were charged with and which were defined in the London 
Charter and Control Council Law No. 10 (te quoque argument). 
On the other hand, popular accusations, such as the violation of 
Germany‟s state sovereignty, the lack of impartiality of the judges, the 
violation of the ex post facto principle, the illegal introduction of individual 
responsibility and the denial of a fair trial, could not be approved as 
examples of victor‟s justice: 
The passing of legislation by the Allies for and the establishment of 
Allied tribunals on German territory immediately after World War II did not 
violate Germany‟s state sovereignty because, from a practical point of view, 
a German state did not exist anymore. The unconditional surrender of 
Germany had not only ended the war, it had ended National Socialism 
which had infiltrated all areas of life in Germany so deeply that its end 
caused the complete collapse of German society. 
Furthermore, German courts and judges were not trustworthy at the 
time, and by dropping the conspiracy charge of the indictment, the 
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appointed US judges of Military Tribunal III proved that they acted 
impartially and independently. 
Also, the introduction of new concepts such as crimes against 
humanity and individual liability did not violate international law. The ex 
post facto principle had to step back in favour of its original aim, the 
creation of justice, because the defendants were aware of the criminality of 
their actions at any time. The same reason apply to individual responsibility 
as the defendants knew that they were doing wrong, and therefore, could not 
expect to go unpunished. Additionally, the unprecedented variety and 
dimension of Nazi crimes, which injured the whole international community 
and shocked the conscience of humankind, required a change of traditional 
international criminal law away from the Acts of State doctrine towards 
individual responsibility. 
With respect to the principles of due process, the Justice Trial 
fulfilled all requirements of a fair trial and disproved the accusation of being 
a show trial, because the defendants were charged with punishable crimes, 
they had full opportunity for defence, including free access of their lawyers 
to captured documents and exhibits, and they were judged fairly on the 
evidence by a proper court. 
Additionally, victor‟s justice did also not occur from a moral point of 
view, because the amount and variety of unprecedented atrocities committed 
by Nazi Germany and the involvement of the German judiciary in it needed 
a significant response. Likewise, the selection of the defendants by the 
prosecution as well as the analysis and evaluation of the Nazi legal system 
and of the individual role of the defendants in Nazi Germany by Tribunal III 
showed no signs of victor‟s justice, as both acted with great care and in an 
unbiased manner. 
Further, this paper analysed the questions of how suitably qualified 
the judges and prosecutors were, why the final sentences were relatively 
mild and why the defendants were all released early from prison in the 
1950s. The idea here was to find out whether the Tribunal and the US 
authorities acted arbitrarily or whether these decisions were based on 
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understandable reasons. Several reasons of practical, political and moral 
nature were given and, therefore, exculpated the members of the Tribunal as 
well as the US officials from the accusation of victor‟s justice in relation to 
these issues. 
In the end, only two aspects can be seen as examples of victor‟s 
justice. The Justice Trial cannot be evaluated without considering them but, 
in the overall context, it would be wrong to draw the conclusion that the 
trial, therefore, was an occurrence of victor‟s justice. As shown in the 
respective chapter above, the achievements of the trial for international 
criminal law are of high value and, although limited by the overall failure of 
the US war crimes trial programme, the trials‟ legacy is a primarily positive 
one. 
Many legal experts were convinced before and during the 13 
Nuremberg Trials that the trials would be nothing else but show trials and 
examples of victor‟s justice. In the end, they were proved wrong and, 
although several aspects of the trials, such as the question whether the ex 
post facto principle was violated, remain controversial, the vast majority of 
legal experts today agree that Nuremberg was characterised by exemplarily 
fair proceedings and set remarkable precedents for international law.
918
 
When looking at the incredible atrocities committed by Nazi 
Germany between 1933 and 1945, it is impressive and remarkable how the 
Allied victors, excepting the show trials and the arbitrary handling of 
prisoners of war by the Soviet Union,
919
 dealt with the German perpetrators. 
The result was not only a more or less fair handling of the vanquished 
Germans, but also the creation of a unique basis for a new international 
criminal law. 
To quote the impressive words of the Chief Prosecutor for the United 
States, Robert H Jackson, which he made in his opening statement for the 
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prosecution in the trial against the major war criminals before the 
International Military Tribunal on 21 November 1945:
920
 
The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been so 
calculated, so malignant and so devastating, that civilization cannot 
tolerate their being ignored because it cannot survive their being repeated. 
That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury stay 
the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the 
judgment of the law is one of the most significant tributes that Power has 
ever paid to Reason. ... 
Unfortunately, the nature of these crimes is such that both prosecution 
and judgment must be by victor nations over vanquished foes. The 
worldwide scope of the aggressions carried out by these men has left but 
few real neutrals. Either the victors must judge the vanquished or we must 
leave the defeated to judge themselves. After the first World War, we 
learned the futility of the latter course. The former high station of these 
defendants, the notoriety of their acts, and their adaptability of their 
conduct to provoke retaliation make it hard to distinguish between the 
demand for a just and measured retribution, and the unthinking cry for 
vengeance which arises from the anguish of war. It is our task, so far as 
humanly possible, to draw the line between the two. We must never 
forget that the record on which we judge these defendants today is the 
record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants 
a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own lips as well. We must summon 
such detachment and intellectual integrity to our task that this Trial will 
commend itself to posterity as fulfilling humanity‟s aspirations to do 
justice. ... 
These defendants may be hard pressed but they are not ill used. ... If these 
men are the first war leaders of a defeated nation to be prosecuted in the 
name of the law, they are also the first to be given a chance to plead for 
their lives in the name of the law. Realistically, the Charter of this 
Tribunal, which gives them a hearing, is also the source of their only 
hope. It may be that these men of troubled conscience, whose only wish is 
that the world forget them, do not regard a trial as a favour. But they do 
have a fair opportunity to defend themselves - a favour which these men, 
when in power, rarely extended to their fellow countrymen. Despite the 
fact that public opinion already condemns their acts, we agree that here 
they must be given a presumption of innocence, and we accept the burden 
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of proving criminal acts and the responsibility of these defendants for 
their commission. 
The defendants in the Justice Trial received all benefits of a real 
trial, including an independent judiciary, the possibility of acquittal, fair 
proceedings and some kind of proportionality in sentencing.
921
 Thus, there 
can be no doubt that those defendants, who were found guilty, deserved 
their sentences, because they committed crimes which could not and should 
never go unpunished under international law. 
According to Professor Harry Reicher,
922
 
Law is inherently neutral. If it is used with wisdom and compassion, it 
can accomplish the greatest good. But if a legal system falls into the 
wrong hands, it can become the instrument of the greatest barbarities. 
These wrong hands were not only Hitler‟s. Besides some leading 
Nazi jurists, they also belonged to many thousands of judges, prosecutors 
and other members of the German judicial system, who stayed in office after 
the Nazis took over power and who applied the new Nazi laws without any 
sense of shame. The defendants in the dock sat as representatives for all 
these German jurists. Although the defendants could and were made 
responsible for their individual guilt only, morally, the whole German 
judiciary was also indicted at the Justice Trial. 
As correctly analysed by US Military Tribunal III, the German 
judicial system was transformed into an instrument of the Nazi Party soon 
after 1933 with the willing help and support of the vast majority of German 
jurists.
923
 Telford Taylor stated in 1949:
924
 
The very nature of the Third Reich was totally incompatible with any 
„law‟ worthy of the name, and German jurists bore a heavy share of the 
blame, both for what they did and what they failed to oppose, for the 
excesses of the dictatorship. 
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As a German citizen and lawyer, I am ashamed of the cowardice of 
my colleagues during the Third Reich. Few expected them to resist actively 
or refuse any orders but, at least, they should have followed the lowest 
moral and ethical standards of humankind and resign from office. 
Many of the jurists, who had collaborated with the Nazis, later 
criticised the Nuremberg Trials as an occurrence of victor‟s justice. Some of 
them also became leading members of West Germany‟s new judiciary in the 
1950s, which denied trying Nazi jurists to a large extent. I do not blame 
their criticism of Nuremberg as this paper shows that many aspects were 
controversial, but I do condemn their refusal to deal with their own past. 
However, it enhances the legacy of the Justice Trial because, without 
the trial, the dimension of involvement of Germany‟s judiciary in Nazi 
crimes would probably be unknown today. The trial record, therefore, stands 
not only for the individual guilt of certain members of Nazi Germany‟s 
judicial system, but also as a memorial for future generations of jurists. 
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APPENDIX: PICTURES FROM THE TRIAL 
 
 
The Nuremberg Palace of Justice in 1947
925
 
 
 
The judges of US Military Tribunal III after the previous presiding Judge Carrington T 
Marshall had resigned for reasons of illness (from left to right: Judge Mallory B Blair, 
Presiding Judge James T Brand and Judge Justin W Harding)
926
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 Picture from www.holocaustresearchproject.org (last accessed 25 March 2010). 
926
 Picture from Charles M LaFollette “Justice Case at Nuremberg Part II” (1948) 139 
Information Bulletin, Magazine for US Military Government in Germany 11, 11. 
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The Prosecution Counsel (Deputy Chief Charles M LaFollette and Chief Prosecutor Telford 
Taylor are sitting on the left table in front)
927
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Prosecutor, Brigadier General Telford Taylor
928
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Deputy Chief for the Prosecution, Charles M LaFollette
929
 
 
 
 
The defendants‟ dock930 
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 Picture from LaFollette, above n 280, 9. 
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 Picture from Charles M LaFollette “Justice Case at Nuremberg Part V” (1948) 142 
Information Bulletin, Magazine of US Military Government in Germany 9, 9. 
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Franz Schlegelberger 
State Secretary and Acting 
Minister of Justice. Guilty 
of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. Sen-
tenced to imprisonment for 
life.
931
 
 Rudolf Oeschey 
Chief Justice of the 
Special Court Nurem-
berg. Guilty of crimes 
against humanity and 
membership in the SS. 
Sentenced to imprison-
ment for life.
932
 
 Oswald Rothaug 
Senior Public Prosecutor 
of the People‟s Court 
and Chief Justice of the 
Special Court Nurem-
berg. Guilty of crimes 
against humanity. 
Sentenced to imprison-
ment for life.
933
 
 
 
 
Ernst Lautz 
Chief Public Prosecutor of 
the People‟s Court. Guilty 
of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. Sen-
tenced to ten years‟ 
imprisonment.
934
 
 Curt Rothenberger 
State Secretary of the 
Ministry of Justice. Guilty 
of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. Sen-
tenced to seven years‟ 
imprisonment.
935
 
 Herbert Klemm 
State Secretary of the 
Ministry of Justice. 
Guilty of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. 
Sentenced to imprison-
ment for life.
936
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Wolfgang Mettgenberg 
Representative of the Chief 
of the Criminal Legislation 
and Administration Divi-
sion of the Ministry of 
Justice. Guilty of war 
crimes and crimes against 
humanity. Sentenced to ten 
years‟ imprisonment.937 
 Guenther Joel 
Legal advisor to the 
Minister of Justice 
concerning criminal 
prosecution. Guilty of 
war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and 
membership in the SS. 
Sentenced to ten years‟ 
imprisonment.
938
 
 Wilhelm von Ammon 
Ministerial Counsellor of 
the Criminal Legislation 
and Administration 
Division of the Ministry 
of Justice. Guilty of war 
crimes and crimes against 
humanity. Sentenced to 
ten years‟ imprison-
ment.
939
 
 
 
 
Guenther Nebelung 
Chief Justice of the 
Fourth Senate of the 
People‟s Court. Acquit-
ted.
940
 
 Paul Barnickel 
Senior Public Prosecutor 
of the People‟s Court. 
Acquitted.
941
 
 Josef Altstoetter 
Chief of Civil Law and 
Procedure Division of the 
Ministry of Justice. Guilty 
of membership in the SS. 
Sentenced to five years‟ 
imprisonment.
942
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Karl Engert 
Chief of the Penal 
Administration Division 
and Secret Prison Inmate 
Transfer Division of the 
Ministry of Justice. Not 
tried because of illness.
943
 
 Hans Petersen 
Lay Judge of the First 
Senate of the People‟s 
Court and Lay Judge of 
the Special Senate of the 
People‟s Court. Acquit-
ted.
944
 
 Hermann Cuhorst 
Chief Justice of the 
Special Court in Stuttgart 
and Chief Justice of the 
First Criminal Senate of 
District Court in Stuttgart. 
Acquitted.
945
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